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ABSTRACT 
Dust explosion is a continuous threat to equipment safety and human health in process 
industries. Although many works have been performed in the context of dust explosion 
mechanism and its prevention measures, a comprehensive risk analysis model which can 
be applied in various industries is absent. One of the barriers to such a risk model has 
been the wide variety of industries threatened by dust explosions, as well as complex and 
interlinked contributors to dust explosions. Selecting safety measures satisfying the 
requirements of safety regulations and the limitation of budget at the same time has been 
another barrier. Moreover, there has not been any work devoted to the propagation of 
dust-domino-effects, although it has frequently been reported in process industries. 
In this research, dust explosion root causes as well as other features such as ignition 
sources have been collected and listed in a comprehensive database. Applying Bow-tie 
(BT) diagram, a conventional quantitative risk analysis (QRA) method, a generic model 
of risk assessment for dust explosions has been established using the developed database. 
In this model, the basic causes contributing to dust explosions are organized according to 
their cause-effect relationships. Furthermore, potential consequences of dust explosions 
have been analyzed depending on the function/malfunction of relevant safety barriers. 
The applicability and efficacy of proposed safety measures to reduce the risk of dust 
explosions have also been discussed. 
To overcome the limitations of BT such as its inability to model conditional dependencies 
and common-cause failures, Bayesian network (BN) has been used in this research to 
capture dependencies and to perform diagnostic analysis and sequential learning. 
ii 
 
According to the results, dust particle properties, oxygen concentration and lack of safety 
training are identified as the most critical root causes leading to dust explosions. 
Further, a risk-based methodology has been proposed for cost-effective allocation of 
safety measures. Moreover, in this research, the occurrence probabilities of dust 
explosions in dust-domino-effects have been estimated based on BN. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
Significant losses and damage to humans, assets, and the environment caused by dust 
explosions are reported worldwide. The earliest record of dust explosions dates back to 
the late 1800s (Eckhoff, 2003) and the most serious reported dust explosion in history 
might be the one that occurred in a coal mine in Liaoning province, China, in 1942, 
causing 1594 deaths and 246 injuries (Mining-technology, 2014). Accident statistics from 
various countries illustrate the worldwide threat of dust explosions in process industries. 
According to Yan and Yu (2012), dust explosions in China from 1980 to 2011 caused 518 
injuries and 116 deaths. Zheng et al. (2009) collected 106 dust explosions that occurred in 
Chinese coal mines from 1949 to 2007. This terrible safety situation due to dust 
explosions can also be observed in the U.S. The U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB) 
collected 197 dust explosions that took place in the U.S. from 1980 to 2005, which were 
responsible for 109 fatalities and 592 injuries (CSB, 2006). Among the cases, an 
aluminum dust explosion occurred in the Hayes Lemmerz plant, Huntington, Indiana, in 
2003, causing 1 death, 6 injuries, and severe damage to equipment (CSB, 2005). The fuel 
of this explosion was identified as aluminum dust in a dust collector, where the 
combustible dust was probably ignited by heat, impact sparks or burning embers. In the 
same year, another dust explosion in West Pharmaceutical Services, Kinston, North 
Carolina, claimed 6 lives and caused 38 injuries (CSB, 2004). The CSB believed the 
accumulation of combustible dust above a suspended ceiling was the main combustible 
source. Also, the ignition of rubber vapor, overheated electrical ballast, an electrical 
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spark, or an electric motor have been the ignition source for the explosion. Reports about 
dust explosions can also be seen in other literature (Blair, 2007; Giby and Luca, 2010; 
Marmo, et al., 2004; Piccinini, 2008; John and Vorderbrueggen, 2011). Emerging accident 
reports worldwide reveal the urgent problem in prevention and mitigation of dust 
explosions as well as the imminence requirement for a comprehensive understanding of 
dust explosions’ mechanism. 
1.2 Dust explosion 
The essential factors for a dust explosion can be attributed to combustible dust, oxidants, 
ignition sources, mixing and confinement, according to research on the mechanism of 
dust explosions. This implies a dust explosion will occur when a suspended combustible 
dust cloud in a confined space is ignited (Ebadat, 2007). Among the factors, combustible 
dust can be observed in a wide range of process industries (e.g. pharmaceutical 
manufacturers). According to the U.S. NFPA (National Fire Protection Association), dust 
can be defined as solids 420 μm or less in diameter. For individual material, the diameter 
of particle size should be located in its explosible particle size range (Eckhoff, 2003). 
Otherwise, dust is considered to be without explosibility. Mixing means the combustible 
dust is suspended to form a combustible dust cloud which could be ignited by ignition 
sources with enough temperature or energy. Oxidant mainly refers to the oxygen in the 
air, and confinement means the spaces where dust explosions occur are confined or 
partially confined to enable heat accumulation. To estimate the explosibility of 
combustible dust, various factors are applied. The minimum ignition temperature 
(MIT, °C) is defined as the temperature above which the combustible dust cloud will be 
ignited. A higher MIT indicates the mixture of combustible dust and oxygen is more 
 3 
 
difficult to ignite. Otherwise, the combustible dust cloud is ignited more easily. Similar to 
MIT, the minimum ignition energy (MIE) expresses the energy required to ignite a 
combustible dust cloud. Minimum explosible concentration (MEC, g/m3) means a 
combustible dust cloud cannot be ignited when its concentration is lower than MEC. 
Further, limiting oxygen concentration (LOC) is the amount of the oxidant, above which a 
deflagration can occur. Further, the severity of a dust explosion can be represented by 
other indicators, such as the maximum explosion pressure (Pmax), with the unit of bar(g), 
and the maximum rate of pressure rise, usually represented as KSt  (Hassan, 2014). 
Moreover, the influence of certain factors on the severity of a dust explosion could also 
be observed. For example, Pmax could increase with decreasing particle size and decrease 
with increasing moisture content (Lees, 1996).  
Compared to other types of explosion, dust explosions can lead to more severe damage. 
This results from more combustible dust being involved in a series of dust explosions 
triggered by a primary one, which gives rise to higher overpressures and temperatures. It 
should also be noted that toxic gases, such as carbon monoxide, as likely byproducts of 
dust explosions can noticeably increase the extent and intensity of damage.  
1.3 Risk assessment methods 
Risk analysis methods can be applied to qualitatively and quantitatively estimate risks of 
accidents. The traditional qualitative risk assessment methods, i.e. HAZOP, are mainly 
used to screen the possible hazard scenarios in a system. The quantitative risk analysis 
(QRA) methods, e.g. Event Tree Analysis (ET), focuses on occurrence probability of 
various accident scenarios with different losses. The widely applied QRA methods 
include Fault Tree Analysis (FT), Bow-tie Analysis (BT) and Bayesian Network (BN).  
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Although conventional QRA methods are most commonly seen in risk analysis, the 
limitations of these methods are in considering common unwanted factors resulting from 
the independent assumption among these factors and the dynamic update of risk with the 
latest available information from the system (Khakzad et al., 2011). To overcome these 
limitations, BN, based on the Bayesian theorem, is introduced and has become a robust 
method in risk assessment (Cai et al., 2012; Khakzad et al., 2013a; Khakzad et al., 2013b; 
Khakzad et al., 2013c; Hanea and Ale, 2009; Langseth, 2007.). 
1.4 Safety strategy determination 
Many safety measures have been recommended to prevent dust explosions or mitigate the 
damage caused by the explosions. One of the most applied methods to protect units from 
dust explosions is venting, which will function when the pressure produced from a dust 
explosion is beyond a designed value (Abbasi and Abbasi, 2007; Ferrara et al., 2014.). 
Other efficient safety measures include housekeeping (Frank, 2004), containment and 
installation of a fire suppression system (Going and Snoeys, 2002), et al. Further, inherent 
principles, relying on the properties of materials or design of a process, are also 
recommended for dust explosion prevention (Amyotte et al., 2009). For example, solid 
inertants are usually mixed with coal dust to reduce its explosibility in coal mines. 
Although various safety measures, categorized into different types, are alternatives, the 
difficulty is how to select suitable safety measures to efficiently reduce the risks of dust 
explosions in a system under the limitations, e.g. the budget.  
1.5 Domino effects of dust explosions 
Secondary/tertiary dust explosions triggered by the initial ones are usually the main 
contributors to the severe losses in an accident due to more combustible dust being 
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involved. The chain of dust explosions is also called the domino effect of dust explosions 
which originates from the primary dust explosion. The process of a secondary dust 
explosion can be simply illustrated as: When the overpressure produced from an initial 
one reaches a dust layer, it could be dispersed to form a combustible dust cloud which 
could be ignited by the flames accompanying the overpressure (Abbasi and Abbasi, 
2007). Moreover, secondary/tertiary dust explosions are often observed far from the 
location where the primary one occurs, which induces difficulties in safety measures’ 
application. The other concern comes from various accidents potentially triggered by dust 
explosions, e.g. toxic gas leakage, which can lead to more serious damage. Depending on 
the layouts of equipment in workshops and the working conditions of safety barriers on 
the propagation routes, physical effects from dust explosions on various target units might 
be different, which further leads to different occurrence probabilities of dust explosions.  
1.6 Problem statement 
As mentioned, in the academic area of dust explosions, the focus has been mainly on dust 
explosion mechanisms (Eckhoff, 2003, 2009; Callé et al., 2005; Amyotte et al., 2005; 
Cashdollar and Zlochower, 2007; Pilão et al., 2006; Benedetto et al., 2010) or preventive 
and mitigative safety measures (Eckhoff, 2003, 2009; Li et al., 2009; Myers, 2008; Marian 
and Rudolf, 2012; Amyotte et al., 2007, 2009). Only a few publications have mentioned 
risk analysis of dust explosions (van dert Voort et al., 2007; Abuswer et al., 2013). The 
challenges in risk estimation of dust explosions are to include the wide variety of industries 
related to dust explosions as well as the complex interlinked contributors. QRA methods, 
e.g. fault tree (FT), are widely applied in estimation of occurrence probabilities of accident 
scenarios, but in the area related to dust explosions they are seldom seen. To conveniently 
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evaluate the risk of dust explosions in various industries, it is necessary to establish a 
generic risk analysis model for dust explosions, which can be tailored to different cases 
with or without slight modifications. 
Secondly, being static and taking advantage of generic failure data are the main limitations 
of conventional risk assessment methods (Meel and Sieder, 2006; Rathnayaka et al., 2010; 
Ferdous et al., 2007; Khakzad et al., 2011). Because variations almost always occur during 
operational time, the conventional methods with the static structure, such as BT, cannot 
easily reflect these changes. This raises the need for a dynamic risk analysis model that can 
take varying operational and environmental parameters into consideration and adapt itself 
as new observations become available.  
Thirdly, a primary dust explosion is usually followed by a secondary or more dust 
explosions, which are able to more seriously damage nearby units. In triggering a secondary 
dust explosion, both the overpressure and flames from the primary dust explosion play an 
important role. A magnitude of overpressure is required with enough strength to disperse 
dust layers to form a combustible dust cloud, and the flames should have with enough 
energy or a high enough temperature. However, due to the limited knowledge about chain 
dust explosions, more research is needed. 
Fourthly, though various safety measures have been recommended to prevent or mitigate 
dust explosions, the method of estimating their effects is still absent. Further, in 
determining safety measures strategies, engineers usually have to choose among various 
available safety measures, even for one critical factor, which leads to the discussion about 
a preference of safety measures selection. Another dilemma is to balance risk level of dust 
explosions in a system and the available resources, e.g. budget. Thus, a reliable 
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methodology considering risk control as well as limited resources is required.  
1.7 Motivation 
Firstly, in this research, the characteristics of dust explosions in various industries are 
investigated and discussed based on a statistical result for dust explosions worldwide. 
Another aim in current research is to develop a generic risk analysis model of dust 
explosions. To deal with the variety of contributors to dust explosions in systems, a 
dynamic risk analysis method, i.e. BN, is also introduced in risk analysis of dust explosions. 
Further, optimal methodology of safety strategy determination satisfying the requirements 
of risk reductions and the limitation of budgets should be developed to reasonably allocate 
resources for safety improvement. Finally, attention should also be paid to analyze the 
domino effects of dust explosions. Brief introductions are presented in the following 
section. 
1.7.1 Accident statistics of dust explosions 
Dust explosions in different industries exhibit individual characteristics. The accidents in 
some countries during different periods will be gathered first. Based on the statistical 
results, the features of dust explosions, i.e. the spatial and temporal distribution, will be 
further discussed. To represent individual characteristics in the different economic 
structures and safety management levels in developed and developing countries, the U.S. 
will be compared with China, the largest developing country in the world. 
1.7.2 Development of a generic risk analysis model for dust explosions 
BT has already proved to be a reliable and efficient method in risk assessment due to its 
ability to combine basic events, critic events, and safety barriers with consequence 
categories regardless of its static characteristic. One of the motivations in this research is 
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to introduce the QRA method of BT into the area of risk analysis for dust explosions:  
 A generic risk assessment model for dust explosions is absent. Although the 
essential factors for dust explosions and their sub-level factors (Eckhoff, 2003) are 
widely discussed in the literature, interlinks among the factors are needed to be 
further teased apart, which will be the basis of the generic risk model of dust 
explosions.  
 BT is composed of an FT on the left and an ET on the right. Taking advantage of 
the FT, various factors of dust explosions can be organized according to the cause-
effect relationships. In the ET, safety barriers and their relevant reliabilities are 
taken into account to estimate the consequence scenarios resulting from accidents 
and relevant occurrence probabilities.      
 The generic risk analysis model for dust explosions based on conventional BT lacks 
the capacity for dynamic analysis. Due to the static characteristic of FTs and ETs, 
conventional BTs are difficult to use in dynamic risk analysis using real-time data 
obtained from operations.  
1.7.3 Dynamic risk analysis of dust explosions 
BN has been applied to perform dynamic risk analysis in many areas. Similar to 
conventional QRA methods, such as BT, BN can be used in forward probability prediction. 
Moreover, other advantages of BN make it a robust method in risk analysis.  
 By using BN, the vulnerable factors in a system for dust explosion can be 
determined by backward analysis. In this step, the latest observed accidents are set 
as evidence to renew  the probability of each node, called posterior probability, in 
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BN. Based on the posterior probabilities of basic events, the vulnerable parts 
needing to be improved can be determined.  
 The latest information from a system can be introduced into risk estimation using 
BN. Taking advantage of probability adapting, the field records describing 
abnormal events, such as misoperation, can be applied in the risk analysis model to 
increase the accuracy of the results.  
1.7.4 Optimal safety strategy methodology for dust explosions  
Certainly, the efficiencies of safety measures should be considered first in safety strategy 
determination for a system. However, it is not the only factor that needs to be taken into 
account. In real cases, the available resources, such as the budget, are other factors which 
cannot be ignored. For example, the available budgets for potential safety strategies should 
also be satisfied, which means the cost of the safety strategies should be kept within the 
budget.  
This research also focuses on developing an optimal safety strategy method to reduce the 
risk of dust explosions satisfying the limitations of budgets. 
 The number of available factors is usually huge. The numerous contributors to a 
dust explosion increase the difficulty of determining safety strategy. However, 
taking advantage of the developed risk analysis model of dust explosions, the 
objectives of decision makers can be limited to the most vulnerable parts in a 
system.     
 Efficiencies of safety measures can be estimated by the QRA model of dust 
explosions. Based on the developed risk analysis model for dust explosions, the 
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efficacies of individual safety measures or potential safety strategies on risk 
reduction can be calculated and compared. 
 Optimal safety strategy for dust explosion prevention and mitigation needs to be 
discussed. The potential safety strategy should satisfy the requirements of both 
system risk control and limited budgets. More safety measures’ application can 
certainly benefit risk control for dust explosions in a system. However, the total cost 
will no doubt increase. 
1.7.5 Domino effects of dust explosions 
The domino effects of accidents have been widely reported and relevant research has been 
published. As five essential factors should be present for a dust explosion to occur, it is 
difficult to estimate the physical effects of a dust explosion on nearby units where a 
secondary dust explosion might be triggered. In this research, the escalation probability of 
a dust explosion will be quantified to benefit domino effect analysis of dust explosions. 
 The escalation probability of a dust explosion is still absent. The essential factors 
of dust explosions could influence the occurrence probability of a secondary dust 
explosion. For example, the overpressure received by a dust layer should be strong 
enough to arouse the dust layer to form a combustible dust cloud. In this research, 
this problem could be addressed with ET, which can represent the dependency of 
potential consequences on initial explosions.   
 Discussion about domino effects of dust explosions is seldom seen. Since a dust 
explosion chain is usually observed in real cases, understanding the mechanism of 
the dust explosion chain is critical for domino effects analysis of dust explosions 
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and further mitigation of the potential damages. In this research, taking advantage 
of BN, the occurrence probability of a dust explosion chain will be analyzed.  
1.8 Organization of this thesis 
This thesis is organized based on five manuscripts in five different chapters (i.e., Chapters 
4, 5, 6, 7 and 8). The outline of each part is presented as follows. 
Chapter 1 introduces an overview about dust explosions and risk analysis methods. The 
challenges in current research and the motivation of this research are also discussed. 
Chapter 2 demonstrates the innovations and contributions of this research. Chapter 3 is 
the literature review related to this thesis, including the mechanism of dust explosions, risk 
analysis methods, i.e. BT and BN, application of risk analysis in dust explosions, etc. 
Five research papers compose Chapter 4, Chapter 5, Chapter 6, Chapter 7 and Chapter 
8 respectively, covering the research scope of dust explosion accident statistics, a generic 
risk analysis model of dust explosions development, a dynamic risk analysis model of dust 
explosions, an optimal safety strategy methodology and domino effects analysis of dust 
explosions. Among these papers, four have been published and others have been submitted 
for publication in international journals. 
Research paper 1 
Dust Explosions: a Threat to world Industries (2015). Process Safety and Environmental 
Protection, 98(11): 57-71.  
Research paper 2 
Risk-based Design of Safety Measures to Prevent and Mitigate Dust Explosion Hazards 
(2013). Industrial & Engineering Chemistry Research, 52(50):18095-18108. 
Research paper 3 
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Risk Analysis of Dust Explosion Scenarios using Bayesian Networks (2015). Risk 
Analysis: an international journal, 35(3): 278-291. 
Research paper 4 
Risk-based optimal safety measure allocation for dust explosions (2015). Safety Science. 
74(4): 79-92. 
Research paper 5 
Domino Effects Analysis of Dust Explosion by Bayesian Networks. (Submitted to 
Reliability Engineering & System Safety for publication, 2015) 
Chapter 9 reports the summary and conclusions drawn from this research. Prospective 
relevant work is also provided at the end of this thesis. 
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2 Novelty and Contribution 
2.1 Overview 
The main contribution of this research can be classified into the following categories: 
 Development of a comprehensive model for risk analysis of dust explosions  
 Development of a cost-effective safety measure allocation to reduce the risk of dust 
explosions 
A brief explanation of the novelties and contributions is given in this chapter while more 
details can be found in the next chapters. 
2.2 Development of risk analysis model for dust explosions 
2.2.1 Developing a generic risk analysis model based on BT 
In this research, a generic risk analysis model is established using BT. In the generic BT 
model, the factors potentially contributing to dust explosions as well as potential 
consequences are listed and organized according to the cause-effect relationship. The 
generic BT model can readily be tailored to analyze the risk of dust explosions in specific 
cases. More details on the generic BT model can be found in Chapter 5. 
2.2.2 Dynamic risk analysis  
To model conditional dependencies and also to perform probability updating, the generic 
BT model of dust explosions is transferred into a BN. Using BN, both probability prediction 
and probability updating can be performed. As a result, the most critical factors contributing 
to dust explosions can be identified. In addition to probability updating, the BN facilitates 
the probability adapting which can be of great importance in sequential (experience) 
learning. In Chapter 6, this issue is discussed in more detail.  
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2.2.3 Domino effects analysis 
The domino effects of dust explosions are also discussed in this research. To quantify the 
escalation probability of initial dust explosions, ET is introduced combining the essential 
factors for a dust explosion with its potential consequences. Based on an analysis of 
potential propagation routes of escalation vectors, the domino effects analysis model for 
dust explosions can be developed using BN. A more detailed description of this innovation 
can be found in Chapter 8. 
2.3 Modification of safety measures allocation in safety strategy based risk analysis 
In this research, a methodology of safety measures allocation for dust explosions, 
combining an optimal method and risk analysis model, is proposed. To overcome the 
limitation of qualitative analysis, widely used in safety strategy determination, the risk 
analysis model of dust explosions is introduced in this method to estimate the effects of 
safety measures on risk level of dust explosions in a system. The details about this 
contribution are discussed in Chapter 7. 
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3 Literature Review 
3.1 Dust explosions 
3.1.1 Mechanism of dust explosions 
Five factors, including combustible dust, oxidant, ignition source, dispersion of dust 
(mixing) and confinement have been proven to be essential for a dust explosion and form 
the pentagon of dust explosions shown in Figure 3.1. Among them, combustible dust 
widely exists in process industries, such as coal mining and plastic manufacturing and 
processing industries, and different definitions of dust can be found for different materials. 
For example, dust is defined as having a particle diameter lower than 76 μm according to 
BS2955 (CSB, 2006; BS2955, 1958). However, NFPA (National Fire Protection 
Association) holds an opinion that a powder 420 μm or less in diameter should be called 
dust (NFPA68, 2007). Oxidant usually refers to the oxygen in the air. The mixture of 
combustible dust and oxygen in the form of a combustible dust cloud is the necessary 
element for a dust explosion. Ignition sources, ranging from hot surfaces to friction sparks, 
can provide enough temperature or energy required for a dust explosion. Confinement is 
also needed for a dust explosion to accumulate enough heat.  
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Fig. 3.1 Dust explosion pentagon (Kauffman, 1982) 
Various indices are applied to measure dust explosibility and the severity of a dust 
explosion as aforementioned. And the research in relevant areas is continuously reported. 
Kuai et al. (2011) revealed magnesium dust explosion characteristics under different 
conditions, e.g. particle size, through experiments. Similarly, Mittal (2013) investigated the 
limiting oxygen concentration of Indian coals by experiments. The influence of dust 
properties on dust explosion parameters was also discussed (Lees, 1996). For example, 
MEC increases with increasing moisture content, and decreases with decreasing particle 
size. However, KSt increases with decreasing particle size. Recently, Kuai et al. (2013) 
compared explosion behaviors of light metal and carbonaceous dusts triggered by different 
ignition energies. Di Benedetto et al. (2010) developed a model to quantify the effect of 
particle size on dust reactivity. 
Besides the five essential factors listed above, there are a number of primary events, 
identified as indirect causes of dust explosions, contributing to the essential ones. Thus, in 
hazards assessment of industries prone to dust explosions, determining the primary events 
should depend on a variety of factors, involving defects in design, operation and 
management. For example, dust accumulation can result from an inefficient ventilation 
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system, which could further be the result of a series of sub-factors, e.g. equipment failure. 
Poor housekeeping can also lead to dust accumulation in a system. However, in some 
process industries (e.g. silos), dust accumulation is considered as a normal operation 
condition. Therefore, hazards should be identified according to the characteristic of 
individual processes. 
3.1.2 Safety measures for dust explosions 
Safety measures for dust explosion prevention or elimination are mainly concentrated on 
removing one or more essential factors for dust explosions in a system, and damage 
mitigation, also known as safety barriers, refers to reducing potential damage caused by 
dust explosions. For prevention safety measures, housekeeping is a typical example, due to 
the fuel elimination. Explosion suppression systems, applied to prevent further 
development of a dust explosion, are among the commonly used safety barriers. Besides 
above, venting system is also an efficient way to reduce damage caused by a dust explosion. 
Holbrow (2013) tested reduced dust explosion pressures through small vessels venting and 
flameless venting. Yan and Yu (2013) studied the influence of relief pipe diameter and pipe 
length on overpressure characteristics of aluminum dust explosions. 
Safety measures can be further classified into inherent, engineered and procedural safety 
measures according to safety management principles. Inherent safety depends on reducing 
the hazards due to the properties of a material or the design of a process. Four key principles 
for inherent safety, including minimization, substitution, moderation, and simplification, 
have been categorized (Amyotte et al., 2007, 2009; Kletz, 1978, 2003). The principles of 
inherent safety are also introduced in dust explosion prevention (Amyotte et al., 2009, 2010, 
2012). Among the three types of safety measures, inherent ones are normally considered 
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more reliable than the others which rely on the performance of additional safety devices or 
the physical or psychological condition of operators. Engineered safety measures, such as 
venting systems, are applied to reduce the frequency of accidents or to lower their severity 
via setting additional barriers which could be further divided into passive and active 
according to the type of operation (Dianous and Fievez, 2006). For passive safety measures, 
no additional activator, actuator or human intervention is required (e.g. explosion relief 
vents) whereas active safety measures depend on the function of additional control systems 
(e.g. automatic suppression systems). Procedural or administrative safety measures, on the 
other hand, rely on management methods to prevent accidents (e.g., training) or mitigate 
their damage (e.g., evacuation and emergency response). These safety measures are 
influenced by human factors such as safety training effectiveness or human response time. 
3.2 Quantitative risk analysis methods 
There are many methods for risk assessment of envisaged accident scenarios in the process 
industries, such as quantitative risk assessment (QRA), and maximum credible accident 
analysis (Khan, 2001; Khan and Abbasi, 1998c). Although these methods consist of 
different steps and follow specific procedures, e.g. identifying the accident scenario causing 
the most serious damage in maximum credible accident analysis, accident scenario 
identification in terms of both mechanism and likelihood is a common and central step for 
all of them. Among the different models available to identify and analyze accident scenarios, 
the fault tree model (FT), event tree model (ET), and bow-tie model (BT) have been well 
proven to be reliable and efficient tools. 
3.2.1 Fault tree 
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FT is a diagnostic technique applied for presenting the possible causes contributing to 
various sub-events which can result in an undesired event, also known as the top event 
(Khan and Abbasi, 2000). An FT can be constructed downwards from the top event and 
further details can be dissected according to causality until all primary factors leading to 
the top event are known. In an FT, primary events, with binary (two) states, are considered 
statistically independent. Various gates are applied to represent the relationships between 
events. AND-gates and OR-gates are the two most widely used types among them. FTs can 
be used in both qualitative analysis, based on Boolean algebra, and quantitative analysis, 
calculating probability of the top event by obtaining the occurrence probabilities of the 
primary events. 
Usually, computerized methods, i.e. Monte Carlo simulation, are required in analysis of 
complex FTs. Fuzzy set theory and evidence theory are also introduced in FT analysis to 
reduce the margin of error due to inaccuracy and incompleteness of the data of the primary 
events (Ferdous et al., 2009; Markowski et al., 2009; Yuhua and Datao, 2005). 
FT has been widely used in estimating occurrence probabilities of unwanted accidents 
(Khan et al., 2001b; Volkanovski et al., 2009; Zhang et al., 2014; Lindhe et al., 2009; Chen 
et al., 2007). However, for complex systems, especially in which the factors dependent on 
each other, the usage of FT is limited. 
3.2.2 Event tree 
ET, an inductive method, is widely used in safety analysis to assess potential consequence 
scenarios caused by accidents. It originates from an unwanted event and analyzes possible 
consequences along potential progression routes considering safety barriers in 
chronological order. Using occurrence probability of the initiating event, consequence 
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scenarios can be quantified in ET depending on the working situations of safety barriers 
(success or failure). When the safety barrier functions, the progression route will follow an 
upward branch, otherwise the lower branch when it fails (shown in the Figure 3.2, the ET 
part). 
ET has been used in the field of accident modeling (Bearfield and Marsh, 2005; Rathnayaka 
et al., 2011), dynamic failure assessment (Meel and Seider, 2006), and dynamic risk 
assessment (Kalantarnia et al., 2009, 2010). 
3.2.3 Bow-tie 
Bow-tie (BT), a graphical method, combines FT and ET to explore both the primary causes 
and consequences of a critical event. It also provides system reliability if effects of safety 
measures are considered (as Figure 3.2. shows). 
 
Fig. 3.2 Structural representation of Bow-tie (BE: Basic event; IE: Intermediate 
event; CE: Critical event; C: Consequence; SB: Safety barrier)  
A BT illustrates an accident scenario, beginning from the basic events (BE) and ending 
with the potential consequences (C). These consequences result from the CE and the failure 
of safety barriers (SB). Using the probabilities of primary causes, along with failure 
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likelihoods of safety measures, the probabilities of consequences can be estimated. As 
Figure 3.2 shows, 
P(C1) = P(CE) ∗ (1 − P(SB1)) ∗ (1 − P(SB2))                 (3.1) 
where P(CE) is calculated from the FT. 
BT has been widely used in the risk analysis area. Dianous and Fiévez (2006) established 
a risk assessment methodology based on BT to evaluate the efficacy of risk control 
measures. Shahriar et al. (2012) introduced fuzzy theory into BT to analyze the risk of oil 
and gas pipelines and provided suggestions for the risk management process. Khakzad et 
al. (2012) coupled Bayesian analysis and physical reliability models with a BT diagram for 
risk analysis of dust explosions in a sugar refinery. Bellamy et al. (2007) proposed a tool, 
called Storybuilder, to identify the dominant patterns of safety barrier failures, barrier task 
failures and underlying management flaws using BT. A systematic HAZID method based 
on BT, named DyPASI, was suggested by Paltrinieri et al. for a comprehensive hazard 
identification of industrial processes (2013). Khakzad et al. (2013a) introduced a 
methodology to map BT into a Bayesian network (BN) and applied it to risk analysis. 
Despite its wide applications in QRA, BT suffers from a static nature due to FT, and cannot 
easily be updated when new information becomes available. However, there have recently 
been efforts to overcome this limitation either by coupling BT with Bayesian updating 
(Khakzad et al., 2012) or via using more dynamic methods such as Bayesian networks 
(Khakzad et al., 2011, 2013a, 2013b). 
3.2.4 Bayesian network 
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The Bayesian network (BN) is an inference probabilistic method. It is a directed acyclic 
graph (DAG) which is composed of nodes, arcs and conditional probability tables (CPT). 
Nodes represent random variables while arcs represent dependencies among linked nodes. 
The types and strength of these dependencies are defined via CPTs (Torres-Toledano and 
Sucar, 1998).  
In BNs, if the direction of an arc is from node A to C, node A is called the parent node of 
C. Node C is called a child node of A (as shown in Figure 3.3). The nodes without parent 
nodes are called root nodes and the nodes without child nodes are named leaf nodes. The 
other nodes are called intermediate nodes, each of which is companied with a CPT. 
 
Fig. 3.3 Different definitions of nodes in BNs (A, B and D: Root nodes; C: 
Intermediate node; E: Leaf node) 
Another important definition in BN is “d-separation”, which is about the rules of 
information transmission among nodes. There are three kinds of connections among nodes: 
serial connections, diverging connections and converging connections (shown in Figure 
3.4). 
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Fig. 3.4 Probabilities relationships based on the chain rule and local dependencies 
As (a) and (b) in Figure 3.4 shows, if the state of B is known, then the chain is blocked and 
information from A cannot transmit to C. In this case, A and C are independent, which 
signifies that nodes A and C are d-separated given B. For converging connection (Fig. 3.4 
(c)), nodes A and C are d-separated when B is unknown.  
Based on the conditional independence and the chain rule, BNs represent the joint 
probability distribution P(O) of variables O = {A1, A2, A3, … … , An} in BNs as: 
P(O) = ∏ P(Ai|Pa(Ai))
n
i=1                          (3.2) 
where Pa(Ai) stands for the parents variables of Ai, P(Ai|Pa(Ai)) is the probability of Ai 
given its parent variables, and P(O) reflects the properties of the BN (Jensen and Nielsen, 
2007).  
Based on equation (3.2), the joint probability of variables in BN in Figure 3.3 can be 
presented as: 
P(E) = P(A)P(B)P(D)P(C|A, B)P(E|C, D)   (3.3) 
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BN takes advantage of new information over time (called evidence, represented as E in 
equation 3.4), which means BN can be used in risk analysis for dynamic systems, such as 
dust explosions. The risk of dust explosions and their potential consequences could be 
updated as the system runs and will help to determine the most fragile factors in the system 
and relative safety measures.  
P(O|E) =
P(E|O)
P(E)
=
P(E,O)
∑ P(E,O)O
                     (3.4) 
In risk analysis for various types of accidents/systems, BN has be proven as a robust method. 
Cai et al. (2012) proposed a Bayesian network model to estimate the reliability of a subsea 
blowout preventer control system. A new methodology based on the Bayesian network is 
proposed by Khakzad et al. (2013b, 2013c) to analyze domino effects and risk in offshore 
drilling operations. Zhang et al. (2013) developed a model based on BN to estimate the 
safety of the Yangtze River. A general framework for the risk-based reconfiguration of a 
safety monitoring system logic of a dynamical system is proposed by Kohda and Cui (2007). 
As aforementioned, the other advantage of BN is that it can be developed directly from FT, 
ET or BT based on a mapping algorithm (Bobbio et al., 2001; Bearfield and Marsh, 2005; 
Khakzad et al., 2011; Khakzad et al., 2013a). This bridges the gap between static and 
dynamic risk analysis methods as well as considering the features of BT and BN.  
3.3 Safety measure strategy determination 
In safety management, risk control for potential hazards is usually the first concern for 
decision makers. Ideally, after figuring out the defects of a system, the relevant safety 
measures should be chosen to improve the safety level in a system. However, due to the 
limited resources, i.e. budgets, not all safety measures can be allocated. Therefore, 
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maximizing the potential safety strategy’s effects on risk control with limited resources is 
a big challenge for policy makers.  
Some optimizing models have been introduced to benefit decision-making (Kim et al., 2006; 
Caputo et al., 2011, 2013; Kazantzi et al., 2013; Bernechea and Arnaldos Viger, 2013; 
Ramírez-Marengo et al., 2013), among which the knapsack problem is usually considered 
to represent the dilemma of safety strategy allocation. The description of the knapsack 
problem originates from the selection methodology of maximizing the total values of 
materials put in a bag (the objective) with limited gross weight (the constraint). Therefore, 
this kind of problem, the relationship between the objective and resource constraints, can 
be expressed as 
Maxz = ∑ Vjxj
n
j=1                                   (3.5) 
s.t.{
∑ Wjxj ≤ WR
n
j=1
xj = 0 or 1          (j = 1, … , n)
 
 where Vj and Wj stand for the objective parameter, i.e. the value of material j, and the 
resource used to obtain the objective parameter, respectively. WR means the available 
resource, i.e. the rated weight of the bag. In the knapsack case, when the material j is chosen, 
1 will be given to xj, otherwise it equals 0.  
The first function, called the objective function, means the goal of the potential strategy is 
to maximize the sum of the objective parameter, i.e. the total value of selected materials. 
The second function, named the constraint function, stands for the available resources, i.e. 
the target weight, which should be considered in decision making.    
Although optimizing models have already been applied in safety measure allocation, Cox 
(Cox, Jr., 2012) suggested more attention should be given to the optimization of safety 
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management. Caputo et al. (2013) proposed a method based on a multi-criteria knapsack 
model to help select the measures with the most efficient in safety management. 
Combining the risk matrix with the knapsack model, Reniers and Sörensen (2013) 
performed a cost-benefits analysis for determining safety strategy.   
3.4 Domino effects of dust explosions 
The domino effects of accidents have been widely reported (Gómez-Mares et al., 2008; 
Abdolhamidzadeh et al., 2011; Hemmatian et al., 2014; Darbra et al., 2010). According to 
the description of a domino event by Cozzani et al. (2006), it is “an accident in which a 
primary event propagates to nearby equipment, triggering one or more secondary events 
resulting in overall consequences more severe than those of the primary event.”  In this 
definition, the primary event means the original accident of the domino accidental sequence. 
The physical effects of accidents (i.e. pool fire), named escalation vectors and categorized 
into radiation, fire impingement, fragments, and overpressure, are responsible for the 
escalation of triggering the secondary scenarios, and the relevant thresholds of escalation 
vectors are also suggested using experimental data and regression methods for a number of 
atmospheric and pressurized units as well as auxiliary equipment (Cozzani et al., 2006). 
Generally, only when values of escalation vectors (i.e. radiation) generated from a primary 
accident is beyond the relevant thresholds, could damage to secondary units and secondary 
accidents occur. For estimating the probability of damage to a target unit, some methods 
can be found in this area. Khan and Abbasi (Khan and Abbasi, 1998a, 1998b, 2001) 
analyzed the likelihood of domino effects in a cluster of industries based on the developed 
methodology, called domino effect analysis (DEA), with DOMIFFECT software. Cozzani 
and Salzano (2004a, 2004b, 2004c) discussed the quantitative assessment of domino effects 
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caused by overpressure. Subsequently, Cozzani et al. (2005) developed a quantitative risk 
assessment procedure for a domino effect and the impact probability triggered by fragments 
was also discussed by Zhang and Chen (2009). A quantitative methodology based on 
probabilistic models and physical equations was further proposed by Kadri et al. (2013) to 
assess domino effects at industrial sites. 
However, research about domino effects of dust explosions is seldom seen, though the 
severe consequences of dust explosion chains are widely reported in accident reports (CSB, 
2005). Compared to the domino effects of other accidents (i.e. projected fragments), the 
mechanism of a secondary dust explosion is more complicated. As aforementioned, the 
overpressures from primary dust explosions should have enough strength to arouse dust 
layers providing enough dust to form a combustible dust cloud. The ignition sources (the 
flame from a primary dust explosion or other existing ignition sources) should also have 
enough energy or high enough temperature (Abbasi and Abbasi, 2007).  
Propagation probability of flames and blast waves from a dust explosion can be observed 
in limited published papers. According to the suggestion from van der Voort et al. (2007), 
the propagation probabilities of dust explosions to nearby units can be given as 0.1 and 0.01 
for a direct neighbouring module and a remote neighbouring module, respectively. Kosinski 
and Hoffmann (2006) revealed that the probability of transmission of an explosion from 
one unit to a nearby unit decreases with decreasing diameter and increasing length of the 
connecting pipeline, based on simulation results using Computational Fluid Dynamics 
(CFD). Zalosh and Greenfield (2014) proposed an empirical equation for calculation of 
propagation probability between units based on test data. Besides blast wave propagation 
among connected units, attention was also paid to dust lifting by overpressures. Kosinski 
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and Hoffmann (2005) studied the dust lifting behind blast waves using the Lagrangian 
model. An experiment for dust lifting caused by a blast wave was also performed by 
Klemens et al. (2006). Similarly, Utkilen et al. (2014) simulated dust lifting by strong 
pressure waves using the Eulerian-Eulerian method. Based on reviewing the research in 
relevant areas, the occurrence probabilities of dust explosions given an initial dust 
explosion have not been seen, which will be discussed in section 8.    
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Abstract 
This paper considers more than 2000 dust explosion accidents that occurred worldwide 
between 1785 and 2012. The statistical features of these cases are first examined spatially 
and temporally. Accident frequencies at different levels of economic development are 
further discussed. China and the United States are chosen as examples to represent the 
differences in distribution features of dust explosions in countries with different economic 
development levels. Data for combustible dusts leading to dust explosions in both China 
and the United States are also collected and categorized. The features of ignition sources 
for dust explosions, the types of enterprises with high risk, and the critical equipment in 
such enterprises are also analyzed. The results could help identify hazards of dust 
explosions in various industries, monitor the critical equipment, and further suggest safety 
improvement procedures to reduce the probability and damage of dust explosions. 
Key words: Dust explosion, Data analysis, Accidents 
 
4.1 Introduction 
A dust explosion could be triggered when flammable particulates suspended in air 
encounter ignition sources with sufficient energy (Amyotte and Eckhoff, 2010). According 
to the Occupational Safety & Health Administration of the US (OSHA), combustible dust 
can be considered as combustible materials in finely divided forms. Combustible dust can 
be found in the form of byproduct in various industries such as drilled-charcoal powder in 
coal mining and wood powder in the wood industry, or in the form of raw materials or 
intermediate products such as sugar powder in food processing plants. Aside from high 
temperatures and overpressures caused by dust explosions, toxic gases can also be produced 
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in such violent chemical reactions (Eckhoff, 2003). Thus, dust explosions present 
significant threats to people, assets, and the environment. Dust explosions have caused 
numerous losses in industry (CSB, 2006). The dust explosion that occurred in a coal mine 
in Liaoning province, China, in 1942, causing 1594 deaths and 246 injuries, might be the 
most serious case in history (Mining-technology, 2014).  
According to previous research (Eckhoff, 2003), fuel, oxidant, ignition source, confinement, 
and suspension are the essential factors for a dust explosion. For example, Callé et al. (2005) 
discussed the effects of size distribution and concentration on wood dust explosion. Various 
safety measures have also been proposed to eliminate the foregoing essential factors or 
reduce damages caused by dust explosions (Eckhoff, 2003). For instance, altering the 
composition of a dust by admixture of solid inertants, recommended by Amyotte et al. 
(2009) as an inherent safety measure, can be applied to reduce the reactivity of the dust. 
Similarly, effective housekeeping could also be considered a useful method to lower the 
probability of dust explosions and their potential damage, because of the elimination of the 
accumulated amount of combustible dust in high risk areas (Khakzad et al., 2012). 
Also, there has been some research to estimate the occurrence probability and risk of dust 
explosions. In this regard, Hassan et al. (2014) proposed a model based on characteristics 
of combustible dust (e.g., dust particle diameter). Van der Voort et al. (2007) developed a 
quantitative risk assessment tool for dust explosions consisting of a series of sub-models. 
More recently, Yuan et al. (2013, 2015) proposed a dust explosion risk analysis model based 
on the Bow-tie method and Bayesian network. In the aforementioned methodologies, the 
common step is the identification of hazards, which requires wide knowledge of both dust 
explosion mechanisms and examination of where the dust explosion takes place. However, 
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in real industrial plants, a large number of potential hazardous factors contributing to dust 
explosions cannot usually be enumerated. Learning from past accidents could help identify 
frequent hazardous factors as well as vulnerable units in various industries, and thus enforce 
monitoring of vulnerable units and prevent dust explosions. 
Relevant data for dust explosion accidents can be found in accident reports, literature, 
reports from professional agencies, and the mass media. For example, the US Chemical 
Safety Board (CSB) collected data for 197 dust explosions that happened in the US from 
1980 to 2005, and these accidents were reported to have caused 109 fatalities and 592 
injuries collectively (CSB, 2006). Similarly, data for accidental dust explosions in China 
from 1980 to 2011 have been collected by Yan and Yu (2012). Zheng, et al (2009) collected 
106 dust explosion cases in Chinese coal mines from 1949 to 2007, and analyzed 
characteristics of Chinese coal dust explosions. Abbasi et al. (2007) gathered some cases in 
2004 and made an attempt to investigate the causes, consequences, and prevention methods 
of dust explosions. Also, according to a report from the National Fire Prevention 
Association (NFPA) (1957), 1123 dust explosions occurred in the US from 1900 to 1956, 
while 426 dust explosions happened in Germany from 1965 to 1985 (Eckhoff, 2003).  
This chapter is organized as follows: resources for data collection are introduced in section 
4.2. Spatial and temporal features of accidents and casualties, types of combustible dust, 
the type of industries involved in dust explosions, ignition sources, and critical equipment 
are discussed in section 4.3. In section 4.4, the contributors to the distributions of accidents, 
combustible dusts and industries are discussed, while the main conclusions are summarized 
in section 4.5. 
4.2 Information of dust explosions collection 
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During information collection for the present research, some difficulties were met. First, 
the number of reported dust explosions is far below their actual occurrence. According to 
Mannan (2004), the gap between the reported and actual numbers decreases as damages 
increase, implying that accidents with less damage tend to be more easily neglected by 
related agencies, as opposed to those with severe damages. Second, different information 
sources may include inconsistent data in terms of casualty and damage even for a similar 
accident. Further, reporting time could affect the accuracy of the information. For example, 
in many cases, fatalities and injuries may increase with time after an accident happens. 
Therefore, seven days following an accident is considered as a term to record losses 
resulting from the traffic accidents or fire accidents in China (Government of the People’s 
Republic of China, 2007). Also, sometimes factories or governments are suspected to 
intentionally under-report consequences of accidents to reduce or escape punishment, 
which also leads to inaccurate information (a very serious problem in China). Related 
punishment notices for hiding accidents can be found on the website of the China State 
Administration of Work Safety (CSAWS). Aside from the above-mentioned problems, 
uncertainty also exists throughout the dust explosion investigation process. For example, 
assessments of dust explosion origins largely rely on experts’ opinions and experience as 
the accident scenes are usually severely damaged. Moreover, it can be observed that some 
information (e.g. ignition sources) is absent in accident reports as a result of limited budgets 
and human resources, or seriously damaged scenes.  
The collected dust explosion accident data in this work are mainly from the following 
sources: 
 Reports and accident statistics from professional organizations and national 
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agencies such as NFPA, CSB, CSAWS and OSHA 
 Process safety text books presenting dust explosion cases  
 Academic papers 
 Local newspapers 
Thirteen percent of the collected cases is shown in Appendix A and categorized according 
to the following factors: 
 Date of accident 
 Country 
 Type of combustible dust 
 Equipment involved 
 Type of industries  
 Number of injuries and deaths 
 Ignition source 
In Appendix A, metal dust mainly includes aluminum, magnesium, iron and associated 
combustible alloy dusts. Flour, corn, sugar dusts, and other combustible edible dusts are 
categorized as food dust. The inorganic dust, excluding metal dust and coal dust, includes 
the other types of inorganic combustible dust such as sulfur powder. 
4.3 The characteristics of hazardous dust explosion accidents 
As shown in Appendix A, the collected cases come from a large range of times and 
industrial types. Features of dust explosions, such as casualties, vary with individual 
countries and periods. Due to the process characteristics of individual industries, various 
features can also be observed in ignition source, involved equipment, and so forth. 
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4.3.1 Spatial distribution of dust explosions 
Performing statistical analyses, the distribution of dust explosions in various countries is 
presented in Figure 4.1.  
 
Fig. 4.1 Dust explosion numbers in different countries 
As can be seen from Figure 4.1, the dust explosion reports are mainly from the US, Europe, 
Japan, China and Canada. Among them, the number of dust explosions in the US is 1611 - 
far more than in other countries. The following is Europe, in which the numbers from 
Germany and the UK account for the majority, holding 426 and 411 respectively. In other 
European countries, including Norway, Sweden, France, Italy and Spain, the accident 
reports are also observed.   
One contributor to accident distribution might be differing economic development levels 
in different countries, due to the close relationship between dust explosions and 
manufacturing activities. The link between economic activities and occupational accidents 
has been widely discussed (Van Beeck, et al., 2000; Gerdham and Ruhm, 2006, Wang, 2006; 
Song, et al., 2011). In the current work, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and industrial 
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output (U.S. dollars) of the top 9 industrial countries or areas (World Bank, 2002, 2012) are 
collected and shown in Figure 4.2 for further discussion. 
 
Fig. 4.2 GDP and industrial output of main industrial countries in the world 
(2002, 2012, World Bank) 
It should be noticed that the data of industrial output from Canada in 2002 is absent (World 
Bank, 2002, 2012). The top countries or areas in GDP and industrial outputs are located in 
North America (2), Asia (3), Europe (5), Oceania (1) and South America (1). Among them, 
the GDP of the United States reached 16,163 billion US dollars and Europe (including 
Germany, the UK, Norway, Sweden, France, Italy and Spain) held 13,317 billion US dollars 
in 2012, followed by China with 8,229 billion US dollars. Similar to GDP, unbalanced 
development can also be seen in the amount of industrial output of different countries. The 
top output country is China with 3,725 billion dollars in 2012, higher than the US with 
3,185 billion dollars and Europe with 3,075 billion dollars. The relationship between 
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economy and accidents will be discussed further in section 4.4. 
4.3.2 Temporal distribution of dust explosions  
The first reported dust explosion accident is possibly a flour explosion in Turin in 1785 
(Echhoff, 2003). Subsequently, dust explosions were gradually recognized as accidents 
capable of causing severe damage, stimulating research on the mechanisms of dust 
explosions and related safety measures to prevent them or to protect plant personnel. 
Research regarding combustible dusts and dust explosions inevitably affected the 
operations at worksites. The distribution of accidents along with different time periods is 
represented in Figure 4.3. 
 
Fig. 4.3 Number of dust explosions in different time periods 
The numbers of reported accidents worldwide appears to be generally decreasing with time, 
especially over the past 20 years. Compared to 526 reported dust explosions before 1930, 
the total number has been reduced to 193 since 2000. Though a spike appears during 1970-
1980, the trend is decreasing, which might result from the continual emergence of safety 
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management system worldwide. From Figure 4.3, it can also be observed that the number 
of reported accidents in China has greatly increased since 1980 from 7 during 1970-1980 
to 41 in 1980-1990 to finally 70 since 2000. This might be explained by rising industrial 
activities since the Chinese economic reform of the 1980s. The number of dust explosions 
and industrial output from 2003 to 2012 in China are depicted in Figure 4. As can be noted, 
the number of accidents increased during 2003-2012 along with the increase of industrial 
output. 
 
 
Fig. 4.4 Number of dust explosions and industrial outputs in China from 2003 
to 2012 
4.3.3 The trend of fatalities in dust explosion accidents 
The fatalities and injuries per accident during various periods are provided in Figure 4.5.    
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Fig. 4.5 Fatalities/injuries per accident in different periods 
The worldwide fatalities per dust explosion decreased from 4.6 before 1930 to 2.9 between 
1930 and 1960. However, it increased to 5.0 between 1960 and 1990. After this period, the 
downward tendency of casualties reappeared, and the value declined to 4.4. The higher 
number of fatalities in developing countries, such as China, might be the main contributor 
to the higher rate after 1960. As Figure 4.5 shows, the fatalities per accident in China 
reached a high number, 29.8, during 1960 and 1990, which is much higher than the 
worldwide level in the same period. Though the rate decreased drastically to 9.2 after 1990, 
it is still twice as high as the average level of the world. It should be noted that the lack of 
accident reports before 1960 in China made it impossible to calculate the number of 
fatalities before 1960. Conversely, fatalities and injuries per dust explosion in the United 
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States are lower than that of the world in various periods, especially compared to China. 
4.3.4 Statistic features of combustible dust involved in dust explosions 
Combustible dust leading to dust explosions worldwide can be categorized as displayed in 
Figure 4.6a.  
 
a. Dust explosions worldwide 
 
b. Dust explosions in US and China 
Fig. 4.6 Contribution of different dusts to dust explosions  
As shown in Figure 4.6a, 40% of dust explosions worldwide are caused by food dust, such 
as wheat, flour and feed dust. This is an important type of combustible causing explosions 
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in China and the US, accounting for 27% and 46%, respectively (Figure 4.6b). Coal dust 
explosions represent the largest proportion of dust explosions in China, leading to 35% of 
dust explosions.  
4.3.5 Industrial distribution of dust explosions 
According to the International Standard Industrial Classification of All Activities (United 
Nations, 2008), the types of factories involved in dust explosions are divided into 
manufacturers of food products, the mining of coal and lignite, warehousing, manufacturers 
of wood and wood products, manufacturers of chemicals and chemical products, 
manufacturers of fabricated metal products, manufacturers of rubber and plastics products, 
electricity suppliers, manufacturers of textiles and other products (including the mining of 
metal ores, other mining and quarrying). The number of dust explosions for each type of 
enterprise is shown in Figure 4.7 (shown in Appendix A). 
 
Fig. 4.7 Dust explosions in various industrial types  
It can be seen that 26% of the dust explosions occurred in food product manufacturing. 
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Other industries with high risk of dust explosions are also represented in Figure 4.7. 
Compared with the statistical results of dust explosions in the US from 1980 to 2005 
(Joseph and CSB Hazard Investigation Team, 2007), aforementioned important industrial 
types, except coal and lignite mining, are also the critical areas which are more easily 
threatened by dust explosions in the US. 
4.3.6 Ignition source for dust explosions 
Ignition sources, as an essential element of dust explosions, are divided into eight types: 
flame and direct heat, hot work, electrical sparks, static electricity, impact sparks, self-
heating and smoldering, friction sparks, and hot surfaces (Abbasi and Abbasi, 2007), which 
are also listed in Appendix A. The contribution of each type has been depicted in Figure 
4.8. 
 
Fig. 4.8 Ignition sources for dust explosions 
As shown in Figure 4.8, flame and direct heat, accounting for 22% of the data set, is the 
largest category of ignition sources contributing to dust explosions. Further ignition sources 
22%
7%
8%
6%
20%
10%
12%
6%
9%
Flame and direct heat
Hot work
Electrical sparks
Static electricity
Impact sparks
Self-heating and smoldering
Friction saprks
Hot surfaces
Other
 54 
 
in various types of enterprises are also categorized and shown in Figure 4.9. 
 
Fig. 4.9 Contribution of ignition sources in various industries 
In Figure 4.9, the primary ignition source in the manufacturing of food products is flame 
and direct heat. However, in the mining of coal and lignite, the main ignition source is hot 
work, which mainly refers to blasting operations. In China, sub-standardized operations in 
blasting, such as inadequate stemming (a muddy filling used to plug blasting holes), are 
often seen in coal mining. In warehousing, the top ignition source is self-heating and 
smoldering caused by heat accumulation from chemical reactions of combustible dusts.  
4.3.7 Equipment involved in dust explosions 
According to the statistical analysis of accident records conducted in the present work, 
equipment with higher frequency involvement in dust explosions can be categorized into 
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silos/bunkers, dust collecting systems, milling and crushing plants, conveying systems, 
dryers, furnaces, mixing plants, grinding and polishing plants and others. The proportion 
of each type of equipment is depicted in Figure 4.10a. Because of the differences in 
production processes of various industries, different distributive characteristics can be 
observed for respective critical equipment. Therefore, in this paper, the critical equipment 
is also categorized according to individual industries with high risks of dust explosions 
based on the results of Section 4.3.5. The results are presented in Figure 4.10b. 
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b. Equipment involved in various types of enterprises 
Fig. 4.10 Equipment involved in dust explosions in various industries  
As can be seen from Figure 4.10a, the critical equipment having the most contribution to 
dust explosions are dust collecting systems and conveying systems. The critical equipment 
in different industries is also represented in Figure 4.10b. 
The techniques in either coal mining or warehouses differ from other types of industries. 
As mentioned above, coal mining belongs to the mineral mining industry, and is involved 
with fewer chemical reactions. Most dust explosions occur in underground roadways, 
especially during blasting operations. So the equipment which is used in blasting, such as 
detonators, accounts for the highest proportion, 29%, of the total number. Moreover, 
dustproof systems, reported to be damaged in different degrees before or after dust 
explosions accidents, are involved in 28% of accidents in mining coal and lignite. Another 
critical unit in coal mining is electrical equipment or cable, which is reportedly participating 
in 20% of dust explosions. On the other hand, warehouses are mainly used to store raw 
materials or intermediate products, which is a simpler process compared to other types of 
enterprises. Therefore, the diversity of equipment involved in warehouses is less than in 
other industries. According to the statistical result, the conveying system is involved in dust 
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explosions in more than half the cases, followed by silos and/or bunkers. 
4.4. Discussion 
4.4.1 Cases mainly distributed in countries/areas with higher industrial output 
According to the statistical results, the majority of accidents are reported in the countries 
with higher industrial output, such as the US, Germany, the UK, Japan and China, because 
dust explosions are closely related to industrial activities. The other reason might be the 
relatively well-organized systems of accident reporting and research in these countries, 
which provide analysis with a more abundant and detailed inventory of accident records. 
One typical example is the U.S. Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA), 
which provides not only standards and regulations about health and safety but also statistics 
of occupational accidents (OSHA, 2013). Similar agencies can also be found in other 
industrial countries. However, a large number of dust explosions are still missed or 
unreported. According to the estimation by Eckhoff (2003), around 160 dust explosions 
each year happened in Germany from 1965 to 1985, which means the total number of 
accidents could be as high as 3200, but only 426 accidents were reported during the same 
period as determined in the current work. Regardless of the huge gap between the number 
of reported and actual dust explosions, the reported data could help to better understand the 
mechanisms of dust explosions and further effectively prevent accidents. 
4.4.2 Trends of dust explosions and casualties per dust explosion 
Despite a limited statistical sample, the decreasing tendency of dust explosions numbers 
can be seen from the analysis (Figure 4.3). The accident reduction could result from the 
growing understanding about the mechanisms of dust explosions (Kauffman, 1982.; 
Eckhoff, 1984, 1986, 1995, 2009; Edwards and Prugh, 1987; Dahoe, 1996; Benedetto et 
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al., 2010; Amyotte et al., 2006), the progress of prevention measures (Craven and Foster, 
1967; Frank, 2004; Amyotte et al., 2009; Holbrow and Tyldesley, 2003; Going and 
Lombardo, 2007; Amyotte et al., 2010; Eckhoff, 1996), and continuous research interest 
in dust explosions. With the help of the Engineering Village database, the number of 
published academic papers (journal papers in English only) relating to dust explosions in 
various periods are collected (Figure 4.11). The number of academic papers about dust 
explosions has vastly increased since 1990. 
 
Fig. 4.11 Academic papers relating to dust explosions in various periods 
However, in some countries or during a specific period, the increasing tendency of dust 
explosions can be related to well-organized accident reporting systems. For example, a 
spike of dust explosion number is observed during 1970 and 1980 as shown in Figure 4.3. 
Another typical example is China, where there has been established a series of regulations 
and laws about production safety and accident reporting (Duan et al., 2011), in order to 
help prevent illegal activities such as purposely concealing accidents. This in turn has led 
to a large number of reported dust explosions after 2000. Furthermore, considering the 
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influence of the economy on occupational accidents at a national level (Song et al., 2011), 
the number of dust explosions grew with the increasing industrial output in China (Figure 
4.4). According to the five stages of production safety defined by Wang (2006), China is 
estimated to be in the middle stage of industrialization with fluctuation in a high level of 
safety accidents and with the positive relationship with economic development (Duan et 
al., 2011). 
Decreasing tendencies can also be found in both fatalities and injuries per dust explosion 
before 1960. However, after 1960, the trend of either fatalities or injuries per dust 
explosion has increased which is mainly caused by the accidents with severe damages in 
developing countries, especially China. As Figure 5 shows, between 1960 and 1990, the 
fatalities per dust explosion in China reached a very high level of 29.8, which is far higher 
than the world average level in the same period. If the cases from developing countries 
are left out of the analysis, the fatalities per dust explosion in the developed industrial 
countries are greatly reduced to 0.8. After 1990, the fatalities per accident decreased to 
4.4 worldwide, and this decrease also benefits from the reduction of fatalities per accident 
in developing countries. 
4.4.3 Contributors to the difference in the casualties between China and the United 
States 
Examining the casualties per dust explosion during various periods in China, it is obvious 
that they are far higher than the world average levels in the same periods, whereas the 
casualty levels in the U. S. are always much lower than worldwide. Many factors could 
contribute to the enormous differences between China and the United States. Firstly, they 
have different levels of safety management. As pointed out by Feng and Chen (2013), the 
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safety management level in the US is in a relatively mature stage characterized by the 
priority of production safety, compared to China’s developing stage with the feature of 
improving investment in safety. For production safety inputs, mainly in safety equipment 
updating and safety training, in the two countries, there are huge differences too. The 
budget for safety research at the National Institute for Occupation Safety and Health 
(NIOSH) and the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in the United States 
is 208 times larger than for safety research in China in 2012 (Feng and Chen, 2013). At 
the same time, according to the Fiscal Year of the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA), 10.71 million dollars was used in safety training in 2012 and the 
spending increased to 10.77 million dollars in 2013 (United States Department of Labor, 
2014). However, a separate list of safety training budgets is not found in the Fiscal Year 
of the China State Administration of Work Safety (2013). Finally, the gap between safety 
supervision in China and the United States is also enormous. According to statistical 
results by Duan et al. (2011), almost 90% of chemical accidents happened in small 
enterprises between 2000 and 2006 in China. Enterprises, especially smaller ones, usually 
lack the motivation to improve safety measures for workers because of the huge 
investment required and the indirect benefits. Meanwhile, the lack of effective 
supervision by relevant official departments or their indifferent enforcement worsened the 
situation. However, for developed countries, like the US, there are a series of strict 
regulations like NFPA 61, 69, 86 and 654, and laws (OSHA) in an attempt to assure 
employers provide safe workplaces and also that enterprises use safety supervision at 
different levels, from firms and independent organizations to local governments. 
4.4.4 Distributions of combustible dusts and factories involved in dust explosions 
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The distributions of combustible dusts and factories involved in dust explosions largely 
depend on the industrial structures of specific countries. As shown in Figures 6 and 7, a 
large part of combustible dust leading to dust explosions can be classified as food dust. 
Similarly, in the analysis of industries with high risk of dust explosions, food processing 
or production is characterized as having the highest risk. This could be due to the high 
output of the food industry. For example, the output value of food manufacturing and the 
related processing is 8.3% of the total industrial output in China in 2011 (Statistical 
Yearbook of China industrial economy, 2011). Similarly, the food industry accounts for 
11.5% of industrial output in the US in 2012 (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2013). 
Further, other important industry types with high output include chemicals and chemical 
products manufacturing, electrical machinery and communication and computer, plastic 
or rubber manufacturing, wood and wood products manufacturing, coal mining and 
washing industries, which also have higher dust explosion risks, according to the 
statistical results. It should be noted that the output of the coal mining and washing 
industry only accounts for 3.4% of industrial output in China (Statistical Yearbook of 
China industrial economy, 2011), but coal dust contributes to 35% of dust explosions, 
which illustrates the severe lack of safety in coal production in China. High dependence 
on coal for energy consumption is one of the main causes of dust explosions in China. As 
Zheng et al. (2009) argue, the percentage of coal in total energy consumption is higher 
than 70% in China. Furthermore, from BP Statistical Review of World Energy (BP, 2013), 
coal production and consumption in China account for 47.5% and 50.2% of the world’s 
coal production and consumption, respectively, in 2012. Both of the percentages are far 
higher than any other country. 
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4.4.5 Distributions of ignition sources in various industries 
Flame and direct heat, the most commonly seen ignition sources in dust explosions, could 
originate from lamps, open lanterns, nearby explosions or unsuitable heating methods in 
production. With the growing understanding of dust explosion mechanisms, lighting 
equipment with potential to cause open fires, such as lamps and open lanterns, has been 
prohibited by relevant regulations in areas with a high risk of dust explosions. 
Meanwhile, safety barriers, such as the screw conveyor (Eckhoff, 2003), are proposed to 
be installed between hazardous sources to isolate the propagation of fires and pressures 
from nearby explosions. Next to flame and direct heat, impact sparks occupies the second 
highest proportion in all kinds of ignition sources. They could be caused by many factors, 
such as mechanical failure or tramp metal. The other ignition sources with higher 
frequencies in dust explosions include friction sparks, self-heating and smoldering, 
electrical sparks, hot work, static electricity and hot surfaces.  
Further, the ignition sources appear to vary in different industries, as depicted in Figure 
4.9. In food product manufacturing, flame and direct heat - the most commonly seen 
ignition source - are mainly from heating equipment in different processes, such as drying 
processes. A similar situation can also be found in other areas, such as wood and wood 
product manufacturing, electricity supply, and chemicals and chemical product 
manufacturing. However, in coal mining, as explosion accidents frequently occur during 
blasting operations, hot work is the most frequent ignition source, especially in China 
(Zheng, et al., 2009). In warehouses, with the heat coming from exothermic reactions, the 
temperatures could increase beyond the threshold of self-ignition when warehouses have 
no, or malfunctioning, suitable temperature control systems. As a result, the stored 
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combustible dust might be ignited, leading to more serious accidents.  
4.4.6 The critical equipment involved in dust explosions 
The statistical result regarding critical equipment shows that equipment that is managing 
combustible dusts, such as ventilation systems, or equipment which are a potential 
ignition sources themselves, such as dryers, are more often involved in dust explosions. 
According to the analysis, the dust collecting system and conveying system are the two 
most critical pieces of equipment for dust explosions, which is similar with the analysis 
results from the Federal Republic Germany (Abbasi and Abbasi, 2007). One reason is that 
these two systems are widely applied in various industries (Klinzing et al., 2010; 
Piccinini, 2008; CSB, 2005). The other reason is that combustible dust clouds can be 
easily formed in these units and thus could be ignited by heat, fire, or spark (Eckhoff, 
2003; CSB, 2009). Therefore, more attention should be paid to these units in production. 
For the dust collecting system, one effective way to prevent dust explosions is to reduce 
the amount of accumulated dust, for example, by cleaning out the dust at filters or in 
ducts regularly (Yuan et al., 2015). The other type of safety measure for a dust collecting 
system is to eliminate potential ignition sources; for example, by installing magnetic 
separators at the inlet to remove tramp metal to eliminate impact sparks (Amyotte et al., 
2009). The next critical unit is the silo/bunker, widely used to temporarily store 
pulverized raw materials or products. As discussed above, the main ignition sources in 
this type of equipment are self-heating and smoldering and external flame or heat. 
Therefore, the safety measures are mainly focused on reducing accumulated heat, by the 
installation of a temperature control system in silos/bunkers (Yuan et al., 2013), and 
eliminating oxygen by installing inert gas devices (Amyotte et al., 2003). Furnaces, 
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similar to dryers, are the third critical equipment as providing enough heat for dust 
explosions. Thus, the key measure is to isolate the heat from furnaces and combustible 
dust clouds (NFPA 86, 2007). Other critical units include milling/crushing plants and 
grinding/polishing plants. For these units, a large amount of heat could be produced along 
with combustible dust clouds. Therefore, the main way to prevent dust explosions is to 
reduce the concentration of the dust cloud by applying ventilation systems and dissipating 
produced heat as soon as possible, by installing cooling systems (Eckhoff, 2003). 
4.5 Conclusion 
In industrial production, dust explosions are a threat worldwide and have caused huge 
losses to operators, shareholders and the environment. By collecting accident records, 
reviewing and analyzing the information, dust explosions can be better understood and 
prevented in the future. 
According to the analysis, dust explosions are closely related to industrial activities and the 
number of dust explosions worldwide is decreasing with time. However, for specific 
countries, like China, the number of reported dust explosions is increasing because of the 
country’s rapid industrial development and the lack of enough investment in safety 
improvement and safety management, which also leads to the far higher casualties per dust 
explosion in China compared to other countries. Combustible dust categorizations and 
enterprise types with dust explosion risk depend on the industrial structures of specific 
countries. Usually, the larger the economic output of a specific industry, the more easily the 
combustible dust in the industry could be found involved in dust explosions. Moreover, 
flame and direct heat is estimated as the most commonly seen ignition source leading to 
dust explosions, and dust collecting systems as well as conveying systems are determined 
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to be the most critical equipment in industrial production. Thus, for critical units in various 
industries, particular attention and supervision should be dedicated in operations, and 
suitable safety measures need to be applied to prevent dust explosions or mitigate potential 
damage caused by such accidents. 
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Abstract  
Dust explosion is one of the main threats to equipment safety and human health in 
industries. Complex factors leading to accidents, serious consequences and relevant safety 
measures are the main interests of governmental agencies, researchers and industrial 
companies. However, a generic risk analysis model for dust explosions is absent. The bow-
tie model can be used to investigate the relationships among basic causes, safety barriers 
and possible consequences of an accident scenario. In this paper, a framework is established 
for quantitative risk assessment of dust explosions based on bow-tie analysis method via 
review and analysis of previous major dust explosions. A large inventory of relevant safety 
measures is presented, and the implementation and efficacy of such safety measures to 
reduce the risk of dust explosions is thoroughly discussed. Finally, the methodology is 
applied to a case-study. The results show that the generic bow-tie developed in this study 
can be tailored to a wide variety of dust explosion accident scenarios with minimal 
manipulation; also, implementation of relevant safety measures can significantly reduce the 
risk of dust explosions. 
Keywords: Dust explosion; Quantitative risk analysis; Bow-tie method; Safety measures  
 
5.1 Introduction 
When suspended combustible dust in a confined space is ignited, a dust explosion occurs 
(CSB, 2006). Compared to other types of explosion, dust explosions can lead to severe 
damage as they may result in a series of secondary dust explosions, causing higher 
overpressures and temperatures. It should also be noted that toxic gases as likely byproducts 
of dust explosions can noticeably increase the extent and intensity of damage.  
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Dust explosions have been causing significant loss to humans, assets, and the environment. 
According to the U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB, 2005), a dust explosion at the Hayes 
Lemmerz plant, Huntington, Indiana, in 2003 caused 1 death and 6 injuries. The cause of 
this accident was identified as aluminum dust in a dust collector, probably ignited by heat, 
impact sparks or burning embers. In the same year, another dust explosion at West 
Pharmaceutical Services, Kinston, North Carolina, claimed 6 lives and 38 injuries (CSB, 
2004). The CSB believed the accumulation of combustible dust above a suspended ceiling 
was the main source of the combustible material. Also, the ignition of rubber vapor, an 
overheated electrical ballast, an electrical spark, or an electric motor was determined to be 
the ignition source. Dust explosions have widely been reported in the literature (Blair, 2007; 
Zheng et al., 2009; Giby and Luca, 2010; Marmo et al., 2004; Piccinini, 2008; John and 
Vorderbrueggen, 2011). Therefore, conducting quantitative risk analysis (QRA) for dust 
explosions is necessary for process facilities dealing with different types of dust-producing 
activities, ranging from wool to food and metal industries. Usually, hazard identification is 
the first step in QRA, followed by accident modeling, cause-consequence analysis, and risk 
estimation.  
In the context of dust explosion QRA, however, the focus has mainly been on dust 
explosion mechanisms (Eckhoff, 2003, 2009; Callé et al., 2005; Amyotte et al., 2005; 
Cashdollar and Zlochower, 2007; Pilão et al., 2006; Benedetto et al., 2010) or pertinent 
safety measures to prevent or mitigate the damage of accidents (Eckhoff, 2003, 2009; Li et 
al., 2009; Myers, 2008; Marian and Rudolf, 2013; Amyotte et al., 2007, 2009). van dert 
Voort and Klein (2007) developed a QRA tool for the external safety assessment of 
industrial plants prone to dust explosion hazards. In their method, the risk of the entire plant 
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is divided into individual risks of constituting units according to their size, shape and 
constructional properties. However, sometimes, dividing a plant into units and choosing 
proper explosion models for each unit are difficult, if not impractical, for complex 
processing facilities. In this paper, a generic comprehensive risk analysis model based on 
the bow-tie method is developed, which can be used in risk assessment and safety measure 
design of dust explosions with different characteristics. This model can conveniently be 
used to assess the risk of dust explosion in various industries. 
The part is organized as follows: fundamentals of the bow-tie method and the role of safety 
measures in risk analysis are recapitulated in Section 5.2. An inventory of potential 
contributing factors to dust explosions is presented in the form of a generic bow-tie in 
Section 5.3 while a list of pertinent safety measures, their applicability and implementation 
are given in Section 5.4. To illustrate the generality and the efficacy of the developed bow-
tie, the approach is applied to a case-study in Section 5.5. Section 5.6 summarizes the main 
conclusions of this study. 
5.2 Background 
5.2.1 Bow-tie method 
Many probabilistic techniques have been used in QRA, among which fault tree analysis 
(FT) and event tree analysis (ET) are the most popular. FT investigates primary causes of 
a critical event (e.g., system failure, system unavailability, release of hazardous material, 
etc.) while ET explores the possible consequences arising from a critical event (e.g., fire, 
explosion, injury, death, etc.). Bow-tie (BT), a graphical method, integrates both the 
primary causes and consequences of a critical event into a logical model. It also provides 
system reliability if effects of safety measures are considered. Using the probabilities of 
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primary causes, along with failure likelihood of safety measures, the probabilities of 
consequences can be estimated. Dianous and Fiévez (2006) established a risk assessment 
methodology based on BT to evaluate the efficacy of risk control measures. Shahriar et al. 
(2011) used fuzzy theory based on BT to analyze the risk of oil and gas pipelines and 
provided suggestions for the risk management process. Bellamy et al. (2013) presented an 
application of BT in industrial practice, ‘Storybuilder’ method, to identify the dominant 
patterns of safety barrier failures, barrier task failures and underlying management flaws. 
Their BT model comprises six lines of defense, three on either side of the critical event, a 
loss of containment event. Despite its wide applications in QRA, BT suffers from a static 
nature, and cannot easily be updated when new information becomes available. However, 
there have recently been efforts to overcome this limitation either by coupling BT with 
Bayesian updating (Khakzad et al., 2012) or via substituting with more dynamic methods 
such as Bayesian networks (Khakzad et al., 2011, 2013). 
5.2.2 Safety measures 
In the context of risk management, safety measures are classified into three types: inherent, 
engineered and procedural safety measures (Khan and Amyotte, 2003). When applying 
safety measures to improve system safety, inherent safety measures are given priority over 
the two other types of safety measures. Generally, inherent safety is aimed at reducing 
hazards, relying on the properties of a material or the design of a process. Four key 
principles for inherent safety have been suggested (Amyotte et al., 2007, 2009; Kletz, 1978, 
2003): 
 Minimization: using smaller quantities of hazardous materials and performing a 
hazardous procedure as few times as possible.  
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 Substitution: using a less hazardous material or implementing a less hazardous 
procedure. 
 Moderation: using hazardous materials in their least hazardous forms or under less 
hazardous processing conditions. 
 Simplification: designing process equipment and procedures to eliminate opportunities 
for errors. 
Inherent safety measures are normally considered the most reliable as they do not depend 
on the performance of additional safety devices or the physical or psychological condition 
of operators. 
Engineered safety measures refer to reducing the frequency of accidents or lowering their 
severity via setting additional barriers. Based on the type of operation, these safety barriers 
could be further divided into passive and active. For passive safety measures, no additional 
activator, actuator or human intervention is required (e.g. explosion relief vents) whereas 
active safety measures depend on the function of additional control systems (e.g. automatic 
suppression systems). Usually, passive safety measures are preferred to active ones since 
no additional interventions or control systems are required. 
Procedural or administrative safety measures, on the other hand, rely on management 
methods to prevent accidents (e.g., training) or mitigate their damage (e.g., evacuation and 
emergency response). These safety measures are influenced by human factors such as 
safety training effectiveness or human response time. 
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Once a BT is developed, the effect of safety measures can easily be analyzed. In the context 
of BT method, safety measures can be categorized under four guide words (Dianous and 
Fievez, 2007): 
 Avoid: making an event not happen. An “Avoid” safety measure functions before a 
basic event occurs on the FT (i.e., is given temporal or spatial precedence over the 
event). As a result, the basic events for which “Avoid” safety measures have been 
implemented can be eliminated from the BT, and is no longer considered in the accident 
scenario sequence.  
 Prevent: reducing the frequency of an event. A “Prevent” safety measure acts before a 
basic event happens, whether on the FT or ET. For example, in an ET, emergency 
training can be considered to reduce the failure probability of evacuation as a safety 
measure.  
 Control: controlling an event or recovering a system to a safe state. A “Control” safety 
measure acts before a basic event occurs on the FT while it acts after an event occurs 
on the ET. For example, fire walls are installed to control flame and overpressure during 
dust explosions. 
 Mitigate: reducing the effect of an event on equipment, human health or environment. 
A “Mitigate” safety measure acts after an event occurs on the ET. For example, using 
the emergency response and rescue system can reduce the probability of severe injury 
and death. 
5.3 Dust explosion causes and consequences 
5.3.1 Generic fault tree 
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The primary causes of dust explosions have already been investigated and modeled using 
FT (Abuswer et al., 2013). In the present study, a more detailed and broader range of 
elements based on past accidents in the process industries are considered. These elements 
are illustrated and organized according to their cause-effect relationships in the form of a 
generic FT in Figure 5.1. This generic fault tree is comprehensive and can be fitted to a 
wide variety of dust explosion accident. Basic events of the FT and their probabilities are 
listed in Table 5.1. These probabilities have been either drawn from literature (OREDA, 
2002; Mannan, 2005; Moss, 2005; Rathnayaka et al., 2011) or calculated using existing 
relationships. For example, the probability of the basic event Particle size in explosive 
range is calculated using an equation given by Eckhoff (2003), considering the percentage 
of particle sizes ranging from 20μm to 125μm (see Table A1 in the appendix (Eckhoff, 
2003)).  Other data such as the probability of Calm which is related to the local atmospheric 
condition is estimated using expert opinions. The intermediate events and undeveloped 
events are also shown, in Table 5.2.   
This generic FT is based on the dust explosion pentagon comprising five elements: 
combustible dust, oxidant, ignition source, dispersion of dust, and confinement of dust, and 
also 79 primary events, involved in various areas, such as human factors (e.g. Not wearing 
protective clothes to eliminate electrostatic), leading to these five elements. 
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(a) Main fault tree 
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(a) Transfer gates 
Fig. 5.1 Generic fault tree of dust explosion including (a) the main part, and 
(b) transfer gates. 
 
Table 5.1 Basic events of generic fault tree in Figure 5.1 (Eckhoff, 2003; 
Mannan, 2005; Moss, 2005; Rathnayaka et al., 2011; Eckhoff and Amyotte, 
2010) 
Symbol Description Probability Symbol Description Probability 
X1 Lack of inert dust for 
explosible dust 
0.3 X41 Misalignment of components 0.1 
X2 Particle size in explosive 
range 
0.71 X42 Equipment with high potential 
to produce friction sparks 
0.085 
X3 Lack of filter in air 
ventilation system/Filter 
system failure 
0.01 X43 Malfunction of equipment 
such as belt slip 
0.04 
X4 Not satisfying the latest 
construction code 
0.02 X44 Tramp metals impact internal 
walls of metal equipment 
0.05 
X5 Equipment failure of 
ventilation system 
0.04 X45 Use of unsuitable tools 0.01 
X6 Lack of written procedure 
for housekeeping 
0.033 X46 Equipment made of material 
with high potential of sparking 
0.067 
X7 Incorrect housekeeping 
methods 
0.067 X47 Loose objects 0.03 
X8 Lack of regular inspection 0.01 X48 Lack of daily documented 
operation procedures to avoid 
impact sparks 
0.04 
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X9 Lack of design codes 0.033 X49 Improper operation procedures 
to avoid impact sparks 
0.067 
X10 Improper design codes 0.04 X50 Lack of spark arresters 0.045 
X11 Failure to follow design 
codes 
0.045 X51 Malfunction of spark arresters 0.05 
X12 Dust collectors malfunction 0.04 X52 Unsuitable switches 0.1 
X13 Leakage of air from 
ventilation system 
0.05 X53 Blown fuse 0.08 
X14 Blockage in ventilation 
system  
0.145 X54 Short circuit 0.05 
X15 Lack of enough knowledge 
about previous system 
before reconstruction 
0.1 X55 Damaged insulation 0.01 
X16 Not strictly applying 
relevant guideline 
0.045 X56 Lightning  0.000001 
X17 Inadequate stewardship 
program of manufacturers of 
raw materials 
0.09 X57 Not wearing protective clothes 
to eliminate electrostatic 
0.06 
X18 Lack of methods to identify 
hazards 
0.033 X58 Electrically nonconductive 
components 
0.045 
X19 Ignoring combustible dust in 
hazard communication 
program 
0.09 X59 Lack of grounding device 0.01 
X20 Employee unaware of dust 
explosion hazard 
0.1 X60 Failure of grounding device 0.004 
X21 Inadequate safety training 
about combustible dust 
hazard 
0.05 X61 Too high breakdown voltage 0.01 
X22 Lack of coverings on 
cleanout, inspection and 
other openings 
0.083 X62 Lack of gas/temperature 
detection system 
0.045 
X23 Dust-tight system 
malfunction 
0.006 X63 Failure of gas/temperature 
detection system 
0.148 
X24 Lack of dust-tight system 0.045 X64 No measures/procedures when 
onset of self-heating is 
detected or after certain 
storage periods 
0.067 
X25 Lack of operational 
procedures for dealing with 
settled dust 
0.04 X65 Unsuitable storage methods 0.045 
X26 Inadequately safety trained 
operators in high risk 
working environment 
0.1 X66 Lack of fire suppression 
system 
0.045 
X27 Improper procedures to 
clean settled dust 
0.067 X67 Malfunction of fire 
suppression system 
0.1 
X28 Lack of isolation devices 0.055 X68 Work permit not issued 0.033 
X29 Failure of isolation devices 0.08 X69 Work permit/rules not strictly 
performed 
0.045 
X30 Collapse of equipment 0.085 X70 Standard defect 0.067 
X31 Lack of inert gas device 0.045 X71 Ignition of settled dust 0.005 
X32 Inadequate inert gas device 0.067 X72 Poor dissipation of heat 0.067 
X33 Failure of inert gas device 0.08 X73 Bad contact 0.02 
X34 Overloading operation of 0.01 X74 Combustion 0.3 
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processing equipment 
X35 Lack of surface 
shielding/isolation for high 
temperature equipment 
0.067 X75 Lack of separation device to 
prevent burning dust from 
entering process system 
0.045 
X36 Incorrectly specified 
electrical equipment 
0.045 X76 Improper enclosure 0.045 
X37 Mechanical failure of 
equipment such as bearings 
or blowers 
0.04 X77 Calm 0.002 
X38 Lack of excessive 
temperature controlling 
system 
0.045 X78 Lack of dust suppressants 0.1 
X39 Failure of excessive 
temperature controlling 
system 
0.08 X79 Equipment erosion 0.0078 
X40 Insufficient, excessive or 
impure lubricant 
0.05    
 
Table 5.2 Intermediate events and undeveloped events of generic fault tree in Figure 
5.1 
Symbol Description Symbol Description Symbol Description 
IE1 Explosible 
concentration of 
dust 
IE17 Misoperation causing 
collision of objects 
IE32 Unwanted horizontal surfaces 
are designed 
IE2 Dust is suspended 
in air 
IE18 Electrical arc/ sparks IE33 Dust emission from process 
equipment 
IE3 Settled dust is 
lofted 
IE19 Electrostatic discharges IE34 Inadequate dust-tight system 
IE4 Dust accumulation IE20 Field intensity exceeds 
3MV/m 
IE35 Heat accumulation leads to 
temperature higher than auto-
ignition temperature 
IE5 Lofting event IE21 Self-ignition IE36 Gas/temperature detection 
system malfunction 
IE6 Improper 
operation to 
activate dust layers 
IE22 Open flame IE37 Inert gas device malfunction 
IE7 Shockwave from 
primary dust 
explosion 
IE23 Confinement IE38 Fire suppression system 
failure 
IE8 Oxidant 
concentration> 
LOC 
IE24 Cramped space IE39 Fire  
IE9 Ignition source 
energy>MIE and 
MIT 
IE25 Inefficient ventilation IE40 Violation of open flame 
standard 
IE10 Heated surfaces IE26 Insufficient air volume IE41 Electrical equipment fire 
IE11 Excessive 
temperature 
control system 
malfunction 
IE27 Deficiency in design IE42 Burning dust 
IE12 Friction, impact or 
other sparks 
IE28 Ventilation equipment 
malfunction 
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IE13 Friction sparks IE29 Improper reconstruction 
of ventilation system 
  
IE14 Impact sparks IE30 Poor housekeeping   
IE15 Sparks from 
engines and 
motor-driven 
equipment 
IE31 Lack of awareness of 
combustible dust hazard 
  
IE16 Sparks produced 
from collision of 
objects 
    
 
5.3.2 Generic event tree 
Dust explosions are able to cause severe consequences, giving rise to significant human 
losses and/or damages to facilities. Based on the severity and likelihood, dust explosion 
consequences can be divided into five categories: near miss, mishap, minor damage, 
significant damage and catastrophic damage. The severities of five consequences are in an 
increasing manner depending on the functions of common used safety barriers in mitigating 
dust explosions. However, their probabilities are decreasing accordingly. For example, the 
severity of Near miss is the least comparing with other consequences but its probability is 
the greatest among them. A brief definition of each category is presented below. 
 Near miss: the dust explosion is controlled at its initial stages, and the system can be 
recovered quickly. 
 Mishap: the process is interrupted, and more time is needed to recover the system 
compared to that of a Near miss. However, no damage is caused to apparatus/equipment 
or operators. 
 Minor damage: equipment may be damaged, and superficial injuries are expected. 
 Significant damage: equipment is damaged along with the possibility of serious injury 
or death.  
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 Catastrophic damage: major facility damage is caused, and several fatalities are 
expected.  
Several safety barriers can be applied to prevent, reduce or control damage if a dust 
explosion takes place: explosion suppression, explosion venting, explosion containment, 
explosion isolation and evacuation (Eckhoff, 2003). The generic ET for dust explosions is 
developed in Figure 5.2.  
 
Fig. 5.2 Generic event tree of dust explosion. 
The explosion suppression is activated when the pressure rises beyond a threshold due to a 
dust explosion. If the explosion suppression functions successfully, further development of 
the dust explosion can be prevented, and no damage would be caused. In this situation, the 
outcome is classified as a near miss. A fast-response flame or pressure detector is an 
essential component of a suppression system. The membrane pressure detector is an 
example of these barriers (Eckhoff, 2003).  
However, if the explosion suppression system fails to operate, and the explosion 
overpressure proceeds further in the unit, the explosion venting barrier can be counted on 
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to relieve the pressure to a safe space. In this case, the equipment and operators will not be 
seriously threatened by the overpressure. However, sufficient time will be needed to 
recover the system to operating condition (e.g., overhauling the explosion suppression 
system). This type of consequence is considered as a mishap.  
If the venting system fails, the safety of the system will depend on explosion containment 
and isolation. Explosion containment refers to the units involving high risk materials or 
processes. These units are designed to withstand the maximum pressure or heat caused by 
dust explosions. Explosion isolation, on the other hand, refers to the safety measures to 
prevent the propagation of overpressure and fire (e.g., fire walls). When explosion 
containment and explosion isolation function, the pressure and fire will be restricted to the 
original unit and will not spread to nearby units. Thus, the system will suffer less damage, 
and can be recovered after the explosion source fails. The outcome can be deemed as a 
mishap. Otherwise, when the isolation system fails, the pressure and fire can spread to 
adjacent units. In this case, if the operators are well trained and successfully evacuate, fatal 
injuries are likely to be reduced, and the consequence can be classified as a minor damage. 
However, in the case of the failure of this barrier, fatal injuries and even death could occur, 
giving rise to catastrophic damage. 
5.3.3 Generic bow-tie  
After the generic FT and ET are developed, the generic BT can be constructed. As depicted 
in Figure 5.3, the BT shows the possible events contributing to a dust explosion as well as 
its potential consequences. The generic BT can also be used to implement a wide variety 
of safety measures to help minimize the risk.  
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Fig. 5.3 Generic bow-tie of dust explosion. The main fault tree of Fig. 5.1 is shown 
for brevity. 
5.4 Dust explosion safety assessment  
5.4.1 Inventory of safety measures 
As previously mentioned, safety measures are divided into inherent, engineered and 
procedural categories. In this study, the potential safety measures to reduce the probability 
of dust explosions are discussed in accordance with the aforementioned categories. The aim 
is to provide useful guidelines for safety measure implementation during different stages 
of a process design and operation. The basic events contributing to a dust explosion and the 
relevant safety measures are presented in Table 5.3 (Eckhoff and Amyotte, 2010). 
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Table 5.3 Safety measures in the context of dust explosion 
Basic 
Event 
Safety 
Measures 
Inherent Safety Measures Engineered 
Procedural Minimizati
-on 
Substitution Moderation 
Simplific
-ation 
Passive Active 
X1 Add inert dust        
X2 
Increase the 
particle size 
    
  
 
X3 
Install filter system 
or timely 
maintenance 
     
 
 
X4 
Follow latest 
ventilation 
construction code 
    
  
 
X5 
Timely 
maintenance 
    
  
 
X6 
Enact documented 
procedures for 
housekeeping 
    
  
 
X7 
Proper supervision 
and training 
    
  
 
X8 
Ensuring regular 
inspection 
    
  
 
X9 
Enact proper design 
codes, such as 
reducing unwanted 
horizontal surfaces, 
ventilation system, 
and so on. 
    
  
 
X10 
Improve design 
codes  
    
  
 
X11 
Proper supervision 
and training 
    
  
 
X12 
Timely 
maintenance 
    
  
 
X13 Inspection/sealing        
X14 Regular cleaning        
X15 Safety training        
X16 
Supervision/Safety 
training 
    
  
 
X17 
Establish integrated 
management 
system for raw 
materials 
    
  
 
X18 
Systematic hazard 
identification 
techniques such as 
HAZOP or HAZID 
and effective use of 
Material Safety 
Data Sheets 
    
  
 
X19 
Supervision/ 
training/written 
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communication 
rather than oral 
communication 
X20 Safety training        
X21 Safety training        
X22 
Installation of 
coverings if needed 
     
 
 
X23 
Regular inspection/ 
timely maintenance 
    
  
 
X24 
Install dust-tight 
system 
     
 
 
X25 
Enact written 
procedures for 
housekeeping 
    
  
 
X26 Safety training        
X27 
Improve operation 
procedures of 
settled dust 
    
  
 
X28 
Install isolation 
devices 
     
 
 
X29 
Regular 
inspection/timely 
maintenance 
    
  
 
X30 
Improve design 
codes to reduce 
collapse of 
equipment 
    
  
 
X31 Add inert gas         
X32 
Ensure adequate 
inert gas supply 
     
 
 
X33 
Install stand-by 
inert gas device and 
timely maintenance 
     
 
 
X34 
Supervision/ 
Training 
    
 
  
X35 
Install 
shielding/isolation 
for high 
temperature 
equipment 
     
 
 
X36 
Choose correct 
electrical 
equipment 
    
  
 
X37 
Regular 
inspection/timely 
maintenance 
    
 
  
X38 
Install excessive 
temperature 
controlling system 
    
 
  
X39 
Regular 
inspection/timely 
maintenance 
    
  
 
X40 Use proper        
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 93 
 
lubricant 
X41 Supervision/Training        
X42 
Improve design 
codes to substitute 
with safer 
equipment 
    
  
 
X43 
Regular 
inspection/timely 
maintenance 
    
  
 
X44 
Install magnetic 
separators at the 
inlet to remove 
tramp metal 
     
 
 
X45 Workplace training        
X46 
Choose materials 
with lower 
potential for spark 
generation 
    
  
 
X47 
Regular 
inspection/timely 
maintenance 
    
  
 
X48 
Enact daily 
operation 
procedures 
    
  
 
X49 
Improve daily 
operation 
procedures 
    
  
 
X50 
Install spark 
arresters 
     
 
 
X51 
Regular 
inspection/timely 
maintenance 
    
  
 
X52 
Install arc control 
device 
     
 
 
X53 
Regular 
inspection/timely 
maintenance 
    
  
 
X54 
Install circuit 
breaker 
    
 
  
X55 Regular 
inspection/timely 
maintenance 
    
  
 
X56 
Install lightning 
protection device 
     
 
 
X57 Safety training        
X58 
Choose proper 
conductive 
equipment 
    
  
 
X59 
Install grounding 
devices 
    
  
 
X60 
Regular 
inspection/timely 
maintenance 
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X61 
Control the 
breakdown voltage 
below 4KV 
    
  
 
X62 
Install 
gas/temperature 
detection system 
    
  
 
X63 
Regular inspection/ 
timely maintenance 
    
  
 
X64 
Rolling of bulk 
material from one 
silo to another 
    
  
 
X65 
Choose suitable 
storage methods for 
hazardous dust 
    
  
 
X66 
Install fire 
suppression system 
    
  
 
X67 
Regular 
inspection/timely 
maintenance 
    
  
 
X68 Safety training        
X69 Safety training        
X70 
Improve work 
permit system 
    
  
 
X71 
Proper and timely 
housekeeping 
    
  
 
X72 
Install cooling 
equipment 
    
 
  
X73 
Regular inspection/ 
timely maintenance 
    
  
 
X75 
Install separation 
device to prevent 
burning dust 
entering system 
     
 
 
X76 
Safety training of 
design to avoid 
forming cramped 
space 
    
  
 
X78 Add suppressants        
X79 
Anti-corrosion 
measures, regular 
inspection 
     
 
 
 
For example, for the basic event Particle size in explosive range, one possible safety 
measure is to Increase the particle size, which is aimed at making the size of particles 
beyond their explosive threshold. In other words, the process is modified to produce 
particles larger in size than those which could cause a dust explosion. This safety measure 
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satisfies the characteristics of the inherent safety principle Moderation. Meanwhile, if 
additional devices and mechanisms, such as humidifiers, are used to combine smaller 
particles to form larger ones, the safety measure can also be classified as a passive safety 
measure. Another example is Proper and timely housekeeping, which is meant to remove 
dust layers from the workplace by correct methods. As smaller quantities of combustible 
dust would be involved in processes, this safety measure can be attributed to Minimization. 
Since the performance of this safety measure relies on the actions of operators, it can also 
be classified as a procedural safety measure. 
5.4.2 Implementation of safety measures to bow-tie 
As previously mentioned, in the context of accident modeling and risk analysis, safety 
measures can further be classified according to four guide words: avoid, prevent, control 
and mitigate. Examples for each guide word and the effective location of each safety 
measure regarding the BT of dust explosion are given in Table 5.4. 
Table 5.4 Examples of Safety Measures 
 Fault Tree Event Tree 
Avoid If the explosiveness of particles is 
reduced, the dust explosion will be 
avoided. This is why in some cases 
inert dust is added to raw materials to 
decrease their explosiveness.  
N/A 
Prevent To prevent sparks produced in high 
risk places, magnetic equipment can 
be installed in inlets to prevent tramp 
metal from entering the system.  
Explosion suppression system is 
used to prevent further development 
of fire.  
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Control Ventilation system can be used to 
control the airborne dust 
concentration below MEC 
(Minimum Explosible 
Concentration). 
Fire walls are used to control fire. 
Mitigate N/A Venting system is used to release 
overpressure to safe areas.  
 
Similarly, all potential safety measures which can be applied to reduce hazards and improve 
the performance of existing safety means are categorized. Figure 5.4 illustrates how these 
safety measures are implemented into the BT. 
 
Fig. 5.4 Effects of safety measures on bow-tie 
As can be seen from Figure 5.4, the effects of some safety measures are twofold. For 
instance, the safety measure Install isolation devices can not only avoid the basic event 
Lack of isolation devices, but also adds a safety barrier Explosion Isolation into the system 
to mitigate the damage caused by explosions. Likewise, Safety training and Regular 
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inspection/timely maintenance are able to reduce the occurrence probability of basic events 
and improve the performance of safety measures (Figure 5.4). However, it should be noted 
that some safety measures only have an effect on basic events or on specific safety measures. 
For example, Improve the designed safety evacuation route only improves the reliability of 
Evacuation. 
5.5 Application of the methodology to a case study 
5.5.1 Case study  
To demonstrate the efficacy of the generic BT developed in Section 5.3, a dust explosion 
in a wool factory in Vigliano Biellese, Biella, Italy on 9 January, 2001 was selected as the 
case study. This accident caused five injuries, three deaths and considerable damage to the 
factory (Piccinini, 2008). The wool processing facility included washing, carding, and 
combing of wool. The burrs and noils, separated in the process, were conveyed by 
pneumatic system and collected in storage cells. The possible ignition source of the primary 
explosion was identified as the flames or embers, triggered by sparks from the electrical 
equipment or the overheating of a component. The collapse of the net separating two cells 
caused the formation of a dust cloud (i.e., dust dispersion) which was ignited and gave rise 
to a primary dust explosion. When flames and overpressure of the primary explosion 
reached nearby dust layers, more dust became suspended and the secondary explosion 
resulted.  
5.5.2 Bow-tie development  
Based on the accident details (Piccinini, 2008), the generic BT of Figure 5.3 was tailored 
to model the accident scenario as shown in Figure 5.5. The basic events and intermediate 
events in Figure 5.5 have already been described in Table 5.1 and Table 5.2.  
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Fig. 5.5 Bow-tie of the dust explosion in the wool factory in Vigliano Biellese. 
 
It should be noted that UEi (i=1, 2, 3) stands for undeveloped events which do not need 
further resolution. For example, pneumatic conveyance of the burr is one of the reasons 
leading to dust dispersion and suspension in air. As a normal working condition for this 
case, it could be considered as an undeveloped event.   
As shown in Figure 5.5, only two safety measures were installed in the facility, both of 
which failed after the dust explosion had occurred. The path to the consequence 
Catastrophic Damage is depicted in bold. The probabilities of the basic events used in the 
analysis are obtained from Table 5.1; using these data the probability of the dust explosion 
is calculated as 2.49E-02. Similarly, the occurrence probabilities of other consequences are 
estimated, and detailed results are presented in Table 5.5 (the second column).  
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Table 5.5 Probabilities of consequences 
 Factory with existing safety 
measures 
Factory with additional 
safety measures 
Dust explosion 2.49 E -02 0.99 E -03 
Near miss N/A 0.89 E -03 
Mishap 
(Suppression fails and 
Venting succeeds) 
N/A 0.91 E -04 
Mishap 
(Suppression and 
venting fail, other safety 
barriers succeed) 
N/A 0.71 E -05 
Minor damage 2.06 E -02 0.59 E -06 
Catastrophic damage 
(Evacuation fails) 
2.28 E -03 0.31 E -07 
Significant damage 
(Containment fails & 
Isolation succeeds) 
N/A 0.46 E -06 
Significant damage 
(Containment fails & 
Evacuation succeeds) 
1.86 E -03 0.38E -07 
Catastrophic damage 2.07 E -04 0.2 E -08 
 
5.5.3 Recommendation of safety measures 
To reduce the risk, additional safety measures are recommended and implemented to the 
BT (Figure 5.6). As can be seen, these safety measures help to avoid or prevent most of the 
basic events and also improve the performance of existing safety measures. Further, some 
of the suggested safety measures, in the generic BT, are also considered to mitigate the 
damage caused by the accident. For example, an explosion suppression device is 
recommended as the first safety measure. 
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Fig. 5.6 Effects of additional safety measures in reducing the risk of explosion in the 
wool factory. 
 
More examples illustrating how safety measures can improve the system’s safety are 
given in Tables 5.6 and 5.7 for FT and ET, respectively. 
Table 5.6 Effects of additional safety measures on basic events of FT of the bow-tie 
model 
Guide 
word 
Symbol 
Safety 
Measures 
Effects 
Avoid X8 Ensuring 
regular 
inspection 
After ensuring regular inspection, the situation of lack of 
regular inspection is avoided and the branch originating 
from X8 could be deleted. The probabilities of related 
events “Poor housekeeping” and “Heat surface” can be 
calculated as:  
P(IE30) = P(IE31) = 1 − (1 − P(X17)) ∗ (1 −
P(X18)) ∗ (1 − P(X20)) ∗ (1 − P(X21)) = 1 −
(1 − 0.09) ∗ (1 − 0.033) ∗ (1 − 0.1) ∗ (1 − 0.05)) =
0.248 (compare with the prior value of 0.255)  
P(IE10) = 1 − (1 − P(IE4)) ∗ (1 − P(X35)) ∗
(1 − P(X37)) ∗ (1 − P(X38)) = 1 − (1 − 0.453) ∗
(1 − 0.067) ∗ (1 − 0.04) ∗ (1 − 0.045)) = 0.532 
(compare with the prior value of 0.537) 
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Avoid X17 Establish 
integrated 
management 
system for 
burrs 
By establishing an integrated management system for 
burrs, the branch including X17, Inadequate stewardship 
program of manufacturers of raw materials, could be 
eliminated from BT. The probability of the relevant 
intermediate event, “Lack of awareness of combustible 
dust hazard”, could be calculated as:  
P(IE31) = 1 − (1 − P(X18)) ∗ (1 − P(X20)) ∗
(1 − P(X21)) = 1 − (1 − 0.033) ∗ (1 − 0.1) ∗
(1 − 0.05) = 0.173  
(compare with the prior value of 0.248) 
Prevent X14 Regular 
cleaning 
(RC) 
When “regular cleaning” is applied to prevent X14, the 
probability of X14 could be calculated as: 
P(X14) = P(X14|RC) ∗ P(RC) + P(X14|RC̅̅̅̅ ) ∗ P(RC̅̅̅̅ ) =
0.145 ∗ 0.06 + 0.085 ∗ 0.94 = 0.089  
(compare with the prior value of 0.145) 
Thus, the probability of IE4, “dust accumulation”, would 
be as: 
 P(IE4) = 1 − (1 − P(X14)) ∗ (1 − P(IE30)) ∗
(1 − P(IE33)) = 1 − (1 − 0.089) ∗ (1 − 0.256) ∗
(1 − 0.1405) = 0.417  
(compare with the prior value of 0.424) 
Prevent X20 Safety 
training (ST) 
When safety training is taken to help operators increase 
their knowledge of dust explosion hazards, the failure 
probability of X20 will depend on safety training (ST), 
where: 
 P(X20) = P(X20|ST) ∗ P(ST) + P(X20|ST̅̅ ̅) ∗ P(ST̅̅ ̅) =
0.1 ∗ 0.01 + 0.05 ∗ 0.99 = 0.0505 
(compare with the prior value of 0.1)  
The probability P(IE31) of the relevant intermediate 
event “Lack of awareness of combustible dust hazard”, 
would be as: 
 P(IE31) = 1 − (1 − P(X17)) ∗ (1 − P(X18)) ∗
(1 − P(X20)) ∗ (1 − P(X21)) = 1 − (1 − 0.09) ∗
(1 − 0.033) ∗ (1 − 0.0505) ∗ (1 − 0.05) = 0.206 
(compare with the prior value of 0.248) 
 
Table 5.7 Effects of additional safety measures on the ET of bow-tie model 
Existing Safety 
measure 
Improvement 
Effects 
Lack of 
Explosion 
suppression 
Install 
explosion 
suppression 
Explosion suppression system can reduce the severity of 
consequences. For example, when fire is detected, the 
suppression devices will be activated. If this works, the 
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system consequence will become a near miss. Otherwise, more 
serious damage would be caused. 
Failure of 
explosion 
containment 
Suitable 
design  
(SD1) 
Explosion containment should be considered in the design 
stage. Therefore, taking suitable design could lessen the 
probability of flaws. The failure probability of explosion 
containment would be: 
 P(EC|SD1) ∗ P(SD1) + P(EC|SD1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) ∗ P(SD1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) = 0.085 ∗
0.01 + 0.06 ∗ 0.99 = 0.06025 (compare with the prior value 
of 0.085) 
 
As may be seen from the examples given in Table 5.6, after implementation of “Avoid” 
safety measures to the FT, the basic events X8 and X17 will not happen. That is, two 
contributory factors of the dust explosion are eliminated, and hence the probabilities of 
their upper events are reduced. “Prevent” safety measures are used to reduce the 
probability of relative basic events instead of avoiding them, as is the case for X14 and 
X20. The probability of either X14 or X20 is decreased and accordingly the probabilities of 
their upper events are also reduced, which improves the safety of the system. 
Aside from their effects on the FT, safety measures can be applied to the ET to mitigate 
potential damage of dust explosions and improve safety performances. For this case study, 
examples are shown in Table 5.7; via installing explosion suppression system to extinguish 
fires and by taking proper supervision and training to detect potential flaws of explosion 
containment, the damage caused by dust explosions is effectively mitigated. 
Applying the above-mentioned safety measures to the facility, the occurrence probability 
of dust explosions could significantly have been reduced and the damage of dust explosions 
could thus have been lessened to a great extent. This helps to minimize the overall risk of 
a dust explosion. 
5.6 Conclusion 
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In the present study, the basic events and likely consequences of dust explosions along with 
relevant safety measures are investigated and presented through a generic bow-tie. This 
bow-tie can be tailored to model a wide variety of dust explosions in different industries. A 
variety of safety measures are also suggested to reduce the probabilities of basic events. 
The practical application of these safety measures under inherent, engineering and 
procedural categories as well as avoid, prevent, control, and mitigate guide words are 
discussed, which provide suggestions for choosing most effective safety measures. Further, 
the efficacy of the generic bow-tie developed in this study is demonstrated via application 
to a case study, illustrating how effective it can be used for risk analysis of dust explosions 
with minimum complexity. The results also demonstrate the methodology presented in this 
study is able to effectively address most of the basic events contributing to dust explosions 
as well as to noticeably improve system safety. 
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Abstract 
In this study, a risk analysis model of dust explosion scenarios based on Bayesian networks 
is proposed. This model is directly transformed from a Bow-tie model of dust explosions 
taking advantage of the relationship between conventional risk estimation method and 
Bayesian networks. By this model, the risks of dust explosions are evaluated, taking into 
account common failure causes leading to dust explosions and dependencies among causes, 
and also probabilities of potential consequences are analyzed. The most critical events 
leading to dust explosions can be figured out by this model. According to posterior 
probabilities of primary events of dust explosions, studied using a diagnostic approach, the 
primary events related to dust particle properties, oxygen concentration and safety training 
are identified as the most critical factors for dust explosions. The probability adaptation 
concept is also used to learn from previous experience, which helps to dynamically revise 
the Bayesian network and prefigure risk by taking steps to design and implement additional 
safety barriers. This model is also applied to a case study that shows it can be used to depict 
the process of the accident, to estimate the risk of accidents and potential consequences, 
and, more importantly, to pick out the vulnerable parts of system for dust explosions.     
Key words:  Dust explosion; Risk analysis; Bow-tie model; Bayesian network 
6.1 Introduction 
Dust explosions are frequently reported industrial accidents. The earliest records of dust 
explosions date back to the late 1800s (Eckhoff, 2003). Dust explosions have caused huge 
damage to human beings and property. For example, a flax dust explosion caused 58 deaths 
and 177 injuries in Haerbin, China, in 1987 (Eckhoff, 2003). Therefore, better 
understanding of dust explosions mechanism is necessary to prevent dust explosions and 
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reduce their effects. To this end, many experiments and simulations have been done 
(Eckhoff, 2003, 2009; Amyotte et al., 2005; Callé et al., 2005; Benedetto et al., 2007; 
Dufaud et al., 2009). However, due to the complexity of dust explosions, arising from a 
number of uncertain and interlinked primary causes, quantitative risk analysis (QRA) of 
such accidents has been limited (Voort et al., 2007; Khakzad et al., 2012).  
Bow-tie (BT) is one of the widely used risk analysis tools. It integrates primary causes, 
potential consequences and safety measures of an accident scenario using a graphic 
approach. Dianous and Fiévez (2006) proposed a risk assessment methodology based on 
BT to evaluate the efficacy of risk control measures. Mokhtari et al. (2011) evaluated risk 
factors in sea ports and offshore terminals operation and management using BT. Celeste 
and Cristina (2010) proposed a semi-quantitative risk assessment methodology based on 
BT in the ship building industry. Yang (2011) used BT to evaluate risks of maritime security 
and proposed risk management strategies for maritime supply chains. However, due to its 
static characteristics, BT cannot easily be used in dynamic risk analysis unless equipped 
with extra models such as physical reliability models or Bayes’ theorem (Khakzad et al., 
2012).  
The Bayesian network (BN) is able to perform both predictive (forward) analysis and 
diagnostic (backward) analysis. It also can consider common causes of failures, 
sequentially dependent failures, expert judgment, and structural and functional 
uncertainties (Khakzad et al., 2011). BN is widely used in modeling and risk analysis of a 
wide variety of accidents due to its flexible structure and robust reasoning engine (Khakzad 
et al., 2012; Cai et al., 2012; Khakzad et al., 2013a, b, c, d).  
The parallels between conventional methods such as fault tree (FT), event tree (ET) and 
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BN have been discussed in previous work (Bobbio et al., 2001; Bearfield and Marsh, 2005; 
Khakzad et al., 2011). Further, Khakzad et al. (2013a) proposed an algorithm to transform 
a BT into the corresponding BN. This provides a bridge between static risk analysis and 
dynamic risk analysis by combining the features of BT and BN. The present study aims to 
establish a real-time risk analysis model for dust explosions using BN as an extension of a 
BT model. By this real-time model, risks of dust explosions and potential consequences 
resulted from dust explosions could be updated if new information is available. Also, the 
critical events for dust explosions in system could be picked out, which provides evidence 
for applying safety measures in systems to reduce risks of dust explosions in future.   
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.2 briefly introduces mechanism of dust 
explosions, characteristics of BT, BN and the method of mapping BT into BN. In section 
6.3, a generic BN is developed for accident modeling and risk analysis of dust explosions. 
To illustrate the efficacy and applicability of the developed BN, it is applied to a real dust 
explosion in Section 6.4. The conclusions drawn from this work are presented in Section 
6.5. 
6.2 Background 
6.2.1 Dust explosion 
Fuel (combustible dust), oxidants, ignition sources, dispersion of dust (mixing) and 
confinement have been proven to be five essential factors for a dust explosion to occur. 
These factors compose the dust explosion pentagon (Kauffman, 1982) and are 
indispensable in any dust explosion accident (Fig. 3.1). Fuel refers to combustible dust, the 
explosibility of which is mainly influenced by particle size, and combustible dust widely 
exists in various industrial areas such as aluminum products processing factories. Oxidants, 
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usually in the form of oxygen in the air, affect the dust explosion process to a very large 
extent (Abbasi and Abbasi, 2007). Ignition sources, with minimal ignition temperature 
(MIT) or minimal ignition energy (MIE) for a specific dust, can be classified into various 
types such as hot surfaces and friction sparks. A dust cloud will be formed if dust is 
suspended in the air (mixing). Only if the dust concentration is within a certain limit, will 
an explosion happen. Confinement is another factor needed to build up the dust explosion 
energy to cause severe damage.    
There are a number of primary events contributing to the aforementioned five essential 
factors, identified as indirect causes of dust explosions. In hazards assessment of industries 
prone to dust explosions, determining the primary events depends on a variety of factors 
such as the process flow diagram, the equipment and raw materials involved, layout of the 
work area, housekeeping and management. For example, the factor of unsuitable cleaning 
methods can refer to improper use of pressure air to clean depositing dust, which in turn 
can cause dust to disperse in the air, forming a combustible dust cloud. Other primary events 
such as the collapse of equipment can also result in dust clouds. However, in some process 
industries, dust suspensions are considered normal operating conditions. For example, 
pneumatic conveying technology, which is widely applied in bulk material handling 
systems, carries a mixture of powdery materials via a stream of air. Therefore, more 
attention should be paid to identifying hazards for such systems. In the present work, many 
factors are collected from accident reports (CSB, 2004, 2005, 2006), existing regulations 
(NFPA, 65, 68, 69, 91, 650, 654), and the literature (Piccinini, 2008; Abbasi et al., 2007).  
As dust explosions could lead to severe consequences, safety barriers are applied to control 
and mitigate damage. Explosion suppression systems are among the commonly used 
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barriers. When an explosion occurs, an explosion suppression system could be activated to 
prevent further development of the dust explosion. If the suppression system fails, pressure 
resulting from the dust explosion could be vented to outer spaces through venting systems 
to reduce risks. Otherwise, the dust explosion overpressure can be constrained in original 
units if the explosion containment and explosion isolation systems perform successfully. 
An explosion containment system is usually used in small-scale units such as grinding mills 
(Abbasi and Abbasi, 2007). An isolation system, on the other hand, is applied to block 
possible paths to prevent dust explosions spreading to nearby units or workshops. 
6.2.2 Risk analysis methods 
6.2.2.1 Bow-tie method 
BT is a graphical method, composed of a critical event (CE) in the center, an FT on the left, 
and an ET on the right hand side of the critical event (Fig. 3.2). The CE is the top event of 
the FT, and the initiating event of the ET. A BT illustrates an accident scenario, beginning 
from the basic events (BE) and ending with the potential consequences (C). These 
consequences result from the CE and the failure of safety barriers (SB).  
6.2.2.2 Bayesian Network 
The Bayesian network is an inference probabilistic method. It is a directed acyclic graph 
(DAG) which is composed of nodes, arcs and conditional probability tables (CPT). Nodes 
represent random variables while arcs represent dependencies among linked nodes. The 
type and strength of these dependencies are defined via CPTs.  
One of BN’s advantages is probability updating when new information becomes available 
over time. This makes BN a robust tool in risk analysis of dynamic systems. Therefore, the 
probability of dust explosions, likelihood of consequences, and the envisaged risks can be 
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updated as new operational and functional data become available through the system’s 
operation. More importantly, the most critical basic events can be determined and proper 
safety measures can subsequently be applied to the weakest parts of the system.  
Based on the conditional dependence of variables, the joint distribution P(U) of a set of 
variables U=(A1, A2, ...... , An) can be expanded as the equation (3.2). In probability 
updating, prior probabilities of variables are updated (posterior probabilities) through 
Bayes’ theorem given the observation of variables E, called evidence and can be 
represented as the equation (3.4). 
6.2.2.3 Mapping Bow-tie to Bayesian Network 
In order to consider dependencies and common causes of undesired accidents, a risk 
analysis model based on BT needs to be transferred into dynamic risk analysis based on 
BN, which has advantages in risk updating and sequential learning. Using the algorithm 
proposed by Khakzad et al. (2013a), shown in Figure 6.1, a BT can be mapped into the 
corresponding BN model. 
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Fig. 6.1 Mapping BN from BT (Khakzad et al., 2013a) 
6.3 Risk analysis of dust explosions 
6.3.1 Dust explosion Bow-tie 
In previous research (Yuan et al. 2013), detailed bow-tie analysis of dust explosion 
scenarios is established (a part of the bow-tie shown in Figure. 5.3). Descriptions and 
probabilities (Column 3 and 6) of basic events are listed in Table 5.1. Intermediate events, 
safety barriers and potential consequences are also listed in Table 5.2. The probabilities of 
a critical event and its potential consequences are calculated and listed in Table 6.1. 
(Column 2). 
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Table 6.1 Probability of critical event and consequences 
Consequences 
Probability 
(Without considering common 
causes) 
Probability 
(Considering common 
causes) 
Dust Explosion 0.49E-2 0.6E-2 
Near Miss 0.44E-2 0.54E-2 
Mishap 
(Venting success) 
0.4E-3 0.5E-3 
Mishap 
(Isolation success) 
3.43E-5 4.19E-5 
Minor Damage 2.69E-6 3.28E-6 
Catastrophic damage 2.99E-7 3.64E-7 
Significant Damage 
(Isolation Success) 
3.11E-6 3.79E-6 
Significant Damage 
(Evacuation Success) 
2.43E-7 2.97E-7 
Catastrophic Damage 2.7E-8 3.29E-8 
 
As inherent limitations of BT, common cause failures and dependency cannot be 
considered. For example, X9 (Lack of design codes), X10 (Improper design codes) and X11 
(Failure to follow design codes) are basic events of IE27 (Deficiency in design of 
ventilation system). Meanwhile, all of them also cause the intermediate event of improper 
reconstruction of ventilation system (IE29). In the BT of Figure 5.1 (a), these basic events 
have been considered twice; that is, once for IE27 and once for IE29. As is shown in the 
next section, this lack of modeling can result in unrealistic probabilities for both the dust 
explosion and its consequences. Compared to BT, however, common causes and 
dependencies can be easily modeled in a BN. 
6.3.2 Dust explosion Bayesian network 
The BN model of dust explosion scenarios is developed as shown in Figure 6.2. For 
example, if the suppression system successfully functions at the beginning stage of a dust 
explosion, a Near miss will result (Figure 6.2). In the Bayesian network model of Figure 
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6.2, arcs are pointed to the consequence node Near miss from the safety measure node 
Explosion Suppression and critical event node Dust Explosion representing the influence 
of the safety measures and the critical event nodes on the consequence node. Similarly, 
other consequences can be mapped into the Bayesian network of Figure 6.2 from the BT 
of Figure 5.3. 
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Fig. 6.2 Bayesian network model of dust explosions 
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6.3.3 Predictive analysis  
BN can be applied to perform predictive analysis to obtain the probability of a dust 
explosion and its potential consequences (www.hugin.com). Results from the BN model 
are shown in Table 6.1. (column 3). It is worth noting that there are some differences 
between the results of the BN and those of the BT. The reason is whether common cause 
failures are considered in the model or not. As an example, Figure 6.3 illustrates how 
considering such dependency affects the results; for this purpose, the intermediate event 
IE26 and its basic causes have been selected (Figure 6.3). 
 
(a) Ignoring dependencies 
 
(b) Considering dependencies 
Fig. 6.3 BN of IE26 
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X9, X10 and X11 are the common failure causes of IE27 and IE29. In Figure 6.3 (a), when 
ignoring the dependencies between IE27 and IE29 (as in the BT model), the probability of 
IE26 can be calculated as 0.4484, which is the same as the result from the BT model. 
However, when X9, X10 and X11 are considered as common parent nodes, the probability 
of IE26 differs from the above result. As shown in Figure 6.3 (b), when X9, X10 and X11 
are seen as common causes of IE27 and IE29, the probability of IE26 is obtained as 0.3778. 
Thus, as can be seen, ignoring dependencies for this special case results in an 
overestimation of probabilities. 
6.3.4 Risk updating 
One of the main applications of BN is backward analysis or probability updating given 
new information (evidence), which is difficult performed using the BT without being 
coupled with other techniques (Khakzad et al., 2012). In risk updating, given that an 
accident has occurred, the probabilities of the basic causes along with the potential 
consequences of the accident can be revised to obtain updated probabilities. This is 
helpful particularly when the most probable configuration of basic causes of the accident 
is to be determined to allocate preventive safety measures. Likewise, knowing the most 
probable consequences of the accident, mitigation and/or control safety measures can be 
applied to alleviate the risk. 
In dust explosion risk analysis, if a dust explosion or a certain consequence is observed, it 
could be considered as new information in the corresponding BN model to update 
probabilities. 
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Fig. 6.4 Probability Changes of critical events of dust explosions 
Figure 6.4 shows the posterior probabilities of some critical nodes contributing to the dust 
explosion (i.e., conditional probabilities of primary events in a dust explosion). As can be 
seen, the probabilities of nodes X1 (Lack of inert dust for explosible dust) and X2 (Particle 
size in explosive range) have increased to 1.0, emphasizing the critical role of 
combustible dust in dust explosions. Other important factors include the nodes pertinent 
to the ventilation system, i.e., X14 (Blockage in ventilation system) and X13 (Leakage of 
air from ventilation system), related to safety training, i.e., X26 (Inadequately safety 
trained operators in high risk working environment) and X27 (Improper procedures to 
clean settled dust). Also, X31 (Lack of inert gas device), X32 (Inadequate inert gas device) 
and X33 (Failure of inert gas device), which are related to the control of oxidant 
concentration in a dust explosion, become more important for dust explosions according 
to the updated probabilities.  
According to the most probable configuration technique of BN, the most probable set of 
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basic events leading to a dust explosion is determined as the occurrence of X1, X2, X14, 
X26 and X33 and the nonoccurrence of other primary events. Considering this, priority will 
be given to the most probable configuration of the basic events to reduce the probability 
of a dust explosion and thus lower the envisaged risk. 
6.3.5 Sequential learning    
Another important application of BN is sequential learning, experience learning, or 
probability adapting. Using sequential learning, the probabilities can be updated with 
information accumulated over time (Jensen and Nielsen, 2007). This information can be 
in the form of accident precursors, near misses, mishaps, and incidents occurring during 
an operation.  
In risk analysis of dust explosions, sequential learning can be implemented considering 
the previous dust explosions, occurrence of basic events from the system of interest. For 
example, it is assumed that the basic events X5 (Equipment failure of ventilation system), 
X34 (Overloading operation of processing equipment), X43 (Malfunction of equipment 
such as belt slip), X45 (Use unsuitable tools), and X73 (Bad contact) have been observed 
and recorded over a 6-week period as shown in Table 6.2. 
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Table 6.2 Records of abnormal events in 6 weeks 
Week 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Equipment failure of ventilation 
system 
_ 1 _ 1 1 _ 
Overloading operation of processing 
equipment 
1 _ 2 _ 1 1 
Malfunction of equipment such as belt 
slip 
2 1 _ 1 _ 1 
Use of unsuitable tools _ 1 1 _ 1 _ 
Bad contact 1 _ 2 2 _ 1 
 
According to Table 6.2, probabilities of Equipment failure of ventilation system, 
Overloading operation of processing equipment, Malfunction of equipment such as belt 
slip, Use of unsuitable tools and Bad contact are adapted by using relative records in 
Table 6.2. Using these new probabilities, the posterior probabilities of a dust explosion 
and the potential consequences can be calculated at the end of each time interval (week). 
Figure 6.5 shows posterior probabilities of dust explosions and the catastrophic damage 
probability over 6 weeks of the system’s operation. 
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Fig. 6.5 Probabilities of dust explosion and catastrophic damages  
As Figure 6.5 shows, the probabilities of dust explosion and catastrophic damage have 
increased more than two times at the sixth week, compared with week 0: the probability 
of dust explosion ascends from 0.06 in week 0 to 0.0124 in week 6 and the probability of 
catastrophic damage rises from 3.29E-08 in week 0 to 6.82E-08 in week 6. Although only 
the trend of catastrophic damage is shown here, other consequences’ probabilities also 
show a rising trend with time (weeks). 
6.4 Application of the methodology 
To illustrate the application of the BN developed for dust explosions, it is applied to risk 
analysis of a dust explosion accident in a wool factory in Vigliano Biellese, Biella, Italy 
on January 9, 2001 (Piccinini, 2008). According to the accident report (Piccinini, 2008), 
the generic BN model in Figure 6.2 is tailored to model the accident scenario (Figure 6.6). 
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Fig. 6.6 BN Model of Wool Dust Explosion 
In Figure 6.6, all the node indices are the same as those in Table 5.1.  
The probability of a dust explosion in the wool factory is calculated as 4.35E-02 
(compared with 2.49E-02 obtained from the BT model). Also, the probabilities of the 
different consequences are presented in Table 6.3. 
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Table 6.3 Probabilities of Consequences 
 BT model BN model 
Dust explosion 2.49 E -02 4.35E-02 
Minor damage 2.06 E -02 3.59E -02 
Catastrophic damage 
(Evacuation fails) 
2.28 E -03 3.99E-03 
Significant damage 
(Containment fails & 
Evacuation succeeds) 
1.86E -03 3.25E-03 
Catastrophic damage 2.07E -04 3.61E-04 
 
Given the dust explosion, the updated probabilities of the basic events (descriptions of 
basic events are shown in Table 5.1.) are shown in Table 6.4.  
Table 6.4 Probabilities and updated probabilities of basic events 
Symbol Description Probability 
Updated 
Probability 
Symbol Description Probability 
Updated 
Probability 
X2 Particle size in 
explosive range 
0.71 1.0 X35 Lack of surface 
shielding/isolati
on for high 
temperature 
equipment 
0.067 0.067 
X8 Lack of regular 
inspection 
0.01 0.022 X37 Mechanical 
failure of 
equipment such 
as bearings or 
blowers 
0.04 0.04 
X14 Blockage in 
ventilation 
system  
0.145 0.32 X38 Lack of 
excessive 
temperature 
controlling 
system 
0.045 0.045 
X17 Inadequate 
stewardship 
program of 
manufacturers of 
raw materials 
0.09 0.20 X62 Lack of 
gas/temperature 
detection 
system 
0.045 0.045 
X18 Lack of methods 
to identify 
hazards 
0.033 0.73 X65 Unsuitable 
storage methods 
0.045 0.045 
X20 Employee 
unaware of dust 
0.1 0.22 X66 Lack of fire 
suppression 
0.045 0.043 
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explosion hazard system 
X21 Inadequate safety 
training about 
combustible dust 
hazard 
0.05 0.11 X71 Ignition of 
settled dust 
0.005 0.005 
X24 Lack of dust-tight 
system 
0.045 0.099 X74 Combustion 0.3 0.3 
X28 Lack of isolation 
devices 
0.055 0.41 X75 Lack of 
separation 
device to 
prevent burning 
dust from 
entering process 
system 
0.045 0.045 
X30 Collapse of 
equipment  
0.085 0.63 X78 Lack of dust 
suppressants 
0.1 0.22 
 
According to the updated probabilities of Table 6.4., the most critical events are X2, X18, 
X30, X28, X14, X20, X78, X17 and X21, showing the highest increase in their probabilities. 
The particle size of burrs and noils in explosion range (X2) is an essential factor for this 
accident. The explosivity of dust, sticking to the nets of the burr cells or gathering in an 
air conditioning system, have been proven to be high according to the accident report of 
Piccinini (2008). Further, the stewardship program of burrs is inadequate (X17) in this 
wool factory; there is a lack of methods to identify hazards (X18). Also, employees being 
unaware of dust explosion hazards (X20) and inadequate safety training about burrs 
hazard (X21) are some reasons for a lack of awareness of a combustible dust hazard (IE31) 
causing poor housekeeping (IE32). Small smouldering combustion events occurred almost 
daily, according to the accident report (Piccinini, 2008). As one of the injured technicians 
described, “the underground is a kingdom of dust” due to the lack of dust suppressant 
(X78) and the application of the pneumatic conveying system. Collapse of the net that 
separated the two cells (X30) was considered by Piccinini (2008) as the likely cause of 
cloud dust formation. After the primary explosion happened, the dust accumulated at bag 
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filters of the air conditioning system, resulting from the blockage in the ventilation system 
in storage cells (X14), was aroused by pressure waves caused by the primary explosion 
and the lack of isolation devices between cells and bag filters (X28) leading to the pressure 
transmission from cells to bag filters.  According to Piccinini (2008), at least 400-500kg 
flammable fibers, mainly on the ground floor equipment, such as bag filters of air 
conditioners, were involved in this deflagration. Further, based on the most probable 
configuration analysis, the particle size of burrs and noils in explosion range (X2), 
blockage in the ventilation system in storage cells (X14), and collapse of the net that 
separated the two cells (X30) are determined as the most probable causes of the accident. 
All these events are the essential components of the dust explosion pentagon as are 
oxygen underground and complex ignition sources in this case. Therefore, the results 
obtained from the BN model in this study are in agreement with those of the accident 
report (Piccinini, 2008). Also, the most critical events for this dust explosion have been 
explored through Bayesian model analysis, illustrating the priority of safety measures for 
this wool factory. 
6.5 Conclusions 
In the present research, a risk analysis model of dust explosions was developed based on 
the Bayesian network. Probabilities of dust explosions and potential consequences were 
calculated using the BN compared with BT developed in a previous study. The 
differences between the results of BT and BN highlight the importance of considering 
common failure causes and dependencies in complex accident scenarios such as dust 
explosions. 
Taking advantage of probability updating and sequential learning of BN, a dynamic risk 
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analysis of dust explosions was also conducted. The critical basic events as well as the 
most probable configuration of basic events leading to a dust explosion were identified. 
These are particle properties, oxygen concentration and safety training. The current study 
also demonstrated the value of experience learning when accident related data over time 
is available. The model is tested and verified using the study of a past accident.  
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Abstract 
Optimal allocation of safety measures in order to reduce threats of dust explosions is very 
challenging, particularly when all potential accident contributors and various safety 
measures are to be taken into account. In this paper, we have proposed a risk-based optimal 
allocation of safety measures while considering both available budget and acceptable 
residual risk. The methodology is based on a Bayesian network (BN) to model the risk of 
dust explosions, which in turn helps to identify key contributing factors, assess 
performances of relative safety measures, and decide on those safety measures to most 
efficiently control the risks of dust explosions within a limited budget. The Bayesian 
network also facilitates the implementation of diagnostic analysis to determine vulnerable 
parts in the system to which special attention should be paid in safety measure allocation. 
The Net Risk Reduction Gain (NRRG) for each relevant safety measure is also used to 
simultaneously account for both the cost of a safety measure and the respective risk 
reduction. Accordingly, the risk-based optimal allocation of safety measures will be 
achieved by maximizing the sum of the NRRG of all relevant safety measures under limited 
budgets, which is regarded as a knapsack problem. We applied the methodology to the 
aluminum dust explosion that occurred at Hayes Lemmerz International, Huntington, 
Indiana, US in October 2003. The result shows the efficacy and applicability of the 
proposed methodology for optimal risk reduction within a limited budget. 
Key Words: Risk analysis model, dust explosions, safety measures, optimization, Bayesian 
network 
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7.1 Introduction 
Dust explosions have been reported as a wide-ranging threat to industrial safety in recent 
decades (Blair, 2007; Zheng et al., 2009; Giby and Luca, 2010), having caused huge losses 
in terms of operators, shareholders, assets and the environment (CSB, 2004, 2005a, b, 2006). 
According to previous work (Abbasi, 2007), fuel, oxidant, ignition source, suspension, and 
confinement are five essential elements for every dust explosion. Accordingly, safety 
measures proposed to avoid or prevent dust explosions are mainly aimed at eliminating one 
or more of these essential factors. For example, the use of an explosion-proof vacuum to 
remove accumulated dust layers is usually intended to eliminate the possibility of 
suspension in areas with high explosion risks (Amyotte et al., 2009). In real cases, each 
essential element might be provided or triggered by a series of factors. For example, settled 
dust might be suspended by various causes such as incorrect methods of housekeeping or 
pressure waves from nearby explosions, to form a combustible dust cloud. Since each 
causation factor could further result from other lower level root causes, a large number of 
factors, directly or indirectly, could contribute to industrial dust explosions. Further, there 
are numerous relevant safety measures to prevent and control dust explosions, ranging from 
inherent to engineering to procedural safety measures, each with their own specific 
characteristics and applications. The complexities of potential dust explosions on one hand, 
and the versatility of pertinent safety measures on the other, introduce significant 
challenges in optimal allocation of safety strategies for dust explosions. Ideally, safety 
measures should be assigned to all dust explosion contributing factors in a process plant; 
however, the available budgets for system safety improvements are usually limited in reality. 
Therefore, decision-makers often face the dilemma of balancing risk reduction with the 
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costs of safety measures.  
Recently, there have been attempts to develop probabilistic models for risk analysis and 
safety assessment of combustible dust (Hassan et al., 2013) and dust explosions (Van der 
Voort et al., 2007; Yuan et al., 2013; Yuan et al., 2014). Van der Voort et al. (2007) proposed 
a quantitative risk analysis tool for the external safety assessment of industrial plants prone 
to dust explosion hazards. Yuan et al. (2013, 2014) developed a generic risk model for 
likelihood modeling and safety analysis of dust explosions based on the bow-tie and 
Bayesian network (BN). In their model, an attempt has been made both to consider as many 
dust explosion root causes as possible and to collect and categorize pertinent safety barriers. 
Since the present work is based on the work of Yuan et al. (2014), the BN and the 
explanation of its components are shown in Figure 6.2 and Tables 5.1 and 5.2, respectively.  
Caputo et al. (2013) proposed a multi-criteria “knapsack” model to select safety measures 
via a balancing between risk reduction (benefit) and cost of safety measures. In a similar 
approach, Reniers and Sörensen (2013) proposed an optimization model based on a risk 
matrix. However, the lack of risk models in the foregoing methods means that the risk of 
accidents and the effects of safety measures on estimated risk are based mainly on 
subjective judgments of decision-makers. The current paper proposes a risk-based 
optimization method for allocation of safety measures to avoid or prevent dust explosions 
based on dynamic risk analysis with the advantage of identifying the most critical factors 
when assigning the safety measures. 
The paper is organized as follows. The fundamentals of the risk analysis model for dust 
explosions and the functions of relevant safety measures are recapitulated in Section 7.2. 
The developed methodology for risk-based optimal allocation of safety measures is then 
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presented in Section 7.3. To verify the efficacy of the model, it is applied to a case-study in 
Section 7.4 while the main conclusions are summarized in Section 7.5. 
7.2 Background 
7.2.1 Bayesian networks 
BN are directed acyclic graphs used to represent random variables and dependencies among 
them by means of chance nodes and directed arcs. Accordingly, the type and strength of 
such dependencies are modeled via conditional probability tables. Like conventional risk 
analysis methods such as fault tree and bow-tie, BN can be used to perform prognostic 
(forward) analysis. However, the main advantage of BN over fault tree and bow-tie is its 
ability to perform diagnostic (backward) analysis or probability updating when new 
information becomes available. Compared to prior probabilities, posterior (updated) 
probabilities are more reliable and reflect the real-time situation of the system of interest, 
as the newest information and operational data are taken into account (Khakzad et al., 2011). 
Therefore, the most critical factors contributing to an accident can be defined based on a 
comparison between prior and posterior probabilities if the occurrence of the accident is set 
as the evidence.  
According to the local conditional dependence of variables, the joint distribution P(X) of a 
set of variables X=(X1, X2, ... , Xn) can be factored as the equation 3.2. 
Using Bayes’ theorem, prior probabilities of variables can be updated given the evidence 
E, as the equation 3.4. 
The following case is a simplified evacuation model by using a free-fail boat and a rescue 
boat in an offshore system (Eleye-Datubo et al., 2006). The explanations of the symbols 
are shown in Figure 7.1. 
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Fig. 7.1 Simplified BN showing a marine evacuation scenario (Eleye-Datubo et al., 
2006) 
Based on equation 7.1, the probability of free-fail boat launch, P(B), and the probability 
of rescue boat launch, P(C), can be calculated as: 
𝑃(𝐵) = 𝑃(𝐵|𝐴)𝑃(𝐴) + 𝑃(𝐵|?̅?)𝑃(?̅?) = 0.96 ∗ 0.355 + 0.08 ∗ 0.645 = 0.392 
𝑃(𝐶) = 𝑃(𝐶|𝐴)𝑃(𝐴) + 𝑃(𝐶|?̅?)𝑃(?̅?) = 0.65 ∗ 0.355 + 0.05 ∗ 0.645 = 0.263 
Assuming the launching of free-fail boat already happened, which is set as the evidence, 
the prior probabilities of A and C can be updated respectively as: 
𝑃(𝐴|𝐵) =
𝑃(𝐵|𝐴)𝑃(𝐴)
𝑃(𝐵)
=
0.96 ∗ 0.355
0.392
= 0.869 
𝑃(𝐶) = 𝑃(𝐶|𝐴)𝑃(𝐴) + 𝑃(𝐶|?̅?)𝑃(?̅?) = 0.65 ∗ 0.869 + 0.05 ∗ 0.131 = 0.571 
7.2.2 Safety measures 
Based on risk management principles, safety measures can be divided into three types: 
inherent, engineered, and procedural. Inherent safety measures eliminate hazards by 
focusing on the properties of materials or making improvements in the design stage without 
additional equipment. Minimization, substitution, moderation and simplification are the 
four key principles in inherent safety (Amyotte et al., 2007, 2009; Kletz, 1978, 2003). For 
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example, the removal of deposited combustible dust via good housekeeping can effectively 
reduce the concentration in a potentially combustible dust cloud. Therefore, it can be 
considered as minimization in the context of inherent safety measures, with strong 
overtones of procedural safety (Amyotte et al., 2009). However, engineered safety 
measures rely on additional safety equipment. According to their method of operation, they 
are further classified into passive or active devices. Unlike active safety measures, passive 
safety measures do not depend on an external activator, actuator or human intervention, 
making them more reliable than active safety measures. For procedural safety measures 
(e.g., safety training), however, the focus is mainly on system management to improve 
human performance (e.g., reducing human response time) or eliminate human errors. 
In safety decision making, inherent safety measures are usually given priority, compared to 
the other types of safety measures. Aside from inherent safety measures, passive safety 
measures are preferred next as they do not depend on external controlling or activating 
systems. Next to passive are active safety measures while the last option would be 
procedural safety measures. The recommended order of safety measures selection is shown 
in Figure 7.2 (in the direction of the arrowhead).  
 
Fig. 7.2 Recommended preference of safety measures 
In terms of the influence safety measures have on risk, they can be further labeled according 
to four keywords: avoid, prevent, control and mitigate. To be labelled using the avoid and 
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prevent keywords, a safety measure should be applied before an accident occurs. After 
application of an avoid safety measure, the abnormal event will not happen. However, a 
prevent safety measure reduces the occurrence probability of a certain event. Classifying 
the control and mitigate keywords, these safety measures are mainly employed after an 
accident occurs in order to control or reduce the resulting damage (Dianous et al., 2006). 
Depending on the functioning or malfunctioning of safety measures, their impacts on the 
likelihood of abnormal events can be derived using the “Law of Total Probability”. For 
example, if magnetic equipment (SMme) is installed in an inlet to prevent tramp metal from 
entering the system to prevent impact sparks, then the probability of tramp metal entering 
the system, P(TM) is: 
P(TM) = P(TM|SMme) ∗ P(SMme) + P(TM|SMme̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) ∗ P(SMme̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)                    (7.1) 
In the above equation, P(SMme) stands for the failure probability of magnetic equipment; 
P(TM|SMme) refers to the conditional probability of tramp metal entering the system given 
the failure of magnetic equipment. Similarly, P(TM|SMme̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) is the conditional probability 
of tramp metal entering the system given the functioning of the magnetic equipment. 
Further information about the classification and function of safety measures can be found 
in Dianous et al. (2006) and Yuan et al. (2013). 
7.2.3 Potential losses from accidents 
To calculate the risk of an accident scenario, the essential information needed is the 
potential damage resulting from the accident along with the probability of the accident. 
Usually, accidents result in damage to either tangible assets such as equipment or intangible 
assets such as market value or company reputation. Compared to tangible losses, the 
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intangible damages are more difficult to assess and are thus often ignored in risk 
assessments. For example, Capelle-Blancard and Marie-Aude (2010) discussed the loss of 
market value caused by accidents and found that shareholders suffer a significant loss of 
about 1.3% in the two days following an accident. 
In the current research based on the severity of dust explosions, potential consequences are 
classified as: near miss, mishap, minor damage, significant damage and catastrophic 
damage. Category definitions were given in our previous work (Yuan et al., 2013), and are 
also listed in Table 7.1. 
Table 7.1 Classification of consequences 
Consequence Description 
Near miss Dust explosion is controlled at its initial stages, and the system can be recovered 
quickly. 
Mishap 
Process is interrupted, and more time is needed to recover the system compared 
to that of a near miss. However, no damage is caused to apparatus/equipment or 
harm to operators. 
Minor damage Equipment may be damaged, and superficial injuries are expected. 
Significant 
damage 
Equipment is damaged along with the possibility of serious injury or death. 
Catastrophic 
damage 
Major facility damage is caused, and several fatalities are expected. 
 
The damage of different consequences can be weighted by equivalent economic losses as 
shown in Table 7.2, which is adopted from the consequence severity matrix proposed by 
Kalantarnia (2009). 
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Table 7.2 Consequence severity matrix (adopted from Kalantarnia, 2009) 
Consequence Dollar 
value 
equivalent 
Asset loss Human loss Environment loss Reputation 
Near miss 0.01K-1K 
Short term production 
interruption 
No injury 
Around the operating 
unit, easy recovery 
and remediation 
Get noticed by the 
operation line 
workers/line supervisor 
Mishap 1K-50K 
Medium term 
production interruption 
No injury 
Around the operating 
line, easy recovery 
and remediation 
Get noticed in plant 
Minor 
damage 
50K-0.5M 
Equipment damage of 
one or more units 
requiring repair/long 
term production 
interruption 
Superficial 
injuries 
Within plant, short 
term remediation 
effort 
Get attention in the 
industrial complex, 
information shared with 
neighboring units 
Significant 
damage 
0.5M-50M 
Loss of major portion 
of equipment/product 
Multiple major 
injuries, potential 
disabilities, 
potential threat to 
life, or one fatality 
Minor offsite impact 
Local media coverage 
or regional media 
coverage, brief national 
media note 
Catastrophic 
damage 
>50M 
Loss of all 
equipment/product 
Multiple fatalities 
Community 
evacuation  
National media 
coverage, brief note on 
international media 
 
7.3 Approach for optimal safety strategies for dust explosions 
The main steps for risk-based optimization of safety measures are expressed in Figure 
7.3. The protocol is a combination of a risk analysis model for dust explosions and an 
optimization method to help decision-makers search for the most efficient safety strategy. 
Explanation of these steps can be found in the following subsections. 
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Fig. 7.3 Flow chart of the proposed optimization method 
Step 1-Development of risk analysis model for dust explosions using Bayesian network: 
Considering a specific case study, the generic BN developed in Figure 6.2 for risk 
analysis of dust explosions will be tailored by adding or eliminating factors to fit the case 
study of interest. 
The dust explosion accident at CTA Acoustics, Inc. in Corbin, USA, in 2003 (CSB, 
2005a) caused seven deaths and 37 injuries, and is chosen as an example to illustrate the 
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methodology. According to the accident report provided by CSB (2005a), the phenolic 
resin dust was identified as the contributor for this accident. The dust explosion was 
triggered by the fire escaping through an open oven door and occurred in the area near the 
oven in line 405. It the risk model of the dust explosion is developed as shown in Figure 
7.4. 
 
Fig. 7.4 Risk model of CTA dust explosion 
Most of the symbols appearing in Figure 7.4 are the same as those used in the generic 
model. Some alteration, however, is required to better represent the case study under 
 145 
 
consideration. For example, in the CTA Acoustics case, the ignition source might have 
been the fire caused by combustible materials in the oven of line 405. At the same time, 
as the oven door was improperly opened, the fire would have propagated from the oven to 
nearby spaces. To accurately depict this process, IE43, standing for Fire propagated from 
oven in line 405, is added to the risk model as shown in Figure 7.4. This modification and 
other specific nodes for this case and their corresponding descriptions are listed in Table 
7.3. 
Table 7.3 Specific intermediate events added to the risk model of Figure 6.4 
Symbol Description 
IE43 Fire propagated from oven in line 405 
IE44 Accumulated combustible materials caught fire in oven 
IE45 Door of oven was improperly opened 
 
Step 2- Analyze critical factors in system: As mentioned above, one of the advantages of 
BN is to utilize the latest known information (evidence) of some nodes to renew the 
probabilities of other nodes of a system. In this step, the occurrence of the critical event, 
i.e., dust explosion, is set as evidence. Then the probability of all contributing factors can 
be updated accordingly to yield posterior probabilities. Among these posterior 
probabilities, the factors with the highest values are considered as more important 
contributors to the dust explosion than others. Therefore, they should be given priority in 
safety improvement design. For this reason, the posterior probabilities of the CTA 
Acoustics dust explosion have been calculated, and the most important contributing 
factors are presented in Figure 7.5 and their descriptions are shown in Table 7.4 (column 
2). 
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Fig. 7.5 Critical factors of CTA Acoustics dust explosion  
Step 3- Selection of safety measures for critical factors: After obtaining the critical factors 
for the system, individual safety measures should be proposed according to suggestions 
made by experts. Some safety measures for each factor of the generic model of dust 
explosions have been recommended in our previous work (Yuan et al., 2013). In the case 
that more than one safety measure is suggested for a critical factor, the safety measures 
should be categorized first according to risk management principles. Priority should then 
be given to inherent, engineered and procedural safety measures in that order. 
For the CTA Acoustics case, potential safety measures for each critical factor and the 
relevant categories are listed in Table 7.4: 
Table 7.4 Safety measures for critical factors 
Symbol Description Safety Measures Category 
X8 
Inadequate regular 
cleaning 
Ensure combustible materials could be 
removed from oven in time 
Inherent, 
Procedural 
X16 
Not strictly 
applying relevant 
guideline 
Strictly follow NFPA 654, NFPA 86 and 
CTA Acoustics incident investigation 
program 
Procedural 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
X8 X16 X39
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X39 
Failure of 
excessive 
temperature 
controlling system 
Install excessive temperature controller 
with higher reliability 
Inherent 
Install new excessive temperature 
controller (same type) 
Active 
Engineered 
Repair broken excessive temperature 
controller in time 
Procedural 
 
As shown in Table 7.4, three possible safety measures have been proposed for basic event 
X39 and classified into inherent, engineered and procedural safety, respectively (shown in 
dashed box). According to the recommended order of preference, the inherent safety 
measure, Install excessive temperature controller with higher reliability, is chosen as the 
safety measure for X39 together with the safety measures for X8 and X16 as presented in 
Table 7.4.  
Step 4- Estimate effects of safety measures on risk reduction: Risk can be defined as:  
Risk = ∑ Pi ∗ Li
n
i=1                                 (7.2) 
where Pi  refers to the probability of the i-th consequence, and Li  stands for the 
corresponding losses, which are usually converted into equivalent financial losses. 
Risk Reduction Index (RRI) is defined to represent the effect of a safety measure on the 
system risk:  
RRIi =
(Rb − Rai)
Rb
⁄                              (7.3) 
where Rb is the risk of the system before application of safety measures; Rai is the risk of 
the system after the application of the i-th safety measure.  
Thus, RRIi must fall between 0 and 1. The closer to 1, the more efficient the i-th safety 
measure is with respect to risk reduction.  
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To obtain the RRI of each safety measure in the CTA Acoustics case, safety measure effects 
on either the probabilities of the basic events (Table 7.5) or those of the accident and 
potential consequences (Table 7.6) should be calculated. 
Table 7.5 Probabilities of basic events with and without safety measures 
Safety 
Measure 
Without 
safety 
measure 
With safety measure 
X8 0.010 P(X8) = P(X8|SMX8)P(SMX8) + P(X8|SMX8̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)P(SMX8̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)
= 0.01 ∗ 0.01 + 0.005 ∗ 0.99 = 0.005 
X16 0.045 P(X16) = P(X16|SMX16)P(SMX16) + P(X16|SMX16̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )P(SMX16̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )
= 0.045 ∗ 0.01 + 0.025 ∗ 0.99 = 0.025 
X39 0.080 P(X39) = 0.040 (new controller with higher reliability) 
 
Table 7.6 Probabilities of critical events and consequences with and without safety 
measures 
 
Without safety 
measure 
With 
SMX8 
With 
SMX16 
With 
SMX39 
Dust Explosion 4.97E-5 2.63E-5 2.78E-5 3.23E-5 
Near Miss * * 2.50E-5 * 
Significant Damage(Isolation Success) 4.57E-5 2.42E-5 2.56E-6 2.97E-5 
Significant Damage(Evacuation 
Success) 
3.58E-6 1.90E-6 2.00E-7 2.32E-6 
Catastrophic Damage(Evacuation 
failure) 
3.97E-7 2.11E-7 2.22E-8 2.58E-7 
 
To calculate the RRI of each safety measure, the potential financial losses caused by the 
dust explosion are also estimated according to Table 7.2. For example, according to the 
description of a near miss in Table 7.2, the losses are mainly from the short term 
production interruption. Here, we assume the time for recovering a unit is one hour and 
the loss resulting from the production interruption is $850/hour. Therefore, the loss of a 
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near miss equals $850. Similarly, the other losses for different categories of damage can 
be estimated for the CTA Acoustics case and the results are listed in Table 7.7. 
Table 7.7 Potential losses of CTA Acoustics dust explosion 
 Near Miss 
Significant 
Damage 
(Isolation success) 
Significant Damage 
(Evacuation success) 
Catastrophic 
Damage 
(Evacuation fail) 
Dollar value 
equivalent 
($) 
850 7 000 000 50 000 000 170 000 000 
 
Then, based on Equation (7.4), the risk before application of safety measures can be 
calculated as: 
Rb = 4.57e − 5 ∗ 7000000 + 3.58e − 6 ∗ 50000000 + 3.97e − 7 ∗ 170000000 = 566.320 
Similarly, the risk after the application of a certain safety measure and the corresponding 
RRI can be obtained (Table 7.8). 
Table 7.8 Risk after application of safety measures and RRI 
Safety 
measure 
Risk after application of safety 
measure 
RRI 
SMX8 300.270 0.470 
SMX16 31.715 0.944 
SMX39 367.760 0.351 
 
Step 5- Estimate cost of each safety measure: In this research, fixed cost and regular 
operation cost are estimated to form an Operation and Fixed Cost (OFC) index as 
expressed by Equation (7.4): 
OFC = fixed cost + regular operation cost      (7.4) 
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For safety measures requiring additional equipment, such as installation of fire 
extinguishing equipment in the system, the fixed cost refers to the expense for purchasing 
equipment and regular operation cost mainly includes the costs of installation, personnel 
training for new equipment, and regular maintenance.  
For different types of safety measures, expenditure on equipment and on operation 
presents different characteristics. For example, for safety measures relying on 
management, the majority of the cost is due to regular operation. For example, the cost of 
the safety measure taking safety training to enforce consciousness for combustible dust 
hazards is mainly used for organizing safety training and hiring safety trainers. However, 
for safety measures involving additional equipment, the fixed cost might be much higher 
than the operation cost. Compared to the fixed cost of equipment, the cost of operation 
will accompany each operation and maintenance procedure. A typical example is the 
installation of suppression systems. After purchasing the equipment, maintenance and 
training might continue throughout the equipment’s lifetime. The fixed cost of equipment 
can usually be readily obtained from suppliers. Operation cost should be further analyzed 
for individual cases. 
Cost potential index (Ci) of safety measure i can be expressed as: 
Ci = OFC/CB                     (7.5) 
where CB stands for the budget allocated for the safety strategy. 
According to this definition, Ci of a suitable safety measure should be between 0 and 1. If 
Ci>1; then, the cost of a given safety measure is beyond the budget, which means the safety 
measure must be excluded from the potential safety measure list. The closer to 0, the less 
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amount of the budget the safety measure costs. 
To better represent the usage of the methodology, assuming the budget for safety 
improvement at CTA Acoustics is $23000 (because of less than this number, this optimal 
problem will be simplified as an either-or question, either SMX8 and SMX39 or SMX16 and 
SMX39.). Then OFC and Ci for each safety measure can be calculated respectively (Table 
7.9). 
Table 7.9 OFC and Ci of safety measures 
Safety Measure Fixed cost Operation cost OFC Ci 
SMX8 0 $8000 $8000 0.348 
SMX16 $2000 $13000 $15000 0.652 
SMX39 $1500 $3000 $4500 0.196 
 
Step 6- Calculate Net Risk Reduction Gain of each safety measure: Net Risk Reduction 
Gain (NRRG) index of safety measure i is also defined in this work as: 
NRRGi = ω1 ∗ RRIi − ω2 ∗ Ci               (7.6) 
Where ωi is a weighting factor indicating the importance of a particular objective estimated 
by decision makers. It should be noted that ω1 + ω2 = 1. 
The net gain of risk reduction brought about by safety measure i will be reduced, because 
the high cost of safety measure i might make an analyst hesitate to apply the safety 
measure. 
In the CTA Acoustics case, assuming that both risk reduction and cost are of the same 
importance would result in ω1=ω2=0.5. Table 7.10 presents the results for NRRG 
calculation.  
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Table 7.10 NRRG of safety measures 
 SMX8 SMX16 SMX39 
NRRG 0.061 0.146 0.078 
 
Step 7- Develop optimization model to select suitable safety measure: The objective is to 
maximize the sum of NRRGi; that is, the net gain of risk reduction should be the greatest 
after the application of the optimal safety strategy under the constraint of the limited 
available budget, which appears to be a typical knapsack problem. So the objective and 
constraint functions can be established as: 
Maxz = ∑ NRRGjxj
n
j=1     (7.7) 
s.t.{
∑ Cjxj ≤ CB
n
j=1
xj = 0 or 1          (j = 1, … , n)
 
where Cj is the cost of safety measure j, and CB is the budget for safety improvement. When 
safety measure j is chosen, xj equals 1. Otherwise, xj equals 0. 
The objective and constraint functions can be developed for the CTA Acoustics case as: 
Maxz = ∑ NRRGjxjj  for j=8, 16, and 39  (7.8) 
s.t.{
∑ Cjxj ≤ 23000$          j
xj = 0 or 1          (for j = 8, 16, and 39)
 
Solving the above set of equations, the results will be x= (0, 1, 1), which means SMX8 will 
not be considered while SMX16 and SMX39 should be taken into account in an optimal safety 
strategy. As a result, the maximum net risk reduction 0.2235 will be gained while satisfying 
the financial constraints. 
7.4 Case study 
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7.4.1 Introduction 
To further illustrate the application of the methodology, the dust explosion at Hayes 
Lemmerz International-Huntington, Inc. Indiana, USA, in 2003 (CSB, 2005b) is considered. 
According to the investigation report, this accident “occurred in the scrap reprocessing area, 
destroyed the dust collection system outside the building, lifted a portion of the building 
roof above one furnace and ignited a fire for several hours”(CSB, 2005b). CSB (2005b) 
concluded this explosion might have originated in the dust collector and propagated to the 
drop box, then traveled to Furnace 5 and ignited accumulated dust in the vortex box. The 
layout of the equipment is shown in Figure 7.6. 
 
Fig. 7.6 Layout of equipment (CSB, 2005b) 
7.4.2 Optimal safety measures allocation for Hayes Lemmerz dust explosion 
The risk analysis model given in Figure 7.7 for the dust explosion at Hayes Lemmerz was 
established using the generic model and using the details in CSB (2005b). The 
corresponding symbols appearing in this model and their descriptions can be found in 
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Tables 5.1 and 5.2. 
 
Fig. 7.7 Risk analysis model of dust explosion for Hayes Lemmerz 
Most of the symbols in Figure 7.7 are the same as those presented in the generic model in 
Figure 6.2. However, some new nodes have been added, and small changes have been made 
to tailor the generic model to fit this specific case study. For example, the basic event 
chemical reaction between rusty tramp metal and aluminum dust is suspected as one of the 
likely ignition sources for this accident (CSB, 2005b). Therefore, this event is added to the 
model as X80 as shown in Figure 7.7. Likewise, lack of vibratory separator at dryer outlet, 
X81, which leads to dust accumulation on surfaces inside vortex box, side well and fume 
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hood, IE43, are added to the model accordingly. 
Based on the above risk analysis model for Hayes Lemmerz, the occurrence of the dust 
explosion is set as evidence to update prior probabilities of all the basic events (Columns 3 
and 7 in Table 7.11). 
The increased ratio can be simply calculated as: Increased ratio = (Posterior − Prior) ⁄
Prior. Results are listed in Columns 4 and 8 of Table 7.11.  
It can be seen that all posterior probabilities are greater than the respective prior 
probabilities. Basic events with the highest increased ratios and higher posterior values 
are assumed to have made a greater contribution to the dust explosion and are thus 
selected as critical factors that need to be improved (shown in bold type in Table 7.11). 
Table 7.11 Prior and Posterior Probabilities of Basic Events 
Symbol Prior Posterior 
Increased 
Ratio 
Symbol Prior Posterior 
Increased 
Ratio 
X3 0.010 0.01428 0.428 X44 0.050 0.08077 0.615 
X6 0.033 0.03308 0.002 X50 0.045 0.07594 0.688 
X8 0.010 0.01002 0.002 X71 0.005 0.00728 0.456 
X15 0.100 0.95547 8.555 X74 0.300 0.43694 0.457 
X18 0.033 0.03308 0.002 X75 0.045 0.23496 4.221 
X19 0.090 0.09022 0.002 X79 0.0078 0.00873 0.119 
X20 0.100 0.10024 0.002 X80 0.050 0.76825 14.365 
X21 0.050 0.05012 0.002 X81 0.083 0.11856 0.428 
X28 0.055 0.09708 0.765     
 
Having identified the critical factors, relevant safety measures for each critical factor are 
proposed, as listed in Table 7.12. 
As can be seen from Table 7.12, there could be more than one potential safety measure 
allocated to critical event X28 (shown in dashed box). Based on the proposed risk 
management principles, the safety measure Install new isolation equipment belongs to the 
category of active engineered safety measures. Thus, compared to the other two 
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procedural safety measures, i.e., Conduct safety training to ensure correct installation of 
isolation devices and Conduct regular inspection, the engineered safety measure is given 
priority, and is selected as the potential safety measure for X28. Further, it can be observed 
that if a magnetic separator is installed in the system, probabilities of impact sparks 
caused by tramp metal and chemical reaction between rusty tramp metal and aluminum 
powders could be reduced at the same time. Thus, for these two critical events, the same 
safety measure is adopted. 
Table 7.12 Safety measures for potential optimization objects 
Symbol Safety Measure Symbol Safety Measure 
X3 Clean up accumulated dust at filter X74 Enforce housekeeping or maintenance of 
fume hood to reduce deposits 
X15 Improve structure of dust collector system 
and ensure it meets NFPA requirements 
X75 Install proper covers to reduce ingress of 
embers 
X28 
Install new isolation equipment 
Conduct safety training to ensure correct 
installation of isolation devices 
Conduct Regular inspection 
X80 Install magnetic separators at inlet to 
remove rusty tramp metal 
X44 Install magnetic separators at inlet to 
remove tramp metal 
X81 Install vibratory separator at dryer outlet 
X50 Install spark box   
 
To seek the effect of chosen safety measures on the critical events (see Table 7.13), 
probabilities of these critical events are considered before and after implementation of the 
safety measures, as shown in Table 7.13. 
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Table 7.13 Effects of safety measures on critical events 
Safety 
Measure 
Probabilities 
without safety 
measures 
Probabilities of basic events with safety measures 
X3 0.010 P(X8) = P(X3|SMX3) ∗ P(SMX3) + P(X3|SMX3̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) ∗ P(SMX3̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)
= 0.01 ∗ 0.06 + 0.005 ∗ 0.94 = 0.005 
X15 0.100 P(X15) = P(X15|SMX15) ∗ P(SMX15) + P(X15|SMX15̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) ∗ P(SMX15̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )
= 0.1 ∗ 0.01 + 0.02 ∗ 0.99 = 0.021 
X28 0.055 P(X28) = 0.05 (Equal to the reliability of new isolation equipment) 
X44 0.050 P(X44) = P(X44|SMX44) ∗ P(SMX44) + P(X44|SMX44̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) ∗ P(SMX44̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )
= 0.05 ∗ 0.08 + 0.02 ∗ 0.92 = 0.022 
X50 0.045 P(X50) = P(X50|SMX50) ∗ P(SMX50) + P(X50|SMX50̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) ∗ P(SMX50̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )
= 0.045 ∗ 0.05 + 0.03 ∗ 0.95 = 0.031 
X74 0.300 P(X74) = P(X74|SMX74) ∗ P(SMX74) + P(X74|SMX74̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) ∗ P(SMX74̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )
= 0.3 ∗ 0.06 + 0.1 ∗ 0.94 = 0.112 
X75 0.045 P(X75) = P(X75|SMX75) ∗ P(SMX75) + P(X75|SMX75̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) ∗ P(SMX75̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )
= 0.045 ∗ 0.2 + 0.03 ∗ 0.8 = 0.033 
X80 0.050 P(X80) = P(X80|SMX80) ∗ P(SMX80) + P(X80|SMX80̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) ∗ P(SMX80̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )
= 0.05 ∗ 0.08 + 0.02 ∗ 0.92 = 0.022 
X81 0.083 P(X81) = P(X81|SMX81) ∗ P(SMX81) + P(X81|SMX81̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) ∗ P(SMX81̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) 
=0.083*0.04+ 0.04*0.96=0.042 
 
Comparing the probabilities (columns 2 and 3 in Table 7.13), the influence of each safety 
measure on the reduction of both dust explosion likelihood and potential consequences 
can be calculated and is presented in Table 7.14.  
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Table 7.14 Probabilities of dust explosion and potential consequences  
with and without safety measures 
 
Without 
SM 
With 
SMX3 
With 
SMX15 
With 
SMX28 
With 
SMX44/ 
SMx80 
With 
SMX50 
With 
SMX74 
With 
SMX75 
With 
SMX81 
Dust Explosion 6.81E-3 6.80E-3 1.68E-3 6.78E-3 3.84E-3 6.74E-3 5.98E-3 6.45E-3 6.68E-3 
Mishap 6.23E-3 6.24E-3 1.54E-3 6.22E-3 3.52E-3 6.18E-3 5.48E-3 5.92E-3 6.13E-3 
Significant damage 
(Isolation success) 
- - - 5.35E-4 - - - - - 
Significant damage 
(Evacuation success) 
5.08E-4 5.08E-4 1.26E-4 2.53E-5 2.87E-4 5.04E-4 4.47E-4 4.82E-4 4.99E-4 
Catastrophic damage 5.64E-5 5.64E-5 1.40E-5 2.82E-6 3.19E-5 5.60E-5 4.96E-5 5.35E-5 5.55E-5 
 
Besides the likelihood reduction, another consequence with less damage, Significant 
damage (Isolation success), is added to the model as a potential consequence when SMX28 
is implemented. 
In order to calculate the risk reduction index (RRI), the potential financial loss of each 
consequence is estimated according to CSB (2005b) (Table 7.15).  
Table 7.15 Losses of consequences 
 Mishap 
Significant 
Damage 
(Isolation Success) 
Significant 
Damage 
(Evacuation 
Success) 
Catastrophic Damage 
(Evacuation Fail) 
Dollar Valve 
Equivalent 
($) 
1000 500 000 1 000 000 50 000 000 
 
Then, the risk of the dust explosion without the safety measures can be calculated as: 
RISK = ∑ Pci ∗ Li
n
i=1
= 6.23E − 3 ∗ 1000 + 5.08 ∗ 10E − 4 ∗ 1000000 + 5.64E − 5 ∗ 50000000
= 3334.230 
It should be noted that the risk of an accident could be reduced not only by adding safety 
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barriers into the system to reduce the probabilities of the consequences (using preventive 
safety measures such as X28) but also by reducing the severities of the potential 
consequences (using mitigative safety measures). For example, if SMx3-Clean up 
accumulated dust at filter- functions, the amount of accumulated dust at the filter will 
decrease. Thus, even if a dust explosion occurs in the filter, its damage to the dust 
collector and to the entire dust collecting system will be reduced. This could decrease the 
severity of Mishap and Significant damage (Evacuation success). For illustrative 
purposes, assume 60% of damage of the consequences Mishap and Significant damage 
(Evacuation success) can be reduced by decreasing the amount of accumulated dust. 
Therefore, the risk after applying SMx3 can be calculated as: 
RISK = ∑ Pci ∗ Li
n
i=1
= 6.23E − 3 ∗ 1000 ∗ 0.4 + 5.08 ∗ 10E − 4 ∗ 1000000 ∗ 0.4 + 5.64E − 5 ∗ 50000000
= 3026.614 
Similarly, the risk after application of other safety measures can be calculated as 
presented in Table 7.16.  
Table 7.16 Risk of dust explosion with and without safety measures 
Without 
SM 
With 
SMX3 
With 
SMX15 
With 
SMX28 
With 
SMX44/S
mx80 
With 
SMX50 
With 
SMX74 
With 
SMX75 
With 
SMX81 
3334.230 3026.614 749.438 440.011 1885.524 3307.182 2664.580 3164.715 2978.267 
 
According to the Risk Reduction Index (RRI) equation, RRI of SMX3 can be calculated 
as: 
RRISMX3 =
3334.230 − 3026.614
3334.230
= 0.092 
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Thus, the RRI for each safety measure can be calculated (Figure 7.8). 
 
Fig. 7.8 Risk reduction index of various safety measures 
The next step is to estimate the cost of each potential safety measure (Table 7.17), 
including fixed cost and regular operation cost, according to suppliers and experts. Based 
on the definitions of Operation and fixed cost (OFC) and cost potential index (Ci), both 
parameters can be calculated for each safety measure (Columns4 and 5of Table 7.17) 
when the budget for safety improvement is assumed as $80,000. 
Table 7.17 Operation and fixed cost of safety measures 
Safety 
Measure 
Fixed Cost Operation Cost OFC Ci 
SMX3 0 $5760 $5760 0.072 
SMX15 $20000 $30000 $50000 0.625 
SMX28 $2000 $1000 $3000 0.038 
SMX44 $10000 $1000 $11000 0.138 
SMX50 $400 $400 $800 0.010 
SMX74 0 $1920 $1920 0.024 
SMX75 $10000 $300 $10300 0.129 
SMX81 $10000 $1000 $11000 0.138 
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In this case, risk reduction caused by application of a safety measure is assumed to be as 
important as its cost when selecting a safety measure. Therefore, ω1=ω2=0.5. Then, 
NRRG of each safety measure can be calculated (Table 7.18). 
Table 7.18 NRRG of safety measures 
SMX3 SMX15 SMX28 SMX44/x80 SMX50 SMX74 SMX75 SMX81 
0.011 0.075 0.415 0.149 0.000 0.089 -0.038 -0.014 
 
Thus, the objective and constraint functions for this case can be established as: 
Maxz = ∑ NRRGjxjj  
s.t.{
∑ 𝐶𝑗𝑥𝑗 ≤ $80000          𝑗
𝑥𝑗 = 0 𝑜𝑟 1          (𝑗 = 3, 15, 28, 44/80, 50, 74, 75, 81)
 
The optimal solution is calculated as: X=(1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0). 
This means SMX3, SMX15, SMX28, SMX44/X80, SMX50 and SMX74 should be considered as 
required safety measures in the safety strategy under this pre-defined budget. By this 
safety strategy, the net risk reduction gain for this system can be maximized. 
7.4.3 Sensitivity analysis 
An optimal safety strategy is decided by various factors, such as budget and weighting 
factors. As a result, this methodology can be applied to a variety of situations to search for 
optimal safety strategies. A higher budget means more financial resources are available 
and this could affect the NRRG index of each safety measure. Therefore, a safety strategy 
decision is inevitably influenced by the amount of the budget. In this work, changes in 
risk with different safety strategies under different budgets are analyzed (Figure 7.9). 
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Fig. 7.9 Number of safety measures and risks under different budgets 
As can be seen from Figure 7.9, with an increase in budget, the number of safety 
measures in the safety strategy can also increase. For example, the safety measures 
number in the safety strategy increases from 2 to 6 when the budget increases from 
$15000/year to $90000/year. The role of a budget increase is twofold: firstly, the higher 
budget can lead to lower Ci, which means a less negative influence is caused by the cost 
of safety measures in calculation of the NRRG index, and secondly, the higher budget 
implies the relaxation of financial constraints. For example, when the budget is 
$20000/year, the safety measure of X15 is obviously excluded. However, when the budget 
increases to $80000/year, the safety measure X15 is considered as an alternative safety 
measure in the safety strategy. At the same time, risks under different safety strategies are 
decreased with increases in budget. However, it also can be seen that this decreasing 
tendency of risk does not mean that the larger the financial investment, the better. As 
shown in Figure 7.9, risk decreases from 29 to 27.1 with increasing the budget from 
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$70000/year to $90000/year. Compared with the increased amount of financial 
investment, the risk slightly declined, which means that it may not be economically 
justifiable to go beyond a $70000/year budget for a lower risk.  
Besides the influence of a budget on the selection of safety measures, the cost of safety 
measures will also affect the process of decision-making. For example, increasing the 
frequency of cleaning of the dust collector, safety measure for X3, will lead to higher 
expenditure in terms of human resources. Considering that the costs of SMX3 with 
different cleaning frequencies will increase from $5760/year to four hypothetical costs of 
$6260/year, $6760/year, $7260/year and $7760/year, via the safety measures optimization 
method, optimal safety strategies under these different costs are calculated for SMX3 
(Table 7.19), 
Table 7.19 Safety strategy with different costs of SMX3 
Cost 
(per year) 
SMX3 SMX15 SMX81 SMX28 
SMX44/
X80 
SMX50 SMX74 SMX75 SMX80 
$ 5760 × ×  × × × ×  × 
$ 6260 × ×  × × × ×  × 
$6760 × ×  × × × ×  × 
$7260 × ×  × × × ×  × 
$7760  ×  × × × ×  × 
 
When the cost of SMX3 increases from $7260/year to $7760/year, SMX3 is excluded from 
the optimal safety strategy and the risk increases from 27.1 to 27.6. This shows that 
estimation of the cost of safety measures will influence the safety strategy decision and 
also the risk level of the system. The reason is the higher cost could bring a higher value 
of Ci and thus reduce the NRRG of the safety measure. 
RRI is another important factor influencing safety strategy decision-making. According to 
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the above analysis, it is already known that SMX3 is included in the safety strategy under a 
budget of $80000/year. Now, considering five different values for the RRI of SMX3 as 
0.094, 0.085, 0.080, 0.075 and 0.070 (only for the purpose of representing the influences 
of different RRIs on the allocation of safety strategy), the optimal safety strategy is 
obtained by using the optimization method (Table 7.20). 
Table 7.20 Safety strategy with different risk reduction index of SMx3 
RRI SMX3 SMX15 SMX28 SMX44/X80 SMX50 SMX74 SMX75 SMX80 SMX81 
0.094 × × × × × ×  ×  
0.085 × × × × × ×  ×  
0.080 × × × × × ×  ×  
0.075 × × × × × ×  ×  
0.070  × × × × ×  ×  
 
As shown in Table 7.20, SMX3 is removed from the safety strategy when the respective 
RRI decreases to 0.070, showing the role of the RRI index in the final decision. This also 
results from the lower NRRG caused by the smaller RRI. 
As mentioned earlier, the weighting indices ω1 and ω2 are introduced into the calculation 
of the NRRG index of safety measures to represent decision-makers’ estimation of the 
importance of RRI and Ci, respectively. Therefore, the emphasis of analysts on RRI or Ci 
could also impact the decision about the optimal safety strategy. Safety strategies under 
different combinations of the weighting index are presented in Table 7.21. 
Table 7.21 Safety strategy of different estimation of weighting index 
Category SMX3 SMX15 SMX28 SMX44/X80 SMX50 SMX74 SMX75 SMX81 
1 𝛚𝟏=0.9,𝛚𝟐=0.1  × × × × ×  × 
2 𝛚𝟏=0.7,𝛚𝟐=0.3 × ×  ×  ×  × 
3 𝛚𝟏=0.5,𝛚𝟐=0.5 × × × × × ×   
4 𝛚𝟏=0.3,𝛚𝟐=0.7   × ×  ×   
5 𝛚𝟏=0.1,𝛚𝟐=0.9   ×      
 
It should be noted that the number of safety measures decreases with increasing the 
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weighting index ω2. For example, when ω2 increases from 0.1 to 0.9, the number of 
safety measures in the optimal strategy decreases from 6 (category 1) to 1 (category 5). 
Moreover, the changes of importance indices can greatly influence compositions in safety 
strategy. For example, although the number of safety measures under category 1 and 3 
both equal 6, their corresponding members are different. For category 1, the safety 
strategy is constituted by SMX15, SMX28, SMX44/X80, SMX50, SMX74 and SMX81. However, 
the members of the safety strategy change to SMX3, SMX15, SMX28, SMX44/X80, SMX50, 
SMX74 when both ω1and ω2 are estimated as 0.5. The higher ω2 implies that decision 
makers treat Ci as a more important factor than RRI in calculation of the NRRG index. 
Hence, the higher cost could notably depress the desire of a safety engineer to apply the 
respective safety measure. The effects of weighting factors on NRRG of the same safety 
measure are shown in Table 7.22 (the second row). One extreme situation is the case in 
which only the risk reduction is considered by decision makers, i.e., ω1 = 1.0 and ω2 =
0.0. Then the optimization model is simplified to maximize the risk reduction brought by 
safety measures under the budget constraint.  
Table 7.22 NRRG of SMX3and Risks under different estimations of importance 
indices 
 𝛚𝟏=0.9,𝛚𝟐=0.1 𝛚𝟏=0.7,𝛚𝟐=0.3 𝛚𝟏=0.5,𝛚𝟐=0.5 𝛚𝟏=0.3,𝛚𝟐=0.7 𝛚𝟏=0.1,𝛚𝟐=0.9 
NRRG 0.077 0.044 0.011 -0.022 -0.055 
Risk 25.739 303.082 27.265 173.079 440.021 
 
Finally, dust explosion risks can be affected by different safety strategies under different 
combinations of importance indices (Table 7.22, the third row). The results show that the 
risk reduction of the system brought about by an optimal safety strategy depends on the 
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estimation of importance indices by decision makers. 
7.5 Conclusions 
When considering the safety improvement of process plants, the most efficient allocation 
of limited financial resources to available safety measures becomes very challenging. The 
issue becomes even more complicated in the case of dust explosions due to the large 
number of contributing factors and interlinked correlations. To efficiently utilize budgets 
for risk reduction of dust explosions, a risk-based optimization approach for optimal 
allocation of safety measures has been proposed in this paper. In this approach, the most 
critical factors contributing to dust explosions can be identified using a Bayesian network 
generic risk model developed for this purpose. This way, not only a smaller number of 
potential factors would need to be considered in safety improvement strategies, but also 
an efficient allocation of limited financial resources to the most vulnerable parts of the 
system would be possible. Further, the dust explosion generic Bayesian network 
facilitates the quantification of the safety measures’ effects on risk reduction, relaxing the 
need for experts’ estimations or qualitative risk ranking methods such as a risk matrix. In 
the present work we applied a knapsack–based formulation in optimization so that the 
optimal safety strategy can be easily obtained using conventional solvers. Applying the 
developed methodology to a dust explosion that occurred at Hayes Lemmerz 
International, US, in 2003, it was demonstrated that the developed optimal safety strategy 
is able to efficiently reduce the risk of dust explosions under a limited budget. However, 
since our methodology relies on a generic Bayesian network risk model developed for 
dust explosions, minor changes would be made to tailor the generic risk model to a dust 
explosion of interest, demanding knowledge by the analyst of the dust explosion under 
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consideration as well as constraints. 
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Abstract  
In most dust explosion accidents, a series of explosions constituting a primary (dust) 
explosion and one or more subsequent secondary dust explosions has been reported. Such 
chains of related dust explosions can be referred to as dust-explosion domino effects. 
Dust-explosion domino effects are capable of causing severe damage to humans, assets, 
and the environment both on-site and off-site. Thus, a detailed understanding of the 
causes, consequences, probabilities, and escalation of such domino effects is of great 
importance for protecting humans and assets. In this research, we have proposed a 
methodology for modeling and probability estimation of a chain of dust explosions based 
on Bayesian networks. The application and efficacy of the proposed methodology have 
been demonstrated via a real case study, CTA Acoustics, in the U.S. in 2003.  
Keywords: Dust explosion; Domino effect; Bayesian network. 
 
8.1 Introduction 
A domino effect is a chain of unintended events in which a primary event triggers secondary 
events, the total consequences of which are much more severe than the primary event in 
terms of human and asset losses (Reniers and Cozzani, 2013). In most process plants, a 
number of major hazardous installations (MHIs) are located and are operating in a limited 
space. Because of the flammability and explosibility of the contained chemical substances 
which are usually stored, processed or transported under high pressure and high 
temperature conditions, a primary accident is likely to lead to a domino effect. The presence 
of numerous flow conduits and conveying systems in chemical plants further facilitates the 
propagation of accidents and ensuing physical effects such as fire, flames and overpressure 
 172 
 
among separate MHIs, thus increasing the probability of domino effects. A variety of safety 
measures such as internal safety distances has been proposed to reduce the likelihood of 
domino effects (National Fire Prevention Association (NFPA), 2012); however, in many 
cases, the implementation of such safety barriers would be difficult due to the inherent 
restrictions of complex industrial processes such as limited land available. 
Among domino effects, dust-explosion-induced domino effects (hereafter called dust 
domino effects) have drawn less attention due to either complex cause-consequence 
relationships or the complicated escalation probabilities involved. Combustible dust is 
widely involved in process industries either as raw production materials or byproducts. It 
can be found in the form of raw materials such as cotton in textile mills, intermediate 
products such as synthetic resin powders in plastic product manufacturers, or as 
byproducts such as aluminum dust in casting forges. Combustible dust can be easily 
suspended in the air and cause a dust explosion if ignited. Reports on dust explosions and 
the huge harm and damage to humans, assets and the environment are commonly seen in 
the media (Eckhoff, 2009; Ebadat and Prugh, 2007; Piccinini, 2008; Wang and Li, 2001). 
Recently, a metal dust explosion at AL Solutions, U.S. in 2010 resulted in three deaths 
and one injury (U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB), 2011). 
The mechanisms of dust explosions have widely been studied (Eckhoff, 2003; Amyotte et 
al., 2005; Cashdollar and Zlochower, 2007; Pilão et al., 2006; Di Benedetto, et al., 2010) 
and a variety of preventive and mitigating safety measures has been proposed (Amyotte et 
al., 2009; Amyotte et al., 2010; Myers, 2008; Holbrow, 2013; Liu et al., 2013). Recently, 
methods of quantitative risk assessment (QRA) have been applied to estimate the risk of 
dust explosions (van dert Voort et al., 2007; Yuan et al., 2013, 2015; Khakzad et al., 2012). 
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Nevertheless, the attempts made to assess dust domino effects have been very few (van dert 
Voort et al., 2007). The present work aims to develop a methodology for modeling and 
estimating the probability of dust domino effects using the Bayesian network (BN). BN has 
successfully been employed to model domino effects triggered by fires and explosions 
(other than dust explosions) (Khakzad et al., 2013, 2014, 2015). However, to the best 
knowledge of the authors, the present study is the first work devoted to the application of 
BN for modeling dust domino effects.  
This paper is organized as follows: Section 8.2 briefly explains the mechanism of dust 
explosions and introduces the basis of dust domino effects. In Section 8.3, a BN 
methodology is developed to model and assess the likelihood of dust domino effects. The 
application of the methodology is demonstrated using a case study in Section 8.4. The 
conclusions drawn from this work are presented in Section 8.5. 
8.2 Background 
8.2.1 Dust explosion mechanism 
Combustible dust, oxidant, mixing, ignition and confinement are determined as essential 
factors for a dust explosion as shown in Figure 3.1 (Eckhoff, 2003, 2009; Pilão et al, 2006; 
Abbasi and Abbasi, 2007; Amyotte and Eckhoff, 2010; Kauffman, 1982). When all these 
factors coexist, a dust explosion will happen.  
Combustible dust in Figure 3.1 can be produced from natural organic materials (e.g., grain, 
coal and peat), synthetic organic materials (e.g., plastics), or metals (e.g., aluminium 
powder) (Eckhoff, 2003). Oxidant mainly refers to the oxygen in the air. Mixing refers to 
the deposited combustible dust suspended in the air by, for example, improper 
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housekeeping methods or pressure waves from falling objects or explosions. Ignition 
source includes but is not limited to impact sparks, flames, and hot surfaces (Abbasi and 
Abbasi, 2007). For a rapid and violent combustion and energy build-up, confinement is an 
essential factor in dust explosions. In summary, a dust explosion will occur when 
combustible dust which has been suspended in a confined space meets an adequate ignition 
source. Nevertheless, dust explosibility can be influenced by various factors such as the 
minimum ignition temperature (MIT) and the minimum ignition energy (MIE). MIT is the 
temperature above which a combustible dust cloud be ignited. A higher MIT (°C) indicates 
the mixture of combustible dust and oxygen is more difficult to ignite and thus less likely 
to cause a dust explosion. MIE (mJ), likewise, expresses the minimum energy required to 
ignite a combustible dust suspension. The severity of a dust explosion can be represented 
using the maximum explosion pressure (Pmax) or the normalized maximum rate of pressure 
rise (KSt) (Hassan, 2014). 
Compared to other types of explosion, a dust explosion usually leads to greater damage 
because of higher pressure and temperature generated (Eckhoff, 2003). For example, the 
experimental results of dust explosions with various combustible dusts in the standard 1m3 
ISO vessel or in the 20-L Siwek sphere show the value of Pmax ranging from 8.0 bar(g) to 
10.4 bar(g) (Hassan et al., 2014). However, similar experiments for methane-air explosions 
show the values of Pmax around 8.0 bar(g) (Razus et al., 2006). Aside from more destructive 
overpressures generated by dust explosions, toxic gases produced from dust explosions can 
cause even more casualties. For example, in polyvinylchloride dust explosions, hydrogen 
chloride gases can be produced, leading to pulmonary edema in exposed workers (Eckhoff, 
2003).  
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8.2.2 Domino effects of dust explosions 
The mechanism of a dust domino effect is shown in Figure 8.1. The dust explosion chain 
originates from a primary explosion (not necessarily a dust explosion). If the blast wave 
generated by the primary explosion is able to suspend settled dust layers and form a 
combustible dust cloud, it is very likely that a secondary dust explosion will take place. 
As mentioned earlier, the occurrence likelihood of such a secondary dust explosion also 
depends on the presence of an ignition source with adequate MIT or MIE. Compared to 
the primary dust explosion, the secondary dust explosion(s) can cause more severe 
consequences due to larger quantities of combustible dust involved (Lees, 2005). 
 
Fig. 8.1 Dust domino effects mechanism 
As the primary and secondary dust explosions could occur in different units of a process 
plant, safety barriers are difficult to implement between different hazardous units to block 
the propagation of pressure and flames in different units in case of a primary explosion. A 
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typical example is the phenolic resin dust explosion at CTA Acoustics, Inc., U.S. in 2003 
(CSB, 2005a). The initial dust explosion occurred at production line 405 while another dust 
explosion took place at line 401, more than 80 ft (24.38 m) away from the initial explosion. 
Another case is the aluminum dust explosion at Hayes Lemmerz International-Huntington, 
Inc., U.S., where a primary dust explosion in the aluminum dust collector located outside 
of the building propagated through ducts and caused a secondary dust explosion around 
furnace 5 in the workshop (CSB, 2005b), due to the lack of an explosion isolation device 
between the dust collector and the connected units. 
For illustrative purposes, consider a process plant in Figure 8.2 where A1, A2, and 
A3represent the units susceptible to dust explosions whereas B1 and B2 are the units for 
which a pool fire and vapor cloud explosion (VCE), respectively, have been determined as 
dominant accident scenarios. It should be noticed that potential accidents in B1 and B2 are 
not limited in listed above and should be determined according to individual process. 
B1
A1 A2
B2
A3
3 (a)
 
B1
A1 A2
B2
A3
3 (b)
B1
A1 A2
B2
A3
3 (c)
 
Fig. 8.2 Schematic of possible domino effects given a primary dust explosion in A1. 
A1, A2, and A3 are units where dust explosions can occur. Dominant accident 
scenarios for B1 and B2 are determined as pool fire and VCE, respectively.  
With a primary dust explosion in A1, several domino effects can be envisaged (Figure 
8.2(a)). The first one is a chain of dust explosions. For example, in Figure 8.2(b), the 
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primary dust explosion in A1 could trigger a dust explosion in A2 which in turn could 
cause a dust explosion in A3 without causing credible damage to B1 or B2. Thus, the dust 
explosions in A2 and A3 can be considered as secondary and tertiary dust explosions, 
respectively. However, it is worth noting that the dust explosion in A1 could directly cause 
a dust explosion in A3 depending on the magnitude of overpressure received by A3 from 
A1. In this case, A2 and A3 are both considered as secondary dust explosions. As another 
chain of accidents in Figure 8.2(c), the primary dust explosion in A1 can result in a VCE 
in B2; the overpressure and flame caused by VCE can then trigger simultaneous dust 
explosions in A2 and A3. As a result of these dust explosions, B1 can be heavily damaged, 
leading to a release of chemical containment and a subsequent pool fire. Therefore, each 
domino effect depicted in Figure 8.2 could occur. To determine which domino effects are 
likely to take place, the magnitudes of overpressures and escalation probabilities have to 
be calculated. This issue is discussed in more detail in the next section. 
8.2.3 Escalation probabilities 
Generally speaking, for a primary accident to cause significant damage to a target unit, 
the magnitude of the physical effects – also known as escalation vectors – such as heat 
flux and explosion overpressure should be higher than some threshold values. These 
threshold values are usually determined using experimental data and regression methods 
for a number of atmospheric and pressurized units as well as auxiliary equipment (e.g., 
pumps) and pipelines (Gledhill and Lines, 1998; Contini et al., 1996; Pettitt et al., 1993; 
Cozzani, 2001; Cozzani and Salzano, 2004). An escalation vector that is greater than the 
respective threshold value is likely to cause significant damage to a target unit, leading to 
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loss of containment of the target unit. Based on the type of loss of containment 
(catastrophic, major or minor) and type of the released chemical substance (flammable, 
explosible or both) a secondary accident could occur. There are several methods to 
estimate the probability of damage to a target unit – the so-called escalation probability – 
among which probit functions are very popular due to their flexibility and applicability to 
a wide range of equipment and escalation vectors (Cozzani et al., 2005). 
In the case of target units or installations that are prone to secondary dust explosions, most 
of the afore-mentioned threshold values and probit functions cannot be employed. As stated 
earlier, to have a secondary dust explosion in a target unit, the magnitude of the 
overpressure received by the target unit from a primary explosion should be able to suspend 
layers of dust settled on the floor, ceiling, or equipment. In addition, the density of 
suspended dust, presence of an ignition source, and confinement should effectively have 
been taken into consideration as influential factors. For the sake of clarity, the event tree in 
Figure 8.3 illustrates different accident scenarios likely to occur in a target unit given a 
primary explosion. 
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Fig. 8.3 Secondary dust explosion triggered by a primary explosion  
In the event tree of Figure 8.3, the essential factors for a secondary dust explosion, i.e., 
the dust layer, dispersion, ignition and confinement, are depicted. As can be seen, a 
secondary dust explosion will occur only if all contributing factors coexist. It should be 
noted that the essential factor, oxygen, is not included in the event tree, since it has been 
assumed the oxygen would be present in most units involved in the process industries. In 
Figure 8.3, an initial dust explosion (or other types of explosion such as VCE and 
BLEVE) can cause two different secondary accidents in a dust-containing unit, that is, a 
flash fire or secondary dust explosion, depending on the presence/absence of essential 
factors. Knowing the occurrence probabilities of the initial dust explosion and essential 
factors, the probability of a secondary dust explosion can be estimated using the event 
tree in Figure 8.3.  
For confinement, the probabilities of 0 and 1 are given to the situations of no-confinement 
and complete confinement, respectively, based on the type of target units. For example, if 
 180 
 
the target unit is a dust collector, the probability of confinement is considered as 1.0 
whereas in the case of dust settled on the roof of a warehouse the probability of 
confinement is taken as 0.0. Since flames are observed in most dust explosions, a 
probability of 0.3, is assumed for the ignition in Figure 8.3. For the probability of a dust 
layer, 𝑃(𝐷𝐿), an exponential equation can be used, considering both the mass of 
accumulated dust in a target unit or area and the threshold of accumulated dust mass: 
𝑃(𝐷𝐿) = 1 − exp (−𝐴𝑀/𝑀𝑡ℎ)       (8.1) 
where 𝐴𝑀 is the mass of accumulated dust in the unit, and 𝑀𝑡ℎ is the corresponding 
threshold value.  
𝑀𝑡ℎcan be calculated according to relevant regulations, such as NFPA 654 (2000): 
𝑀𝑡ℎ = 0.004 ∗ 𝐴𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑟 ∗ 𝐻        (8.2) 
where 𝐴𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑟 = min (𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎, 2000 𝑚
2); 
𝐻 = min (𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 , 12 𝑚). The unit of 𝑀𝑡ℎ is kg. 
𝐴𝑀 can be conveniently calculated based on observation of the real situation: 
𝐴𝑀 = 𝐷 ∗ 𝐴𝑑 ∗ 𝐶         (8.3) 
In Equation (8.3), 𝐷 (m) is the depth of the dust layer in the target area or unit; 𝐴𝑑(𝑚
2) 
means the area of dust layer; C (kg/m3) is the bulk density of the dust layer. The values of 
D and 𝐴𝑑 can be identified by inspection while the value of C can be estimated by 
experiments. 
When the overpressure from a primary dust explosion reaches the dust layer, the 
accumulated dust can be dispersed and result in a combustible dust cloud if the magnitude 
of the overpressure is greater than some threshold value. Because the overpressure will 
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decay along the distance from the location where the primary explosion occurs, the 
magnitude of overpressure reaching a dust layer can be estimated by the equation listed in 
the German standard VDI 3673 (2002):  
𝑃𝑟 = 𝑃𝑀𝐴𝑋 ∗ (𝑅𝑠/𝑟)
1.5                                                                                           (8.4) 
where 𝑃𝑀𝐴𝑋 is the maximum pressure generated from a dust explosion; 𝑅𝑠 is the distance 
of the blast center from the vent (m); 𝑟 is the distance of the target (dust layer in this 
study) from the vent (m). Note that 𝑅𝑠 could also be considered as the distance from the 
blast center to the connections with other units if no venting system is installed. An 
overpressure (𝑃𝑟) with the value of 1.0 psig (7.0 kPa) can lead to partial demolition of 
houses and make them uninhabitable (National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration). An overpressure at this level is thus assumed to be able to disperse the 
dust layer in the form of a combustible dust cloud. Thus, in this study the probability of 
dispersion, 𝑃(𝐷𝑝) is considered as 1.0 when the magnitude of overpressure equals or is 
higher than 1.0 psig. For overpressures magnitudes lower than 1.0 psig Equation (8.5) can 
be employed to estimate P(𝐷𝑝). 
𝑃(𝐷𝑝) = 1 − 0.2 ∗ (7 − 𝑃𝑟)        (8.5) 
A secondary dust explosion would be able to trigger other tertiary accidents. However, if 
the primary dust explosion results in a flash fire (see event tree of Figure 8.3), the 
probability of tertiary accidents triggered by the flash fire can be ignored (Cozzani et al., 
2014). 
8.2.4 Bayesian network and its application in domino effect analysis 
The Bayesian network (BN) is a directed acyclic graph (DAG) (Neapolitan, 2003; Jensen 
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and Nielsen, 2007), in which nodes stand for random variables and arcs between nodes 
refer to the direct dependency between them. The type and strength of dependencies are 
determined by conditional probability tables (CPTs). One of the main applications of BN 
is probability updating by taking advantage of the latest information so that the accuracy 
of predictions can be improved. 
The joint distribution P(U) of a set of variables U=(X1, X2, ...... , Xn) can be expanded in 
equation (3.2) according to the conditional dependence of variables. 
Similarly, if the latest information is observed, called evidence E, the posterior 
probabilities can be estimated based on Bayes’ theorem as shown by the equation (3.4). 
Due to its flexibility and robust probabilistic reasoning engine, BN has been widely used 
in risk analysis and safety assessment (Khakzad et al., 2013b, 2013c, 2013d; Zhao et al., 
2012; Holický et al., 2013; Eleye-Datubo et al., 2006; Nordgård and Sand, 2010; Donald 
et al., 2009). Further, applications of BN to risk analysis of dust explosions (Yuan et al., 
online) and domino effects (Khakzad et al., 2013a, 2014, 2015) have been examined. In the 
current work, the risk of dust explosions with respect to domino effects is assessed using 
BN, with a main focus on a chain of dust explosions (e.g., A1→ A2→ A3 in Figure 8.2(b)). 
8.3 Development of domino effects model of dust explosions 
The developed methodology for dust domino effects analysis is composed of several steps 
as follow: 
Step 1: Locate areas or units with potential risk of dust explosions.  
According to the characteristics of the process equipment, the units and the areas where 
combustible dust can be generated, either as a cloud or as settled layers, are identified as 
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potential units and areas for dust explosion. For example, at Hayes Lemmerz 
International-Huntington, Inc. (Hayes, hereafter) (CSB, 2005b), the whole chip-
processing system, including the chip mill and dry chip hopper, and the dust collection 
system including drop box and dust collector can be considered as areas where dust 
explosions might occur. 
Step 2: Identify the most critical unit/area for the location of primary dust explosions.  
As can be noted from Hayes, more than one unit can be determined as a potential location 
for a dust explosion. In this step, among the units identified in Step 1, the unit with the 
highest risk is determined as the location of the primary dust explosion. The presence and 
intensity of essential factors for a dust explosion (Figure 3.1) are used to further screen 
the equipment/areas. The more the necessary elements of a dust explosion coexist in a 
unit, the higher the likelihood of a dust explosion; such a unit can be considered as the 
initiating unit in a domino effect (such as A1 in Figure 8.2). For example, at Hayes, the 
dryer burner is excluded as the primary unit due to the incomplete combustion process 
involved, though it was identified as a potential unit for dust explosion in Step 1. 
Historical data and accident records can be effectively used to identify the most critical 
units for dust explosion occurrence. 
Step 3: Calculate the strength of escalation vectors and identify target units. 
For the escalation vector of dust explosions, the maximum pressure caused by the primary 
dust explosion can be obtained from relevant sources (Eckhoff, 2003; ASTM E1226-09). 
After calculating the magnitude of overpressure reached at target dust layers using 
equation (8.4), the probabilities of dispersion can be determined by equation (8.5). 
Step 4: Estimate escalation probabilities and develop the BN.  
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Based on the methodology proposed by Khakzad et al. (2013a), a potential domino effect 
can be illustrated and modeled using a BN. The domino effects of dust explosions, 3(b) 
and 3(c), in Figure 8.2 are represented by 5(a) and 5(b) respectively in Figure 8.4.  The 
units/locations with a risk of an accident triggered by a primary dust explosion in A1 are 
represented by respective nodes. The influence relationship among nodes can be 
represented by directed arcs, i.e. A1→A2. It should be kept in mind that this research 
focuses on the chain of dust explosions, shown as A1→A2→A3. The occurrence 
probability of a dust explosion in nodes Ai (i=1, 2, 3) can be calculated using a QRA 
method, i.e. fault tree (Yuan et al., 2013). In the current work, a developed generic risk 
analysis model for a dust explosion based on BN (Yuan et al., 2015), being tailored to 
various cases, is recommended. 
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Fig. 8.4 Domino effects of dust explosion based on BN 
The conditional probability table (CPT) of each node in the BN can be calculated using 
the event tree developed in Figure 8.3 once all the probabilities of essential factors are 
obtained in step 2. For illustrative purposes, the probabilities of dust explosion in node A1 
and A2 and the probability of each essential factor in the event tree shown in Figure 8.3 
are demonstrated in Table 8.1. 
Table 8.1 Probabilities of initial dust explosion and safety barriers in event tree 
 Initial Dust  
Explosion in A1 
Dust  
Explosion in A2 
Dust 
Layer 
Dispersion Ignition Confinement 
Probability 0.50E-5 0.40E-6 0.20 0.10 0.30 1.0 
 
Like unit A1, unit A2 is also determined to have a dust explosion risk in step 1, which 
means a dust explosion could occur even if unit A2 is not affected by a dust explosion in 
A1. This is called the inherent probability of A2 (Khakzad et al., 2013a). 
Based on the assumed data used in Table 8.1, the probabilities of potential consequence 
categories in unit A2 triggered by the initial dust explosion in A1 can be calculated and 
listed in Table 8.2. 
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Table 8.2 Probabilities of different situations in A2 resulting from  
initial dust explosion in A1 
Outcome 
No Secondary 
Accident 
Flash Fire 
Secondary Dust 
Explosion 
Probability 0.41E-5 2.70E-7 0.30E-7 
 
Thus, the CPT of A2 can be represented in Table 8.3: 
Table 8.3 CPT of node A2 
 
No Secondary 
Accident 
Flash Fire 
Secondary Dust 
Explosion 
Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Initial Dust 
Explosion 
Yes 0.41E-5 0.999 2.7E-7 0.999 0.30E-7 0.999 
No 0 1 0 1 0.40E-6 0.999 
 
Repeating the above steps, the CPT for each node can be established and the model of 
domino effect analysis for dust explosions is developed using BN. 
8.4 Case study 
8.4.1 Introduction 
On Feb. 20, 2003, a dust explosion occurred at CTA Acoustics, Inc., KY, U.S., causing 7 
deaths and 37 injuries (CSB, 2005a). CTA manufactures acoustical and thermal insulation 
products involving fiberglass, phenolic resin powder and facing. According to CSB 
(2005a) the phenolic resin dust was the fuel for this explosion, and the primary dust 
explosion occurred near the oven in line 405 and led to a secondary dust explosion in the 
space above the blend room in line 405. Then the pressure wave and fireball from the 
secondary dust explosion propagated along the ceiling toward line 403, line 402 and line 
401. In the southeast corner of the blend room on line 401, another dust explosion 
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occurred and caused extensive damage. The layout of the facility is shown in Figure 8.5. 
 
Fig. 8.5 Simplified layout of CTA facility 
8.4.2 Domino effect of dust explosions analysis for CTA Acoustics 
According to the descriptions of the production process and daily operations, the areas 
around the ovens, the blend houses and the spaces above the blend houses on production 
lines can be identified as the units/areas susceptible to dust explosions because 
combustible layers are often observed in these areas. Among them, the area around the 
oven in line 405 can be identified with the highest risk of a dust explosion (CSB, 2005a). 
One of the reasons is that the accumulated dust above the production lines cannot be 
effectively removed by the housekeeping program, and can even arise because of 
improper housekeeping methods (e.g., compressed air forming a combustible dust cloud 
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around ovens in different lines). The other reason is that the fires ignited in the residual 
material in the oven with enough ignition energy for a dust explosion can propagate 
outside of the oven through the improperly opened oven door on line 405 to reduce the 
unexpected high temperature in the oven due to the malfunction of temperature control 
equipment. Therefore, tailoring the generic likelihood estimation model for dust 
explosions to this case, the occurrence probability of initial dust explosions around the 
oven on line 405 has been calculated in previous research (Yuan et al., 2015) and equals 
4.97E-5. 
Once a dust explosion occurred around the oven on line 405, the propagation routes of 
produced flames and pressure blast can be classified into two possible scenarios. One is 
spreading into the space above the blend room on line 405 (as shown in Figure 8.5), where 
accumulated dust layers on flat surfaces resulting from inadequate housekeeping could be 
dispersed to form a combustible dust cloud, and further lead to a secondary dust explosion. 
The other propagation path is to the outer spaces of line 405, where a fireball from the 
initial dust explosion is less likely to be further transferred. As the CSB found (2005a), 
when the fireball reached the molding department, it dissipated. Moreover, the semi-cured 
pelts stored between line 403 and 405 was ignited. Therefore, in domino effect analysis, 
the space above the blend room on line 405 is considered as the potential area where a 
secondary dust explosion could occur. Due to the similar production process and safety 
management in lines 403, 402 and 401 as in line 405, phenolic resin powders can easily 
accumulate on the flat surfaces in and above the blend rooms, which are able to be the fuel 
for fires and further dust explosions. Thus, the blend rooms on lines 403, 402 and 401 and 
their overhead spaces are also determined as the units with dust explosion risks. Based on 
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above analysis about the production process, origins of dust explosions and potential 
propagation routes of dust explosions, the model for the domino effect of dust explosions 
can be established using BN and is shown in Figure 8.6. 
 
Fig. 8.6 Domino effect of dust explosions originating from area around oven on line 
405 
In Figure 8.6, A1 and A2 stand for the area around the oven and the space above the blend 
room in line 405, respectively. Similarly, the blend rooms on lines 403, 402 and 401 are 
represented by A3, A4, and A5, respectively. Using the tailored occurrence probability 
model of dust explosions for unit A2, the probability of a dust explosion in A2 can be 
calculated as 5.31E-6. Due to the similar working circumstances and maintenance 
strategies as in A2, the probabilities of dust explosions in A3, A4, and A5 can be considered 
as equal to that in unit A2. 
Before obtaining the CPT of each node based on the event tree in Figure 8.3, the 
probability for each safety barrier should be calculated as discussed in section 8.2.3. For 
this case, the probability of a dust layer is first calculated using equations (8.1) to (8.3). 
According to the investigation report (CSB, 2005a), the area above the blend rooms can 
be calculated as 112 m2 (listed in Table 8.4, column 1) and the mass threshold of 
combustible dust accumulating in the areas above the blend rooms can be calculated as 
1.366 kg using equation (8.2) (Table 8.4, column 3). 
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Table 8.4 Values of Relevant Parameter 
Afloor (m2) H (m) Mth (kg) AM (kg) Pr (psi) 
112 3.05 1.366 7.2 5.98 
 
Further, the depth and area of the dust layer can be observed during the regular 
investigation and operation. However, due to the extensive fire and explosion damage, 
both parameters of the dust layer cannot be determined from CSB (2005a). For the 
purpose of analysis, 0.0008 m, recommended by NFPA above which the area needs 
immediate cleaning (NFPA654, 2000), is taken as the depth of accumulated dust layer and 
the area of dust layer is estimated as 20 m2. The CSB report also revealed the test result 
for the diameters of phenolic resin samples from CTA ranged from 10 to 50 μm (CSB, 
2005a). Thus, the bulk density of the dust layer can be estimated as 450 kg/m3 according 
to Janès et al. (Janès et al., 2014). With equation (8.3), the mass of accumulated dust can 
be calculated as 7.2 kg (column 4 in Table 8.4) and the probability of the dust layer in this 
case can be calculated as 1.0 according to equation (8.1). Because of the similar operation 
processes and housekeeping in the blend rooms on lines 403, 402 and 401, the 
probabilities of dust layers in these units can also be considered as 1.0 
For the estimation of the probability of dispersing dust layers, the strength of overpressure 
received by a dust layer should be first calculated. According to the test by CSB (2005) 
using ASTM E1226-09, the Standard Test Method for Pressure and Rate of Pressure Rise 
for Combustible Dust (ASTM, 2000), the Pmax of combustible dust collected from CTA can 
be up to around 110 psig (7.59 bar(g)). According to the layout of the CTA facility (CSB, 
2005a), the longest distance between two units is 80 ft (24.38m) between line 405 and line 
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403. Therefore, if the dust layer in the blend room in line 403 can be lifted by the 
overpressure from line 405, the dust layers in other production lines can also be dispersed 
by the overpressure from a nearby dust explosion. Using equation (8.4), the overpressure 
propagating from line 405 to line 403 (Pr) can be calculated as 5.98 psig (0.41 bar(g)) 
(column 5 in Table 8.4). This value is much greater than the threshold of overpressure with 
the ability of dispersing dust layers as discussed in 8.2.3. Therefore, in this case, the 
probability of dispersion can be considered as 1.0. Further, as the result of estimating the 
confinement of the space above the blend rooms and the blend rooms themselves, the 
probability of confinement can be considered as 1.0. Based on the event tree in Figure 8.3, 
the probabilities of two outcomes in node A2, secondary dust explosion and no secondary 
accident (the paths are depicted in bold in Figure 8.3), given an initial dust explosion in 
node A1, can be calculated. For example, the conditional probability of a secondary dust 
explosion, given an initial dust explosion, P (secondary dust explosion given initial dust 
explosion), can be calculated as 0.3. Thus, the CPT of node A2 can be obtained as shown 
in Table 8.5. Following similar steps, the CPT of each node can be established. 
Table 8.5 CPT of A2 in Figure 7 
 A2 
 Secondary Dust Explosion No Secondary Accident 
A1 
Dust Explosion  0.30 0.70 
No Dust Explosion 5.31E-6 0.999 
 
Note that the CPTs for node A3, A4 and A5 are considered to be the same as for node A2 due 
to their similar operating conditions and maintenance strategy in this case. Otherwise, the 
CPT of each node should be individually calculated by tailoring the event tree in Figure 8.3 
to the units with different operating conditions and maintenance.  
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After obtaining the CPT of each node, the occurrence probability of dust explosions in each 
unit can be calculated taking advantage of HUGIN 8.0 (http://www.hugin.com) (2010). The 
results are given in Table 8.5. The occurrence probabilities of dust explosions in various 
units from A1 to A5 are decreasing, which reveals that the threats from dust explosions in 
different units are reduced along with domino effects of the primary dust explosion in unit 
A1. However, due to the effects of the initial dust explosions, the occurrence probabilities 
of dust explosions in A2, A3, A4 and A5 increase in different degrees. For example, the 
occurrence probability of a dust explosion in A2 increases from 5.31E-06 to 2.02E-05. 
Table 8.6 Occurrence probabilities of dust explosions in different units 
 A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 
Probability of 
dust explosion 
4.97E-5 2.02E-5 1.14E-5 8.72E-6 7.93E-6 
 
8.5 Conclusions 
Domino effects of accidents are usually difficult to analyze especially in complex process 
industrial scenes. Due to the presence of multiple essential factors of dust explosions, the 
issue is more complicated in the analysis of the chain of dust explosions. In the current 
research, a methodology is proposed to analyze domino effects of dust explosions using 
BN.  
In this methodology, the units or locations with risks of dust explosions are identified first 
according to the production processes in specific industries. Among them, the unit or 
location with the maximum number of essential factors for dust explosions is considered to 
have the highest risk of dust explosions and the dust explosion occurring in it is located as 
the primary one. Then, taking advantage of BN, the potential propagation routes of the 
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escalation vectors, the overpressures, are represented considering facility layout. After 
developing an event tree to quantify the occurrence probabilities of different consequence 
categories triggered by an initial dust explosion, the CPT of corresponding nodes in the BN 
model can be calculated. By tailoring the developed risk analysis model of dust explosions 
to target units, the inherent probability of dust explosions in each node on the BN can be 
further estimated. Then, based on the developed domino effect analysis model of dust 
explosions, the occurrence probability of a dust explosion in each unit can be calculated. 
CTA Acoustics, Inc. was chosen to illustrate the usage of this method. 
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9 Conclusions and Future Research 
Dust explosions are commonly occurring accidents in process industries and cause severe 
financial losses to shareholders and insurance companies and physical damage to operators. 
The research about dust explosions mainly focuses on the occurrence mechanisms as well 
as prevention technologies and there are few risk estimations about dust explosions. At the 
same time, the domino effects of dust explosions are seldom seen due to the complex 
mechanisms and complex scenes. Therefore, a versatile QRA model for dust explosions, 
considering interlinks among contributors, still needs to develop. Further, the features of 
dynamic analysis should be integrated in this model to represent the dynamic characteristics 
in process industries. Moreover, the dust explosion chain should be analyzed, which can 
help to prevent accidents’ propagation and mitigate severe consequences caused by dust 
explosions in a system. 
9.1 Conclusions 
The main conclusions of this study are as follows: 
9.1.1 Investigation of dust explosion accidents worldwide 
This study analyzed statistical characteristics of dust explosions worldwide. The huge 
differences among the statistical results in various countries, periods, and industries, shows 
the contributors to these accidents need to be further discussed, but usually have been 
ignored due to the limitations in data collection.  
More than 2000 dust explosions cases are collected to overcome the limitation of 
insufficient samples. Also differences in developing and developed countries are compared 
and further discussed. However, note that the number of reported accidents is far lower than 
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that of the actual occurrences, which limits the representativeness of this study. Moreover, 
the missing critical information (e.g. ignition source) and intentional underestimation of the 
casualties in some accident reports also limit the value of this study. 
9.1.2 Developing generic risk analysis model for dust explosions 
In this study, a generic risk analysis model of dust explosions is established based on BT. 
Due to the numerous factors contributing to dust explosions and their complex internal 
relationships, utilizing them in QRA is a big challenge, as is integrating various safety 
barriers with potential consequences. 
Taking advantage of BT, the primary causes of dust explosions are integrated according to 
cause-effect relationships on the left side; at the same time, common applied safety barriers 
as well as potential consequences categories are presented on the right. After obtaining the 
probabilities of basic events, the reliabilities of safety barriers and loss of each consequence 
category, the risk of a dust explosion is calculated. The tailoring ability of this generic 
model is also illustrated through a case study which shows its adaptability. Moreover, a 
potential safety measure is recommended for each basic factor, and the implementation of 
the safety measures as well as their efficacies in risk reduction for dust explosions are 
discussed.  
9.1.3 Developing dynamic risk analysis model for dust explosions 
Although the risk of dust explosions can be obtained by tailoring this generic risk analysis 
model to specific cases, the limitation of ignoring the dependencies among basic events 
restricts its application. Moreover, since BT is composed of FT and ET, this also brings the 
static characteristic into BT.  
To overcome these limitations, in this research, the BT model of dust explosions is 
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transformed to BN, which enables analysts to perform dynamic risk analysis, including 
probability prediction, probability updating and sequential learning. In addition, the 
dependencies among primary causes of dust explosions are conveniently represented. 
Moreover, utilizing the latest information from a dynamic system in the risk analysis of 
dust explosions using a BN model leads to more accurate results compared to the 
conventional QRA (i.e. BT). These functions are represented by taking advantage of a case 
study.  
9.1.4 Proposing a methodology of safety measures allocation 
A risk-based optimal methodology of safety measures allocation for dust explosions is 
proposed in this research. The barrier in selecting suitable safety measures is to satisfy the 
risk control requirement within a limited budget. Moreover, considering various potential 
safety measures for a basic event, the selection priority should be determined. 
Safety measures are proposed and categorized first according to risk management 
principles in this study. Further, the priorities of safety measures are recommended to 
follow inherent, engineered and procedural safety measures. To obviate the aforementioned 
dilemma in determining a safety strategy for dust explosions, optimization methods are 
introduced and integrated with the developed risk analysis model of dust explosions to 
establish the methodology for safety measures allocation. In this method, an index, NRRG, 
is also defined for each safety measure to account for the cost of a safety measure and its 
efficacy in risk reduction. 
9.1.5 Analyzing domino effects of dust explosions 
The chain of dust explosions is analyzed based on BN. Although the effects of blast waves 
and flames can be analyzed using conventional methods (i.e. probit method) in the 
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academic area, discussion about the dust explosion chain is seldom seen due to the lack of 
comprehensive research in the propagating mechanisms of dust explosions. 
To quantify the escalation probabilities of dust explosions, ET is resorted to in this study 
considering the five essential factors of dust explosions as safety barriers. After obtaining 
their occurrence probabilities, the probability of a secondary dust explosion given the 
primary one can be calculated, which is taken as the targeted escalation probability. Then, 
taking advantaging of the BN model, the occurrence probability of each dust explosion on 
the chain can be obtained.  
9.2 Future research 
The current research includes establishing a generic risk analysis model of dust explosions, 
overcoming its static characteristics by introducing BN, analyzing domino effects of dust 
explosions and developing optimal methodology to help decision makers to determine 
safety strategies. Distribution characteristics of dust explosion accidents worldwide are also 
discussed. Based on this research, the following recommendations for future research can 
be made. 
9.2.1 Extending the scope of hazards identification 
In this research, the contributors to dust explosions, involving defects in design, operations 
and management, and so forth, were drawn as comprehensively as possible from accident 
investigations, academic papers, and relevant regulations, and the total number of primary 
events is 79. However, due to the characteristics of individual industries and productions, 
some potential factors might be missed in the generic model. Though the defects can be 
overcome along with continuously tailoring the generic model to different cases to some 
extent, by which new basic events can be added, it is also recommended to expand the 
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range of hazards identification based on the latest accident investigations, updated 
regulations and research. 
9.2.2 Dealing with uncertainty 
Though this research focuses on developing a risk model for dust explosions, a large 
amount of probability data of basic events is essential in risk estimation. The crisp values 
were obtained from academic papers, relevant handbooks and expert opinions. However, 
the arbitrary estimations from experts are usually questioned. In the future work, the fuzzy 
set theory, being available in the situation where complete or precise information is lacking, 
could be introduced to both the developed BT model and the BN model to improve the 
accuracy of estimation. 
9.2.3 Settling multi-objective programming problem 
In this research, an index of Net Risk Reduction Gain (NRRG) was defined to simplify the 
problem of safety measures allocation as a knapsack problem. However, in a more complex 
case, both the objectives of experts and constraint conditions could be multiple. For 
example, the cost of a potential safety strategy can be considered as the other objective in 
safety measures allocation, besides controlling the risk level of a system. Therefore, a multi 
objective programming model might be introduced to solve the complex issues. 
9.2.4 Introducing risk analysis in domino effects of dust explosions 
In this research, the domino effects of dust explosions are analyzed. However, the work 
focuses on estimating the occurrence probability of a dust explosion in the chain. In order 
to obtain the risks of dust explosions, the loss caused by an individual dust explosion should 
be further considered. Based on analysis of risks caused by dust explosions, the areas with 
a higher risk can be evaluated which will efficiently help to introduce safety measures to 
 205 
 
mitigate potential damage caused by dust explosions. For this purpose, loss functions, 
estimating the potential losses with the changes of process characteristics, could be 
introduced in the risk analysis of domino effects. By this method, both the probabilities of 
occurrence categories and their individual potential loss could be updated with dynamic 
processes. 
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Appendix A 
A partial case of dust explosions around the world from 1785 to 2012 
Date Country Material Equipment Involved Types of Industries 
Dead/ 
Injured 
Ignition Source Reference 
1785 IT F Warehouse Food plant 2i Flame and direct heat Eckhoff, 2003 
1866 UK C _ _ 388d Hot work 
Mining-technology, 
2014 
1878 US F _ Mill 18d _ 
Explosion Hazards 
Ltd 
1906 FR C _ Coal mine 1099d Flame and direct heat Energy Liabrary 
1911 UK F Store Flour mills 5d/7i Flame and direct heat PAPERSPAST 
1911 UK F _ Food and feed plant 39d/100i Electrical sparks 
Explosion Hazards 
Ltd 
1911 UK _ _ _ 3d/5i _ 
Abbasi & Abbasi, 
2007 
1916 US F Steel bin Silo/elevator/warehouse _ _ Vijayaraghavan, 2011 
1919 US F _ Food and feed plant 43d _ 
Explosion Hazards 
Ltd 
1924 US F Starch powder house Food and feed plant 42d/100i Static electricity GenDisasters, 2007 
1930 UK F Silo Food and feed plant 11d/32i Self-heating and smoldering 
Explosion Hazards 
Ltd 
1936 US In Coal handling equipment Chemical plant 2d _ NFPA, 1957 
1956 US F Elevator Food and feed plant 1i Hot work NFPA, 1957 
1960 CHN C Electric locomotive, tripper Coal mine 684d Electrical sparks Wang & Li, 2001 
1960 AUS F Elevator Silo/elevator/warehouse 
_ 
 
Hot work 
Explosion Hazards 
Ltd 
1963 JPN C Mining slope Coal mine 458d/839i Friction sparks Hoshino et al., 1992 
1963 CHN M Dust collector Metal products plant 19d/24i Impact friction Wenku, 2012 
1965 IN C Mining slope Coal mine 375d Flame and direct heat 
Mining technology, 
2014 
1969 CHN C Electric locomotive Coal mine 115d/108i Electrical sparks Wang & Li, 2001 
1970 GER F Grain silo Silo/elevator/warehouse 6d/17i _ Eckhoff, 2003 
1973 CHN C Switch/ cable Coal mine 50d/10i Flame and direct heat Wang & Li, 2001 
1975 IN C _ Coal mine 372d _ 
Mining technology, 
2014 
1977 US F 
Tunnel connected to 
elevator 
Silo/elevator/warehouse 18d/22i Friction sparks GenDisasters, 2009 
1977 US F Elevator Silo/elevator/warehouse 36d/10i  Static electricity Bright Hub,2012 
1978 CHN M Multiclone dust collector Metal products plant 5d/6i Impact sparks Safehoo, 2011 
1980 US F Bin, conveyor Food and feed plant 8d/1i _ CSB, 2006 
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1981 CHN F Store house Silo/elevator/warehouse 7i Flame and direct heat MuYung Ltd 
1985 CHN C Working surface Coal mine 63d/3i Hot work Wang & Li, 2001 
1985 US IN Electric equipment Animal pesticide packaging plant 13d/1i Flame and direct heat CSB, 2006 
1986 JPN CH Weighing hopper Chemical plant 1i Static electricity 
Failure Knowledge 
Database 
1986 CHN F _ Food and feed plant 2d/5i _ Yan & Yu, 2012 
1986 CHN O Dust collector Textile mill 5d/15i Friction sparks Safethoo, 2009 
1986 US W Incinerator, propane heater 
Manufacturer of "smoke" flavoring for 
food products 
4d Flame and direct heat CSB, 2006 
1987 CHN C Working surface Coal mine 3d/1i Hot work  Wang & Li, 2001 
1987 CHN F _ Food and feed plant 1i _ Yan & Yu, 2012 
1987 CHN O Dust collection system Textile mill 58d/177i Static electricity 
Explosion Hazards 
Ltd 
1987 CHN F _ _ 1i _ Yan & Yu, 2012 
1987 US M 
Grinder, aluminum fuser 
rolls 
Coating, Engraving, and Allied 
Services 
5d/1i _ CSB, 2006 
1988 CHN C 
Working surface, 
ventilation 
Coal mine 26d/3i Hot work Wang & Li, 2001 
1989 US M 
Dust collection system, 
grinder/polisher 
Metal products plant 2d/1i Hot work CSB, 2006 
1989 US W 
Tyler model 2400 multi-
spindle panel router 
s/n2984-87 
Unsupported Plastics Profile shapes 2d Hot surface CSB, 2006 
1990 CHN C 
Detonators,  
roadway 
Coal mine 12d/4i _ Wang & Li, 2001 
1990 JPN O Storage Chemical plant 9d/17i _ 
Abbasi & Abbasi, 
2007 
1990 US M 
Magnesium batching 
hopper 
Chemical plant 1d/2i Impact sparks CSB, 2006 
1991 CHN C Roadway, cable Coal mine 29d/14i Electrical spark Wang & Li, 2001 
1991 CHN C  Working surface Coal mine 35d/1i Hot work Wang & Li, 2001 
1991 CHN C Working surface  Coal mine 16d/7i Hot work Wang & Li, 2001 
1991 US IN Granulator Pharmaceutical preparations  1d/1i _ CSB, 2006 
1991 US W Conveyor belt Wood products plant 2d/1i _ CSB, 2006 
1991 US M 
Machine press, acetylene 
torch  
Plastic products factory 2d Flame and direct heat CSB, 2006 
1992 JPN M Mixing operation Firework manufacturing plant 3d/58i Friction sparks 
Explosion Hazards 
Ltd 
1992 CA C _ Coal mine 26d Flame and direct heat GenDisasters, 2009 
1992 US W Dust collection system Wood products plant 2d _ CSB, 2006 
1993 CHN C Roadway Coal mine 40d/4Si Hot work Wang & Li, 2001 
1993 US PR 
Air arc gauge with 
Plasmarc and Mappgas; 
mixing tank 
Plastic products factory 2d/2i Electrical sparks CSB, 2006 
 208 
 
1993 US F  _ Food and feed plant 9d Flame and direct heat CSB, 2006 
1994 CHN C Coal lane Coal mine 79d/129i Friction sparks Wang & Li, 2001 
1994 US C Turbine generator hopper Electric Services 22d Flame and direct heat CSB, 2006 
1994 US O Metal duct Metal products plant 6d/1i Friction sparks CSB, 2006 
1994 US W 
Halogen light, Dust 
collection system 
Facilities support services 2d Hot surface CSB, 2006 
1996 US PR Blending Tote 
Automobile brake pads and lining 
manufacturer 
1d _ CSB, 2006 
1997 JPN M 
Bag filter dust-collecting 
device 
_ 1d/1i _ 
Abbasi & Abbasi, 
2007 
1997 FR F Storage Silo/elevator/warehouse 11d/1i Impact sparks Masson, 1998 
1997 US O 
Dust collection system, 
welding device 
Motor vehicle parts and assessories 5d _ CSB, 2006 
1998 US C Tripper, Vacuum Electric Services 17d _ CSB, 2006 
1998 US PR 
Dust collector; air handling 
ducts 
Sports equipment manufacturer 16d _ CSB, 2006 
1999 US C Boiler  Power station 30d/6i Flame and direct heat CSB, 2006 
1999 US PR 
Oven; dust collection 
system 
Grey and duct tile foundries 9d/3i Flame and direct heat CSB, 2006 
1999 US W Silo Wood products plant 4d _ CSB, 2006 
1999 US PR 
Machine that grinds plastic 
pellets 
Plastic manufacturing 2d Hot work CSB, 2006 
2000 CHN W Dust  removal equipment Wood products plant 4d/7i _ Chinanews, 2008 
2000 US F _ Food and feed plant 3d Hot work CSB, 2006 
2001 CHN C Roadway Coal mine 17d/23i _ CSAWS 
2001 IT O Storage Wool factory 3d/5i Electrical sparks Piccinini, 2008 
2001 CHN W Ventilation system Wood products processes 6i Static Electricity Safehoo,2011 
2001 CHN O Silo Food and feed plant 1d/7i Self-heating and smoldering Chinanews, 2008 
2001 US W _ Wood Products plant 10d/3i _ CSB, 2006 
2001 US IN Saw, vacuum cleaner 
Rocket propellant/motor manufacturing 
plant 
3d/1i Hot work CSB, 2006 
2001 US M Dust collector Metal products plant 2d _ CSB, 2006 
2002 CHN F Agitator Food and feed plant 8i _ Sina, 2002 
2002 CHN W _ _ _ Flame and direct heat Anquan 
2002 CHN F _ Food and feed plant 6d/12i _ Chinanews, 2002 
2002 CHN C _ Coal mine 9d/14i _ CSAWS 
2002 CHN F Workshop Maintenance 17i Hot work Sina, 2002 
2002 US PR Tire bin Tire recycling 13d _ CSB, 2006 
2003 CHN C _ Coal mine 3d _ CSAWS 
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2003 US PR Milling equipment Mechanical rubber goods 38d/6i _ CSB, 2006 
2003 US W  _ _ 2d _ CSB, 2006 
2003 US PR Oven _ 37d/7i _ CSB, 2006 
2003 US W  _  _ 9d/2i _ CSB, 2006 
2004 CHN C Coal lane Coal mine 2d/16i _ CSAWS 
2004 UK PR LPG tank Plastic products factory 9d/33i Flame and direct heat 
Explosion Hazards 
Ltd 
2004 US W  _  _ 2d _ CSB, 2006 
2004 US W Dust collection system Wood products plant 3d Impact sparks CSB, 2006 
2004 US F Bag house Tofu manufacturer 16d/1i _ CSB, 2006 
2005 CHN C Underground coal bin Coal mine 171d _ Chinanews, 2005 
2006 CHN C _ _ 7i _ Yan & Yu, 2012 
2006 CHN C _ Coal mining 14d _ CSAWS 
2007 CHN W Conveyor Wood pelts manufacturer 4d/5i _ Xinhuanews, 2007 
2007 CHN F Workshop, pulverizer Rice process factory _ Hot surface Wenku, 2010 
2007 CHN F Hopper Feed processing 5i Self-heating and smoldering 
Fire department, 
2007 
2007 CHN W Packing workshop Wood products processes 1d/1i Electrical sparks Chinanews, 2007 
2007 CHN C _ Coal mining  31d _ 
CSAWS 
2008 CHN F _ Starch/Candy 12i _ Yan & Yu, 2012 
2008 CHN M Dust collection system Metal fabrication 10i Electrical sparks Chinanews, 2008 
2009 CHN M Workshop Aluminum products manufacturer 11d/20i Self-heating and smoldering Xinhua news, 2009 
2009 CHN W _ Wood products plant 8i _ Yan & Yu, 2012 
2009 CHN IN Dust collection system Chemical preparations  2i _ Chinanews, 2009 
2010 US M Silo Titanium plant 3d _ CSB, 2006 
2010 CHN M Dust setting chamber Metal polishing 2d/6i Impact sparks Chinanews, 2010 
2010 US C Coal lane Coal mine 29d/2i Flame and direct heat McAteer, 2011 
2011 US M Pipes, furnace Iron Powder plant 3d/2i Impact sparks CSB, 2011 
2011 CHN M Polishing workshop Aluminum products plant 5d/1i Flame and direct heat China news, 2011 
2012 CHN M Polishing workshop Metal polishing plant 13d/16i Electrical sparks Safehoo,2013 
2012 CHN M Polishing workshop Apple supplier factory 59i _ NPR news, 2012 
2012 CHN C _ Coal mine 6d _ China news, 2012 
M: Metal; W: Wood; F: Food; C: Coal; IN: Inorganic; PR: Plastic/Rubber; CH: Chemical; O: Others; 
